China, Economic, Foreign Affairs, History, Politics, Russia, Society, United Nations, United States

The new and emerging Russia-China pact bodes ill for the United States…

GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

It was in 1972, at the height of the Cold War, when President Nixon made his impromptu (but famous) visit to China in an attempt to normalise relations with Beijing. His aim was for the United States to gain an advantage over its superpower rival, the Soviet Union. In recent days, Russia’s Vladimir Putin made his journey to China. The countries in this geopolitical strategic triangle may be the same, but their roles are far different from what they once were.

Transformation in Russia, the successor state of the former Soviet Union, has been huge. Moscow is a diminished power now and not the threat it once posed. The US, the only remaining superpower, is also in decline, at least in relative terms. But this trend in turn reflects the emergence of China, almost dormant 40 years ago, but now accepted as being a mighty global force on the world stage. China’s economy is soon expected to surpass that of the US, and many economists suggest that China’s currency poses a serious challenge to the US dollar, the world’s main currency reserve.

In the 1970s, the odd man out in the triangle was Moscow. Now, though, Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping are trying to forge an alliance that will cut the US down to size.

Symbols of intent are apparent in this new and emerging joint partnership. The launch of the current joint naval exercises, for example, was attended by both leaders. And, far more importantly, is the massive 30-year deal signed this week for the sale of Russian gas to China. This will start in 2018, but the deal also contains contractual terms which allows for substantial Chinese investment in Russia’s infrastructure. The agreement will provide a new outlet for the energy exports on which the Russian economy largely depends. More broadly, Moscow’s orientation is being seen as part of a ‘pivot to Asia’, with a focus on deepening ties with the East (rather than the West).

The driving force and logic behind this new alignment has been accentuated when we consider the sharply deteriorating relations between America and its emerging eastern superpower rivals. In the case of Moscow, the annexation of territory in Ukraine has raised tensions with the West to levels not seen since the Reagan era. Ongoing difficulties have generated a fear of a looming second Cold War, which are by no means fanciful. Mr Putin’s unconcealed ambition to restore a de facto Russian empire continues to fuel such suspicions.

China and the United States, economic and increasingly geopolitical rivals, could well be described as being at loggerheads. Notwithstanding Beijing’s perceived expansionism in South-east Asia, which has brought it into direct conflict with several close American allies in the region, this week’s announcements of unprecedented criminal indictments in the US against Chinese military officials for cyber spying has raised the political stakes even further. Not surprisingly, Beijing has referred to a major setback in relations with Washington, while simultaneously proclaiming that relations with Moscow have never been better.

In some respects, however, this Sino-Russian rapprochement may make little difference. Economically, Russia needs China far more than the other way round: not just as an export energy market, but also as a source of vital capital.

When Russia’s economy is slowing and tensions over Ukraine threaten future financing and investment by the West, having Beijing as a strategic partner could unsettle relations with the West much further. China is already increasingly supportive of Russia’s position on Ukraine and, with both countries being permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, with the right to exercise the power of veto, the prospects of resolving the crises in Syria and elsewhere seems remoter than ever. Between them, too, they could also make it even harder to secure a satisfactory nuclear deal with Iran. Whichever way we turn, the loser in this changing eternal triangle of geopolitics is the United States.

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Asia, China, Foreign Affairs, Taiwan

The meeting between China and Taiwan has symbolic meaning…

ASIA

Intro: Despite more than six decades of bitter hostilities, China and Taiwan came together recently in a diplomatic meeting in Nanjing. Its significance was hugely important

Following months of dogma and revival of old tensions in East Asia, an unexpected break in relations has occurred as representatives of China and Taiwan sat down together in Nanjing last week in an attempt to improve bilateral relations.

Little of substance was expected from the talks, but in retrospect that hardly mattered. More important was the symbolism.

Ever since Mao’s Red Army chased the nationalist Kuomintang into the sea in 1949, the two Chinas have been locked in antagonism. For the better part of six decades, two distinctly unique populations with the most ancient and intimate links have been embroiled in bitter hostility. On a couple of occasions now these hostilities have threatened to spill over into outright war.

Taiwan’s President, Ma Ying-jeou, was elected in 2008, but his political dream to bring Taiwan closer to the mainland has been embraced by Xi Jinping, the mainland’s President. Whilst the two sides met in Nanjing, the capital under Chiang Kai-shek, the significance is that all flags, maps or other visual reminders of Beijing’s longstanding claim to rule all China, including Taiwan, had been removed prior to the meeting. More significant – highly significant from Taiwan’s point of view – was the fact that both sides addressed each other by their official titles. With China never likely to relinquish or ever intending to modify its claim to the island, here is an instance where goodwill can still flourish even after decades of stalemate and diplomatic limbo.

In the wider context of the region, this meeting mattered. The ongoing disputes surrounding China’s claims to sovereignty over much of the East and South China Seas have caused tensions to rise to dangerous and unprecedented levels. The recent flashpoints over the group of uninhabited rocks – known to the Japanese as Senkaku, and to the Chinese as Diaoyu – have been under Japanese influence since the end of the 19th century. Now, though, they are being claimed and fiercely contested by China with increasing vehemence. Similar disagreements have set Vietnam and the Philippines at odds, too, against their giant and emerging superpower neighbour.

None of the disputes are anywhere near close to being resolved. But a chink of light through the quiet and mannerly discussions between old adversaries has raised hope that diplomacy may yet prevail.

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China, Economic, Government, Politics, United States

The shifting tide of global power…

CHINA VERSUS AMERICA

A week of global economic peril, concluded late last week with a sigh of relief that reverberated around the world. America’s Republican Party zealots finally backed down following President Obama’s steadfast refusal to compromise on his signature healthcare bill. Life in Washington has returned to what passes for normal, but for the risk and uncertainty of a U.S. default deferred until January.

Late last week, too, came the news that China’s economy – the world’s most important locomotive – has recovered from two lacklustre quarters to report annual growth figures of 7.8 per cent. The good sense of the UK Chancellor, George Osborne, to engage as keenly as possible with China should be self-explanatory.

Yet, these two different events portray in the simplest terms the widening gulf and relative performance of the world’s two most powerful states. That in turn is reflecting the rather expeditious way in which global power is shifting. The Obama administration made a pivot to Asia a central tenet of its term in office, a policy that was made in response both to the economic opportunities on that side of the world and the brisk growth in China’s economic muscle. China’s geopolitical ambitions are a direct threat and challenge to the United States.

Mr Obama’s tactical approach was a sound one. The fact that Washington’s bitter political stalemate has led the president to cancel two planned Asian summits this month speaks loudly for the limits on the actual power of the man – often described, erringly, as the most powerful in the world.

China, meanwhile, continues to surge ahead, its peculiar and atypical political architecture proving to be more than adequate in hauling the rest of the world out of recession.

The economic data released from Beijing has received a muted greeting from many economists: the wild and extraordinary years in which China’s economy grew at double figures are undoubtedly over, and China’s new leadership certainly does not want them back. The Chinese challenge is to keep the economy growing fast enough to maintain a strong employment market and to avoid any prospect of incomes stagnating. Protecting domestic consumption on which future growth will inevitably depend is an important factor. Dramatic growth figures, however, will make it much harder for the Chinese government to push through their plans to curb inefficient and highly polluting industries. They need just enough growth to allow the economy to become leaner and more contemporary, but not much more to allow the unreformed parts to inflate more than they already have.

In achieving this, China has the advantage, and one that is shared by all authoritarian regimes, that all the political controls and levers are in their own hands – at least notionally. And it has to be said they are managing them with impressive competence: Xi Jinping’s self-congratulatory tune that China’s economy is basically doing very well, and that the slowdown was the result of its own adjustment initiative, is largely correct.

China is still growing, and the geopolitical power is increasingly pivoting to the East. The U.S. has tied itself in knots which it will struggle to untangle if a clear budget blueprint is not now delivered.

The implications may be stark enough, but this does not necessarily mean that we should resign ourselves to a new kind of dominion in our dealings with the Far East. For centuries, foreigners who have lived in awe of China’s size and revered age performed a pandering act. We should be careful in repudiating the idea that anyone should not be nervous about doing business with say the Chinese firm Huawei, a company that is frequently accused of industrial espionage, or by embracing Chinese management of our nuclear power stations, and saying nothing of a controversial nature. Dictatorial regimes have brutal histories, and in the case of China persecuting religious minorities and suppressing Tibetan autonomy are well documented.

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