Category Archives: Britain

Britain, Economic, Europe, European Union, Financial Markets, Government, Politics, Society

The sanctions on Russia should not be borne solely by London…

EUROPE

Germany and the rest of the Eurozone trade far more with Russia than Britain does. Our European partners buy billions of pounds worth of oil and gas, hugely profitable cash-flows which props up the regime of Vladimir Putin.

Yet, Europe’s proposed sanctions on Russia have been carefully designed to inflict as much damage as possible on the City of London, while shielding other economies from collateral damage. The stench of hypocrisy fulminates through the corridors of power.

The aim of the European establishment is to punish Mr Putin, whose behaviour has been appalling. But the cost should not be borne solely by London. According to Europe’s plans, German companies will still be able to sell their wares with relative impunity; Italy will continue to receive their energy supplies courtesy of Moscow; and, France will deliver its warships to Russia as promised. The bulk of the cost will be paid for by British workers who will lose their jobs to satisfy Europe’s desire to be seen to be acting and doing the right thing.

This is the latest example of the European elites showing their expertise in turning every crisis to their advantage. The higher echelons of the European establishment are clearly seeking to use the need to punish Russia as an excuse to intensify their long-standing campaign against the City.

The EU often makes grandiose claims about being a global force for democracy and human rights. Splendid as those values are, time and time again the EU reveals itself as merely an alliance of competing national interests. On matters of global conflict, Brussels not only struggles to produce a united front, but also often ends up pursuing its own internal vendettas instead. This prejudice is seen within the corporatist view of the Eurozone elites when, for example, they are happy enough to sign massive energy deals with corrupt and authoritarian regimes, but don’t either like or understand the workings and mechanisations of genuine free markets. The creation of the single currency too saw much of the financial activity previously conducted in Frankfurt and Paris shift to London.

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Effective sanctions should mean moving beyond the freezing of Russian assets in EU capitals and foreign travel bans on Mr Putin’s inner circle. Financial services, defence, and energy are some of the areas that should come under tighter sanction.

Financial sanctions operate in two ways. They restrict the access of Russian companies to working and investment capital, impeding not just their growth but their continuing activity, so hurting the Russian economy. They also make overseas investors much less likely to continue investing in Russia, with a similar effect. Defence sanctions, essentially the sale of Russian military equipment to other EU members, has the same consequence with the additional value of Russia becoming increasingly isolated. Sanctions on energy can range from tougher regulatory action to an effective blockade on the sales of oil and gas to the EU. Germany’s recent withholding from Gazprom of permission to use a pipeline is illustrative of the effectiveness of such action.

Further sanctions like these would, however, act like a two-edged sword. Certainly, they will injure Russia’s economy, but they will also wound Europe. Some parts of Europe could not get through a winter without severe difficulties if homes and offices were not heated by Russian gas. Some economies remain distinctly shaky and probably wouldn’t want to commit to a sanctioning agenda that would likely rebound on their own trading position.

Of course, it is only right that where Mr Putin’s regime can be targeted, given his ongoing refusal to face up to the consequences of his support for Ukraine’s separatists, such action be taken. Weaning Europe from its addiction to Russian gas is one real way to punish the Russian president and his cronies. Germany gets around a third of its gas and oil from Russia. Given that energy accounts for around 68 per cent of Russia’s exports, an opportunity to hit the regime hard should have been taken by now.

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Britain, Defence, Government, Military, United States

A replacement for the Nimrod. The search is on…

DEFENCE

Four years ago, Britain scrapped its Nimrod maritime surveillance aircraft. But the issue of whether an island nation needs a plane to patrol its waters remains.

The Ministry of Defence cancelled the Nimrod’s replacement as part of the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), citing the need to cut costs. The decision, however, meant Britain lost a crucial ability to monitor the threat from foreign submarines in its territory.

There have been reports of Russian vessels mooring and sending sailors ashore to enjoy local hospitality – all without being tracked by the UK military, the security implications of which should be clear.

Some aspects of the Nimrod’s function have continued, using surface ships, the RAF’s E3D Sentry aircraft and helicopters.

But much of what the Nimrod was good at has been lost – particularly the ability to detect small objects on the sea’s surface, such as submarine periscopes.

That Britain has no suitable maritime patrol aircraft capability is viewed by some defence analysts as a ‘national disgrace’. As a minimum, Britain needs to be able to monitor what goes on within the UK search and rescue area – no small task given it covers 2m square miles of sea.

A typical mission for these aircraft lasts eight hours before refuelling is required.

However, if rumblings from within Whitehall and industry are to be believed the gap left by the Nimrod could soon be filled.

Prior to Philip Hammond leaving Defence to become Foreign Secretary in the recent UK Government reshuffle, Mr Hammond is said to have privately given ‘top priority’ to the project, insisting that it be contained within the 2015 SDSR.

Analysts estimate that plugging this gap will cost around £2bn. Once funding is assigned, it could go into the MoD budget cycle for 2016 with an aircraft in service by the end of the decade.

The MoD is keen to emphasise that the first question is just what is required. Only then can the machine and sensors that will provide the surveillance be considered. One idea is some form of multi-mission aircraft that can be used for maritime patrol, intelligence gathering, airborne command and control and even in some transport capacity.

The current favourite appears to be the P8 Poseidon made by US aerospace giant Boeing – effectively a militarised 737 passenger jet. Instead of seats, the P8 would be packed with sensors and equipment used to track submarines or missing surface ships.

British crewmen are already flying on the P8 aircraft to maintain their skills. As defence secretary, Mr Hammond also visited a P8 squadron in America and is said to have been impressed.

Other ideas include packing the fuselage of Lockheed Martin’s rugged C-130 Hercules transport aircraft with high-tech sensors and turning it into a maritime patrol specialist.

Northrup Grumman, another US defence firm, would like to see its drones used to monitor the ocean from high up and then send specialist reconnaissance aircraft in to check on possible discoveries closer to the surface.

Just how many aircraft will eventually be needed is another moot point. Analysts suggest a minimum of 12, given some aircraft will inevitably be in maintenance, some used for training and others deployed overseas at any one time.

But senior industry executives believe the MoD’s decision is also about the continued viability of Britain’s defence industry.

Buying off the shelf might be seen as ‘cheaper’, but if the domestic capability to design and manufacture military equipment is lost it will leave the nation’s security at the mercy of foreign powers.

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Britain, European Court, Government, Human Rights, Legal, National Security, Politics, Society

Surveillance legislation: Conflicts exist between freedom and security…

SNOOPING LAWS

The announcement of a new surveillance law has fostered the suspicion that a voracious security state is elbowing aside the rights of civilians to communicate in private. There may well be cause for mistrust – but such concerns lie in the manner of the law’s introduction, and much less so the provisions it contains.

The UK Government justifies bringing in ‘emergency’ legislation as it intends to keep a full-blown register (a ‘who’s who of public enemies) that will shore up the power of government bodies to gather data on British citizens.

This is a law which has been agreed upon in principle by party leaders at Westminster behind closed doors. The speed of its introduction has raised many eyebrows, not least because this is a process that has not been open to public consultation and one which clearly adds to the impression that the Government is seizing for itself unwarranted powers.

In reality, though, the ‘emergency’ being enacted upon is more banal. In a few years, the law may actually benefit the libertarian cause. The exact cause for adopting parliamentary legislation in the first place is down to a legal case launched by the Open Rights group. Although the organisation is temporarily dormant, it has been made active following an April ruling from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). That ruling would have lifted the requirement for telecommunications companies to keep a wide range of billing data on their customers for a period of 12 months.

Keeping this data available to the authorities is the reason for instigating emergency legislation. This is preferable than to suddenly ‘going dark’, and appears to require no immediate development in changing the status of our security. Important concessions have been conceded: an independent privacy and civil liberties board is to be created, and there will be a review of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA). This sets the limit on digital surveillance. The emergency amendments will also expire in 2016, so that new laws can be created once the review has been completed and appraised.

Some critics argue that what we need is smarter surveillance, not yet more of it. This far reaching extension of government spying on our daily lives, they say, would be illiberal and possibly ineffective.

Since this Bill is also about interception (and not just retention of data) many people will want to know what the additional protections will be if we are to have any confidence in such powers. One requirement is greater transparency so that we know how and why this data is being used. Government openness around surveillance can be improved without compromising security.

The Government has promised an annual transparency report. The concerns of libertarians will be whether it is sufficiently comprehensive, but that can only be deduced once the full details are known. In his annual report, the Interception Communications Commissioner, Sir Anthony May, said: ‘The unreliability and inadequacy of the statistical requirements is a significant problem which requires attention.’ Sir Anthony also expressed ‘considerable sympathy’ with those who are hazy and unsure about the details and implications of snooping legislation.

The Government has made a strong case for law enforcement agencies to be given access to communications traffic (which precludes its content as this would require a warrant) in the investigation of serious crime and terrorism.

The Coalition remains divided over how wide the new powers should be. The Prime Minister has indicated that he favours revisiting the option of wider snooping powers, but Nick Clegg remains opposed. But however surveillance legislation evolves it is right that a sunset clause exists in the Bill to curtail its powers in 2016. That forces a renewal by the next Parliament – but only after a wider democratic debate about how best to strike the balance between privacy and security.

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