Tag Archives: Xi Jinping

China, Europe, Politics, Russia, United States

The strengthening partnership between Russia and China?

GEOPOLITICS

Intro: Relations between China and Russia have been growing closer since the end of the cold war. But while the crisis in Ukraine has drawn Russia closer to China, the relationship is far from equal

The commemorations in Moscow to celebrate the capitulation of Nazi Germany 70 years ago speak volumes about today’s geopolitics. On May 9th, Western leaders stayed away in protest against Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, an important proclamation as this was the first annexation of sovereign territory in Europe since the second world war. China’s president, Xi Jinping, was the guest of honour of his friend, Vladimir Putin. Western sanctions over Ukraine, and what looks set to be a long-term chilling of relations with America and Europe, has given Russia no other option than to embrace China as tightly as it can.

In the coming days, in a further symbol of the growing strategic partnership between the two countries, up to four Chinese and six Russian naval vessels will rendezvous to conduct live-firing drills in the eastern Mediterranean. The exercise, which follows several similar ones in 2013, is aimed at sending a clear message to America and its allies. For Russia the manoeuvres send a strong signal that it has a powerful friend and a bonding military relationship with a country that has growing geographic reach and influence. For China, such an exercise of this kind speaks of increasing global ambition that is line with Mr Xi’s slogan about a ‘Chinese dream’, one which he says includes a ‘dream of a strong armed-forces’. In taking part, China is sending its ships from anti-piracy duty in the Gulf of Aden.

But this also provides an opportunity for China to display its Type 054A guided-missile frigate, which it would like to sell to the Russians. It also brings with it operational experience in an unstable region in which it has an expanding economic presence. In 2011, China organised the evacuation of more than 38,000 Chinese from Libya during that country’s upheaval. And just last month its navy disembarked several hundred of its citizens out of Yemen, which is being torn apart by civil war. There are believed to be at least 40,000 Chinese working in Algeria and more than 1m across Africa.

Relations between China and Russia have been growing closer since the end of the cold war. For different reasons both countries resent America’s ‘hegemony’ and share a desire for a more multipolar world order. Russia, for all its bravado, is a declining great power, and is looking for ways to recover at least some of its lost status; whereas China, a rising power on the world stage, bridles at what it perceives as American attempts to constrain it. As fellow permanent members of the UN Security Council, both with autocratic governments, Russia and China find common cause in expressing grievance at Western liberal interventionism. The two countries settled all of their long-standing border disputes in 2008, just prior to the Russian-choreographed war in Georgia. This provided the onset for Russia in concentrating more of its military forces in the west as a deterrent against the further expansion of NATO.

Despite the strengthening partnership there have been the occasional tensions. For example, Russia played a key role during the 1990s in helping China to reform and modernise its military forces. Russia was able to preserve a defence-industrial base that would otherwise have withered from lack of domestic orders. But since the middle of the last decade, irked by China’s pilferage of its military technology and its consequent emergence as a rival in the arms market, Russia’s weapons sales to its neighbour have slowed.

Moscow’s wariness of becoming little more than a supplier of natural resources to China’s industrial machine speaks volumes of Russia’s humiliating position that until recently saw China as backward. As long as Russia could sell to Europe all the gas required to keep the Russian economy growing, it could arbitrarily put deals with China on hold. These included plans for two gas pipelines from Siberia into China that were announced in 2006 and then quietly dropped as the two sides argued and bickered over prices.

All that has changed. The continuing crisis in Ukraine has forced Russia to ‘pivot’ its economy towards Asia in an effort to lessen the impact of Western sanctions by finding alternative markets and new sources of capital. For China it is a golden opportunity to gain greater access to Russia’s natural resources, at favourable prices, as well as being in a better position to secure access to big infrastructure contracts that might have gone to Western competitors and to provide financing for projects that will directly benefit Chinese firms.

Russia’s incursions into Ukraine and its seizure of Crimea violated two of China’s most consistently held foreign-policy tenets: non-interference in other states and separatism of any kind. Yet, while China abstained from voting on the UN Security Council resolutions condemning Russia (with the Chinese media giving Russia strong support) it has quietly welcomed a new cold war in Europe that might distract America from its declared ‘rebalancing’ towards Asia.

Additional and striking new evidence of the new closeness between China and Russia was a $400 billion gas deal signed in May last year under which Russia will supply China with 38 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas annually from 2018 for 30 years. China has insisted that the gas comes from new fields in eastern Siberia by passing through as yet an unbuilt pipeline, a plan that will ensure supplies are not diverted elsewhere. Other deals have followed too. The biggest was a preliminary agreement signed in November for Russia to sell an additional 30 bcm a year through a proposed pipeline from Western Siberia. In every such new instance it is probable that China was able to drive a hard bargain on price.

Other clear signs of Russia’s weakness have also become clear. Its recent decision to resume high-tech arms exports to China most noticeable. In April it agreed to sell China an air-defence system, the S-400, for around $3 billion. This will help give China air dominance over Taiwan and the Senkaku islands (Diaoyu to the Chinese), who dispute Japan’s claim to them. In November, too, Russia said it was prepared to sell China its latest Sukhoi-35S combat aircraft. Initially it had refused to sell any fewer than 48, in order to make up for losses it suffered as a result of China’s purloining of the designs. Now it has agreed to sell only 24.

Looking ahead problems seem discernibly clear. One is that both countries are competing for influence in Central Asia, once Russia’s backyard. Mr Putin wants to establish his Eurasian Economic Union partly to counter growing economic power in Central Asia, through which China wants to develop what it calls a Silk Road Economic Belt. China is using the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), of which Russia and Central Asian nations are also members, to boost its security ties in the region as well. Another difficulty is Russia’s military and energy links with countries such as India and Vietnam, both of which are rivals of China. But the biggest problem of all seems likely to be Russia’s irritation with being forced into an increasingly subservient role in its relations with China.

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China, Economic, Foreign Affairs, History, Politics, Russia, Society, United Nations, United States

The new and emerging Russia-China pact bodes ill for the United States…

GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

It was in 1972, at the height of the Cold War, when President Nixon made his impromptu (but famous) visit to China in an attempt to normalise relations with Beijing. His aim was for the United States to gain an advantage over its superpower rival, the Soviet Union. In recent days, Russia’s Vladimir Putin made his journey to China. The countries in this geopolitical strategic triangle may be the same, but their roles are far different from what they once were.

Transformation in Russia, the successor state of the former Soviet Union, has been huge. Moscow is a diminished power now and not the threat it once posed. The US, the only remaining superpower, is also in decline, at least in relative terms. But this trend in turn reflects the emergence of China, almost dormant 40 years ago, but now accepted as being a mighty global force on the world stage. China’s economy is soon expected to surpass that of the US, and many economists suggest that China’s currency poses a serious challenge to the US dollar, the world’s main currency reserve.

In the 1970s, the odd man out in the triangle was Moscow. Now, though, Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping are trying to forge an alliance that will cut the US down to size.

Symbols of intent are apparent in this new and emerging joint partnership. The launch of the current joint naval exercises, for example, was attended by both leaders. And, far more importantly, is the massive 30-year deal signed this week for the sale of Russian gas to China. This will start in 2018, but the deal also contains contractual terms which allows for substantial Chinese investment in Russia’s infrastructure. The agreement will provide a new outlet for the energy exports on which the Russian economy largely depends. More broadly, Moscow’s orientation is being seen as part of a ‘pivot to Asia’, with a focus on deepening ties with the East (rather than the West).

The driving force and logic behind this new alignment has been accentuated when we consider the sharply deteriorating relations between America and its emerging eastern superpower rivals. In the case of Moscow, the annexation of territory in Ukraine has raised tensions with the West to levels not seen since the Reagan era. Ongoing difficulties have generated a fear of a looming second Cold War, which are by no means fanciful. Mr Putin’s unconcealed ambition to restore a de facto Russian empire continues to fuel such suspicions.

China and the United States, economic and increasingly geopolitical rivals, could well be described as being at loggerheads. Notwithstanding Beijing’s perceived expansionism in South-east Asia, which has brought it into direct conflict with several close American allies in the region, this week’s announcements of unprecedented criminal indictments in the US against Chinese military officials for cyber spying has raised the political stakes even further. Not surprisingly, Beijing has referred to a major setback in relations with Washington, while simultaneously proclaiming that relations with Moscow have never been better.

In some respects, however, this Sino-Russian rapprochement may make little difference. Economically, Russia needs China far more than the other way round: not just as an export energy market, but also as a source of vital capital.

When Russia’s economy is slowing and tensions over Ukraine threaten future financing and investment by the West, having Beijing as a strategic partner could unsettle relations with the West much further. China is already increasingly supportive of Russia’s position on Ukraine and, with both countries being permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, with the right to exercise the power of veto, the prospects of resolving the crises in Syria and elsewhere seems remoter than ever. Between them, too, they could also make it even harder to secure a satisfactory nuclear deal with Iran. Whichever way we turn, the loser in this changing eternal triangle of geopolitics is the United States.

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Asia, China, Foreign Affairs, Taiwan

The meeting between China and Taiwan has symbolic meaning…

ASIA

Intro: Despite more than six decades of bitter hostilities, China and Taiwan came together recently in a diplomatic meeting in Nanjing. Its significance was hugely important

Following months of dogma and revival of old tensions in East Asia, an unexpected break in relations has occurred as representatives of China and Taiwan sat down together in Nanjing last week in an attempt to improve bilateral relations.

Little of substance was expected from the talks, but in retrospect that hardly mattered. More important was the symbolism.

Ever since Mao’s Red Army chased the nationalist Kuomintang into the sea in 1949, the two Chinas have been locked in antagonism. For the better part of six decades, two distinctly unique populations with the most ancient and intimate links have been embroiled in bitter hostility. On a couple of occasions now these hostilities have threatened to spill over into outright war.

Taiwan’s President, Ma Ying-jeou, was elected in 2008, but his political dream to bring Taiwan closer to the mainland has been embraced by Xi Jinping, the mainland’s President. Whilst the two sides met in Nanjing, the capital under Chiang Kai-shek, the significance is that all flags, maps or other visual reminders of Beijing’s longstanding claim to rule all China, including Taiwan, had been removed prior to the meeting. More significant – highly significant from Taiwan’s point of view – was the fact that both sides addressed each other by their official titles. With China never likely to relinquish or ever intending to modify its claim to the island, here is an instance where goodwill can still flourish even after decades of stalemate and diplomatic limbo.

In the wider context of the region, this meeting mattered. The ongoing disputes surrounding China’s claims to sovereignty over much of the East and South China Seas have caused tensions to rise to dangerous and unprecedented levels. The recent flashpoints over the group of uninhabited rocks – known to the Japanese as Senkaku, and to the Chinese as Diaoyu – have been under Japanese influence since the end of the 19th century. Now, though, they are being claimed and fiercely contested by China with increasing vehemence. Similar disagreements have set Vietnam and the Philippines at odds, too, against their giant and emerging superpower neighbour.

None of the disputes are anywhere near close to being resolved. But a chink of light through the quiet and mannerly discussions between old adversaries has raised hope that diplomacy may yet prevail.

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