Asia, China, Economic, Europe, Government, Intelligence, Middle East, Military, National Security, NATO, Society, United States

US Defence Strategy…

(From the archives) Originally posted on January 7, 2012 by markdowe

SHIFT IN AMERICA’S DEFENCE STRATEGY

On Saturday, 07 January, 2012, the Editorial of the Daily Telegraph focused on America’s shift in defence strategy, following Thursday’s announcement by President Barack Obama. The US is to focus less on Europe and more on Asia following the rising threat of China.

The Editorial states:

‘The Pentagon briefing room rarely hosts all of America’s service chiefs, let alone the president. Its use by Barack Obama to announce the conclusions of his defence review was designed to add a sense of drama – and the occasion certainly lived up to its billing. Future historians will probably conclude that this was the week when America’s entire foreign and defence strategy pivoted decisively away from Europe and towards the Pacific. More ominously, it might also mark the onset of a new, if concealed, arms race between the US and its aspiring rival, China.

First things first: America’s military dominance will remain unchallenged for the foreseeable future. Mr Obama might have announced spending cuts of almost $500 billion over the next decade, but this amounts to a light trim for a defence machine with an annual budget of $650 billion, amounting to 45 per cent of all military expenditure in the world. America is not axing capabilities in the foolish fashion of British governments; rather, its power is being focused on the great strategic challenges of the next century. These can be simply summarised: the struggle for mastery in Asia, home of the world’s most populous countries and fastest-growing economies, and responding to sudden crises. To this end, the US will reduce its presence in Europe, cut 90,000 soldiers and bulk up in the Pacific, with new bases in Australia and elsewhere. As for other flashpoints, few will be surprised that the US policy stresses the goals of containing Iran and guaranteeing free passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

On a purely military level, two points stand out. The US might be cutting its army, but it has ruled out reducing its fleet of 11 aircraft carriers, each of which packs more punch than the entire air forces of most countries. While China’s defence budget has recorded double-digit increases for the past decade, it has still launched only one carrier – an old Russian model of doubtful combat value. Second, Mr Obama stressed his determination to invest in “intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance”. Put simply, the US will seek to extend its lead in the most advanced combat systems: where scores of troops – and hundreds of support staff – might once have been required to dispatch a senior al-Qaeda operative, now one unmanned drone can do the job.

America’s new course could well be shifted by a strategic shock akin to the September 11 attacks. Nevertheless, this plan will have momentous consequences for Europe and Asia alike. For decades, the US has underwritten the security of the Atlantic as well as the Pacific, effectively allowing Europe a free ride and permitting a string of Nato members the luxury of running down their defence budgets. This era is rapidly coming to a close. Yet with a few honourable exceptions, such as Britain and France, European powers have failed to fund their armed forces adequately, or deploy them when needed. Germany, in particular, must overcome the burden of its history and face up to the responsibilities that go with being the Continent’s leading economic power.

Mr Obama’s address studiously refrained from mentioning China, the country that probably has most at stake. Beijing’s leaders will now have to make far-reaching choices of their own. As events in Burma have shown, China’s “peaceful rise” has alarmed many of its neighbours: for most countries in the region, American power and values remain far more appealing. Moreover, China has grown rich largely thanks to trade, not least with the US. Faced with the net of containment that America is quietly laying across the Pacific, China will search for the Achilles’ heel of the US Navy, perfecting a new generation of missiles capable of destroying aircraft carriers from hundreds of miles away, working out how to cripple the internet, and how to blind the US satellite network, on which all its military assets now depend.

The world will pay a bitter price, however, if this veiled arms race between America and China escalates. History shows that free trade and military rivalry – however disguised – make for uncomfortable bedfellows. Beijing has gained rapidly in both wealth and power. The manner in which it chooses to pursue them now will have consequences for us all.’ [sic]

 

MD responded:

Whilst the US has declared China as a threat and announcing Asia as a priority, America is also to invest in a long-term strategic partnership with India. India will become the new powerful Asian ally of the United States in the region. In rolling out its new strategy, the Pentagon has made clear that the fronts for potential conflicts are shifting towards China. The US says that all of the trends – whether that is demographic, geopolitical, economic or military – are shifting towards the Pacific and, that over the long-term, China’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the US economy and security in a variety of ways.

It shouldn’t be in any doubt that China has unsettled its neighbours over several years with the expansion of its navy and improvements in missile and surveillance capabilities. The Pentagon is anxious about China’s strategic goals as it begins to search for a new generation of weapons.

The US defence strategy followed a major diplomatic push by Washington to expand security partnerships with its allies in the region. Last month, the US, India and Japan held their first trilateral meeting in an attempt to counter China’s rising influence in the Asia-Pacific.

China has advanced its influence in the region, along with allies like North Korea, Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Over recent years it has established itself as a growing, and sometimes bullying power in the Pacific, particularly in East Asia. Most of the countries, though, in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have festering territorial disputes with China. America’s new emphasis on Asia and the containment of China also stems from the fact that the Asia-Pacific region now constitutes the centre of gravity of world economic activity.

But is America’s new stance the beginning of something that could fan Cold war-style antagonism?

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Britain, European Union, Government, Politics, Society

Should Britain leave the EU?

(From the archives) Originally posted on January 17, 2012 by markdowe

THE UK AND THE EU

Argument for the UK to leave the EU… The European Union was sold to the British people as an economic proposition. In exchange for giving up a measure of democratic self-government, it was assumed that the UK would be part of a flourishing trade bloc. The credibility of that argument has been seriously eroded – if not mortally wounded – as most British people associate the EU with a loss of sovereignty and a loss of prosperity. The argument for saying that the UK should leave the EU goes much deeper than the euro crisis – though that has certainly damaged the credibility of those EU pragmatists who, a decade ago, were assuring us that we would be ruined if we kept pound sterling. When Britain joined the European Union in 1973, Western Europe accounted for 40% of world GDP. Today that figure is 25%, and in 2020 it is projected to be just 18%. In retrospect, we could not have picked a worse moment to join. Western Europe had grown spectacularly during the three decades after the Second World War, the years of Germany’s Wirtschaftswunder. But following the OPEC oil crisis in the 1970s, it never properly got going again. Far from joining a dynamic market, we have confined ourselves in a cramped and declining customs union. In doing so, we have stood aside from the parts of the world which are still growing—not least the Anglosphere markets to which we are connected by affinities of habit, outlook and commercial practice. The inauguration in the 1950s of the European Economic Community (EEC) allowed a strong case to be made for regional blocs. Now, though, that case has been undermined and overtaken by technology. With the internet having removed the problem over distance, geographical proximity is not an issue in a globalised market in which Capital can surge around the planet at the mere touch of a button. A company located in the UK can deal as easily with one located within its own shores as it can with a firm located anywhere else. London has the benefit of being English-speaking. Others around the world will have similar accountancy techniques and use compatible common-law arbitration methods. The alternative to EU membership is a free-trade arrangement, along the lines of that enjoyed by Switzerland. Under a series of bilateral accords negotiated in the 1990s, along with the more recent Schengen Agreement, the Swiss participate fully in the four freedoms of movement of the single market – goods, services, people and capital. However, the Swiss are outside the common agricultural and fisheries policies and the EU’s political structures, and pay only a token contribution to the EU budget. Whilst true, of course, that Swiss exporters must meet EU standards when selling to the EU – just as they must meet standards when selling to anybody else – they are not obliged to apply every EU directive or diktat to their domestic economy. But, critically, they are also free in signing trade accords with third countries, and often do so when they feel that the EU is being pedantic or excessively protectionist. Britain, by contrast, is bound by the common external tariff, and is often prevented from adopting a more liberal position by the interest of a cosseted producer elsewhere in the EU. In 2010, the Swiss exported four times as much per head to the EU as the British did. What credibility does that give to the argument that the UK’s exports to the continent depends on its participation in the EU’s political structures? It can hardly be the case that other member states might discriminate against those exports if the UK were to leave the EU. The UK would still be covered by World Trade Organisation (WTO) and European Economic Area (EEA) rules. More to the point, perhaps, is that Britain’s trade with the EU, which was in surplus before it joined, has been in deficit in all but one of the subsequent years. In 2010, the UK ran a deficit of some £52.4 billion with the EU, but a net surplus of £15.7 billion with the rest of the world. Over the period to which Britain has held membership of the EU it has had a cumulative surplus with every continent except Europe. The UK’s trade deficit would not be a reason for leaving the EU. But it gives the lie to any notion that the other members would seek to restrict cross-Channel trade when they are the chief beneficiaries. Some might say that the EU is showing its age. Essentially, it is a 1950s construct, and is falling rapidly behind in a competitive and globalised world. If Britain were to leave there is nothing stopping it from maintaining its trade links with other countries in the EU, its intergovernmental co-operation and its commitment to the military alliance. Argument for the UK to stay in the EU… The pro-Europeans would start this debate against the backdrop of much negative public polling. Nevertheless, for the UK to cut itself off from a market of some 500m people generating in excess of £10 trillion would not just say we had lost faith in Europe, it would say we had lost faith in the ability of British companies to ever out-compete, out-innovate and out-think their European competitors. To consider how the debate has shifted in recent years, we should look no further than in comparing two ICM polls ten years apart. According to one poll, today, 49% of the public would vote to get the UK out of the EU, against just 40% who would prefer that Britain stayed in. When the pollster asked a slightly different worded question in May 2001, some 68% to 19% of the public indicated Britain should remain a member of the EU, a 49 percentage point lead for the pro-Europeans. One might suggest that there is an implicit propensity among some pro-Europeans to blame the media, or even the voters, for the fact that support has been deteriorating. But are pro-European propositions being rejected because they are not being proposed anywhere near enough in a pro-European way? Not that this will help those advocates win the argument as to why Britain should be firmly embedded within the European Union. For those who support the UK as an active member doesn’t necessarily imply that they will be defending the status quo in Europe or saying that Europe does not need to reform and change. By being part of a wider and integrated union gives a member nation within it influence and real power. There are two dominant arguments that resonate in terms of Britain’s continued EU membership. The first is on access to the single market, and being a powerful voice in shaping rules by which it is governed. Only those who want to compete on low-skill, low-value added production could argue that having access to these markets without a voice in shaping the rules would be sufficient for Britain. But that’s lubricious. Clearly, with a market of 500m people, Britain needs its companies to be competitive, innovative and by being in a position to out-think their competitors across the EU. Having a voice means engaging in a pragmatic way that benefits contributory nations. The position of the British Government has become a little difficult to understand. It is now understood that, despite the prime minister’s assurances, the new draft EU treaty does include references to the single market – but, for reasons not yet clear, David Cameron has decided to walk away from the table. Laws on common standards, educational property and competition need to be underwritten – such as those involving the law, business and financial services, medical technology and within creative industries – but if the UK is not in the room when critical decisions are being made on such matters, it will lose the ability to shape them in a way that is most advantageous to British business. The second most pressing argument for the UK remaining part of the EU relates to finding ways in which the British voice can be heard. In an era of billion-person countries and multi trillion-dollar economies, this is most likely to happen if the UK is part of a £10 trillion economy rather than just a £1.5 trillion economy. The only logical way to change the rules of the game with large emerging economies (such as China) is to work closely with our European partners. That’s the only way, surely, that markets will be prised open in these countries. Political and economic leadership is about doing what you think is right rather than what you think might get you short-term popularity. See also:

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Britain, Government, Human Rights, Intelligence, Military, National Security, Politics, United Nations, United States

Rendition…

(From the archives) Originally posted on April 19, 2012 by markdowe

 MURKY POLITICAL WORLD

EVEN welcome regime change can have treacherous effects, transforming once-needed allies into enemies, or vice versa. And rarely have the risks been more graphically illustrated recently than with Libya, where a former dissident, Abdelhakim Belhaj, is now head of post-Gaddafi Libya’s armed forces. Not only is he suing the British government for allegedly colluding with Colonel Gaddafi to have him forcibly returned to Libya and tortured, but – as of yesterday – he is also taking legal action against a named official: Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary in the last British government.

The drama has unfolded in two stages. The first was last September, when documents found in Tripoli appeared to support claims that British intelligence had supplied information that allowed the CIA to spirit the fugitive Mr Belhaj and his wife back to Libya in 2004. The second has played out over the past week, after a newspaper quoted sources alleging that Mr Straw personally signed off on the operation. The former cabinet minister is accused of complicity in torture and misfeasance in public office.

It is thought to be the first time that such proceedings have been launched against a former Foreign Secretary – which is one reason why the full implications are as yet unclear. That there are implications, however, and potentially serious ones – both positive and negative – is beyond doubt. On the plus side, the latest lawsuit could mean that real light is finally cast on the still-murky subject of rendition and the involvement of the last British government. That rendition – the clandestine detention and transfer of suspects to their own country or third countries – and interrogation under torture were weapons deployed by the United States during George Bush’s “war on terror” is known and largely admitted. What is less known and mostly not admitted – though not expressly denied either – is how much the British government of the day knew about, and actively co-operated with, such actions with its transatlantic ally.

Co-operation may have taken many forms: from supplying information that permitted rendition (as Mr Belhaj’s lawsuit alleges), through facilitating it by, for instance, allowing the use of planes or refuelling stops, to providing the questions and witnessing, or even conducting, interrogations that entailed torture. Such accusations have featured in the testimony of many former British prisoners at Guantanamo, and in most cases the government has paid compensation rather than have the charges aired in court. The justification given is that crucial intelligence methods might be divulged. The suspicion must be, however, that there is another consideration: fear that the real role of the British state in the ill-conceived “war on terror” would be laid bare. If the lawsuits initiated by Mr Belhaj force genuine information about this shameful chapter into the open, that can only be a good thing. The people of this country have a right to know what was being done in their name.

The novelty of Mr Belhaj’s latest lawsuit, however, is that it names Jack Straw personally. And here the arguments become more complicated. Of course, individual ministers – like military commanders – must act within the law, hence the controversy about Lord Goldsmith’s rulings on the Iraq war. But does knowledge of rendition or torture break the law? Or would it take active involvement? What about ordering information to be passed to the US (a major ally)? And does the legal responsibility reside with the minister or the Prime Minister or the government collectively?

In principle, a minister’s responsibility is political – to Parliament – rather than judicial. But are there instances where that line is crossed? It might be salutary for that question to be tested. But if ministers are to be held personally accountable before the courts for their (or their boss’s) decisions, the risk is that no significant decisions – right or wrong – will be taken at all.

ANALYSIS

IT IS NOT UNKNOWN for ministers to be sued in the civil courts. During the last Conservative government, both John Patten and Michael Heseltine were sued – separately and successfully – for libel. The rule of thumb in such cases is that if the minister is found to have transgressed while performing ministerial duties (as was the case with Lord Heseltine), the government covers any damages, while if he was acting in a private or party political capacity (as was Lord Patten) he has to foot the bill himself. This may come as a relief to Jack Straw, the former foreign secretary, who is being sued by Abdel Hakim Belhadj, former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Mr Belhadj alleges that Mr Straw personally authorised his rendition in 2004 when he was seized by CIA agents and handed over to the Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi. The LIFG had links to al-Qaeda and Mr Belhadj claims he was tortured by the Libyan regime. He is already suing the British government and its security services.

Rendition is not a crime. The British government’s position on this was set out in 2008 by the then foreign secretary, David Miliband. He said that the agreement this country has with the United States meant permission for rendition via UK territory or airspace would be given only if it accorded “with UK law and our international obligations; and how we understand our obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture”. If rendition is not a criminal offence, complicity in torture is, and in his complaints against Mr Straw and the British government, Mr Belhadj appears to be eliding the two. Yet Mr Straw last year explicitly denied any involvement in torture: “We were opposed to any use of torture or similar methods. Not only did we not agree with it, we were not complicit in it and nor did we turn a blind eye to it.”

It is self-evident that criminal allegations against a minister should be investigated by the police. But civil actions, where the burden of proof is less rigorous, are more problematical. The difficulty facing both Mr Straw and the Government is the reluctance of the intelligence services to contest such accusations as Mr Belhadj’s in the civil courts because it would expose their own officials to unwanted public scrutiny. This is what led to the payment of many millions of pounds in compensation to 16 Guantánamo detainees two years ago. Perhaps it is the prospect of such easy pickings that lies behind this case. In these circumstances, and in the unlikely event of this case ever reaching the courts, fairness demands that Mr Straw be indemnified against financial outlay. Otherwise a dangerous precedent will have been set in a complex and contentious area.

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