Category Archives: China

China, Economic, Foreign Affairs, History, Politics, Russia, Society, United Nations, United States

The new and emerging Russia-China pact bodes ill for the United States…

GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

It was in 1972, at the height of the Cold War, when President Nixon made his impromptu (but famous) visit to China in an attempt to normalise relations with Beijing. His aim was for the United States to gain an advantage over its superpower rival, the Soviet Union. In recent days, Russia’s Vladimir Putin made his journey to China. The countries in this geopolitical strategic triangle may be the same, but their roles are far different from what they once were.

Transformation in Russia, the successor state of the former Soviet Union, has been huge. Moscow is a diminished power now and not the threat it once posed. The US, the only remaining superpower, is also in decline, at least in relative terms. But this trend in turn reflects the emergence of China, almost dormant 40 years ago, but now accepted as being a mighty global force on the world stage. China’s economy is soon expected to surpass that of the US, and many economists suggest that China’s currency poses a serious challenge to the US dollar, the world’s main currency reserve.

In the 1970s, the odd man out in the triangle was Moscow. Now, though, Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping are trying to forge an alliance that will cut the US down to size.

Symbols of intent are apparent in this new and emerging joint partnership. The launch of the current joint naval exercises, for example, was attended by both leaders. And, far more importantly, is the massive 30-year deal signed this week for the sale of Russian gas to China. This will start in 2018, but the deal also contains contractual terms which allows for substantial Chinese investment in Russia’s infrastructure. The agreement will provide a new outlet for the energy exports on which the Russian economy largely depends. More broadly, Moscow’s orientation is being seen as part of a ‘pivot to Asia’, with a focus on deepening ties with the East (rather than the West).

The driving force and logic behind this new alignment has been accentuated when we consider the sharply deteriorating relations between America and its emerging eastern superpower rivals. In the case of Moscow, the annexation of territory in Ukraine has raised tensions with the West to levels not seen since the Reagan era. Ongoing difficulties have generated a fear of a looming second Cold War, which are by no means fanciful. Mr Putin’s unconcealed ambition to restore a de facto Russian empire continues to fuel such suspicions.

China and the United States, economic and increasingly geopolitical rivals, could well be described as being at loggerheads. Notwithstanding Beijing’s perceived expansionism in South-east Asia, which has brought it into direct conflict with several close American allies in the region, this week’s announcements of unprecedented criminal indictments in the US against Chinese military officials for cyber spying has raised the political stakes even further. Not surprisingly, Beijing has referred to a major setback in relations with Washington, while simultaneously proclaiming that relations with Moscow have never been better.

In some respects, however, this Sino-Russian rapprochement may make little difference. Economically, Russia needs China far more than the other way round: not just as an export energy market, but also as a source of vital capital.

When Russia’s economy is slowing and tensions over Ukraine threaten future financing and investment by the West, having Beijing as a strategic partner could unsettle relations with the West much further. China is already increasingly supportive of Russia’s position on Ukraine and, with both countries being permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, with the right to exercise the power of veto, the prospects of resolving the crises in Syria and elsewhere seems remoter than ever. Between them, too, they could also make it even harder to secure a satisfactory nuclear deal with Iran. Whichever way we turn, the loser in this changing eternal triangle of geopolitics is the United States.

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Asia, China, Foreign Affairs, Taiwan

The meeting between China and Taiwan has symbolic meaning…

ASIA

Intro: Despite more than six decades of bitter hostilities, China and Taiwan came together recently in a diplomatic meeting in Nanjing. Its significance was hugely important

Following months of dogma and revival of old tensions in East Asia, an unexpected break in relations has occurred as representatives of China and Taiwan sat down together in Nanjing last week in an attempt to improve bilateral relations.

Little of substance was expected from the talks, but in retrospect that hardly mattered. More important was the symbolism.

Ever since Mao’s Red Army chased the nationalist Kuomintang into the sea in 1949, the two Chinas have been locked in antagonism. For the better part of six decades, two distinctly unique populations with the most ancient and intimate links have been embroiled in bitter hostility. On a couple of occasions now these hostilities have threatened to spill over into outright war.

Taiwan’s President, Ma Ying-jeou, was elected in 2008, but his political dream to bring Taiwan closer to the mainland has been embraced by Xi Jinping, the mainland’s President. Whilst the two sides met in Nanjing, the capital under Chiang Kai-shek, the significance is that all flags, maps or other visual reminders of Beijing’s longstanding claim to rule all China, including Taiwan, had been removed prior to the meeting. More significant – highly significant from Taiwan’s point of view – was the fact that both sides addressed each other by their official titles. With China never likely to relinquish or ever intending to modify its claim to the island, here is an instance where goodwill can still flourish even after decades of stalemate and diplomatic limbo.

In the wider context of the region, this meeting mattered. The ongoing disputes surrounding China’s claims to sovereignty over much of the East and South China Seas have caused tensions to rise to dangerous and unprecedented levels. The recent flashpoints over the group of uninhabited rocks – known to the Japanese as Senkaku, and to the Chinese as Diaoyu – have been under Japanese influence since the end of the 19th century. Now, though, they are being claimed and fiercely contested by China with increasing vehemence. Similar disagreements have set Vietnam and the Philippines at odds, too, against their giant and emerging superpower neighbour.

None of the disputes are anywhere near close to being resolved. But a chink of light through the quiet and mannerly discussions between old adversaries has raised hope that diplomacy may yet prevail.

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Asia, China, Japan, Politics, Society, United States

The embroilment over the Senkaku Islands between Japan and China…

SENKAKU ISLANDS

Intro: Japan and China, and America’s delicate balancing act

The row between Japan and China over the Senkaku islands is escalating. It has implications for almost everyone.

The Senkaku (or to China the Diaoyu) is an obscure archipelago comprising a tiny chain of five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks, located hundreds of miles from land. To an outside observer this might seem an unlikely prize given the awkwardness of the island’s geographical position, but with everything from oil revenues to regional clout at stake, the dispute in Asia is cause for grave concern.

The history concerning ownership of the islands is important to understand. Whilst Beijing maintains that the islands were claimed by China in the 1300s, Tokyo insists they were classed as an international no man’s land until Japan seized control and took them over in 1895. The political dispute has been rumbling on since the 1970s, but the pressure has steadily increased in recent years as a newly rich and empowered China has sought to flex its regional muscles by attempting to extend its influence in the US-dominated Pacific.

Last year, Japan stoked tensions with the announcement by the Governor of Tokyo of plans to use public money to purchase the islands from their private owner. That hardly gave notice of Japan’s intention to defuse ongoing tensions. Now, though, it is China that has upped the ante. Last week, Beijing declared a new ‘air defence identification zone’ covering a swathe of the South China Sea, including the disputed islands. The order from China requires all aircraft entering the sector to submit flight plans or face ‘defensive emergency measures’. This was always going to be contentious, if not provocative for Tokyo, as the area overlaps with one of Japan’s own air defence zones.

Indeed, Tokyo’s response was swift and uncompromising. The Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, derided the plan as being ‘unenforceable’ and of having ‘no validity’. Two Japanese long-haul airlines which initially complied with Beijing’s demands were soon persuaded to withdraw their co-operation.

The reaction of the United States, however, has been imperative here. Because Washington has a post-war commitment to the defence of Japanese territory (which includes the Senkaku Islands), and given its recent foreign policy ‘pivot to Asia’, Beijing’s moves are increasingly being interpreted as a test of resolve for Barack Obama and of Mr Abe. America’s orientation towards Asia has stemmed from China’s rising power.

The U.S. has acted decisively. This week, it sent two unarmed B52s through the zone without notifying the Chinese authorities.

In an attempt to pacify tensions being inflamed still further, the Pentagon quickly claimed the flight was a long-planned training mission. For many analysts, though, the message is crystal clear – particularly given that it came days after the Defence Secretary, Chuck Hagel, denounced Beijing’s move as a ‘destabilising attempt to alter the status quo in the region’. Mr Hagel stated, too, that American military operations or its foreign policy on Asia would not change.

America’s intervention and move has been the right one, simply on the premise that China cannot be allowed to throw its weight around. If Beijing has a case then it must be sought through the correct legal channels, not implemented and administered unilaterally because of its desire to control.

Japan must also bear some responsibility in provoking tensions as flashpoints have become commonly frequent. In equal fashion it has shown itself too ready to indulge in rhetorical chest-beating with Mr Abe at times exhibiting disturbingly nationalist leanings. For the U.S., maintaining regional balance is paramount, and it should not been seen to be endorsing posturing from either side.

The diplomatic task facing the US in Asia is as difficult and perilous as any it is currently faced with. The Senkaku Islands may be just a few distant and remote rocks, but the chances are they could become the fulcrum upon which one of the greatest challenges of 21st century geopolitics lie. With both Beijing and Tokyo under growing domestic pressure for a show of strength abroad, and with the inevitable disruption that China’s economic rise will cause, America must be sure of its approach in maintaining regional balance.

At the heart of the dispute are eight uninhabited islands and rocks in the East China Sea. They have a total area of about 7 sq km and lie north-east of Taiwan, east of the Chinese mainland and south-west of Japan's southern-most prefecture, Okinawa. The islands are controlled by Japan.

At the heart of the dispute are eight uninhabited islands and rocks in the East China Sea. They have a total area of about 7 sq km and lie north-east of Taiwan, east of the Chinese mainland and south-west of Japan’s southern-most prefecture, Okinawa. The islands are controlled by Japan.

Related issue:

In response to an article published on The Economist, dated 20 October, 2012, entitled: ‘Rattling the supply chains’, MD wrote:

‘The simmering tensions between Beijing and Tokyo over the Senkaku islands has prompted questions over what the high-profile dispute could mean for proposed trade talks between Asia’s two largest economies and South Korea, as well as for regional trade overall.

An announcement in May of this year was made of plans to open formal trade negotiations between Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing. They agreed to begin the talks by the end of 2012 but this deadline has lately been called into question, with many analysts believing that two of the three parties might not even make it to the negotiating table.

The tensions between China and Japan stem from a territorial dispute over a series of tiny islands in the East China Sea, an area to which both countries have now laid claim. The islands – known as Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China – have symbolic significance, with their surrounding waters said to be rich in natural gas deposits.

The row, which has intensified rapidly in recent weeks, reached new heights in the past few days when Chinese finance officials pulled out of attending annual meetings with the IMF and World Bank that were being hosted by Tokyo. How the disagreement will be resolved remains unclear, as well as what the broader trade implications could be. The tri-lateral trade agreement with South Korea, for instance, might be under threat.

However, despite their disagreements, Chinese and Japanese officials have made clear that the proposed free trade agreement could have major benefits for both economies. Regardless of his insistence that his country will not cede sovereignty of the disputed territory, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda has openly acknowledged the value of eliminating trade barriers with Asia’s most powerful country. In the last decade alone, trade between the two nations has tripled, reaching more than $340 billion. A continuing row is not only likely to damage what has been a healthy relationship over the past ten years but could prove troublesome for the wider Asia region. Regional trade could be affected; ties between many countries could radically change because, invariably, any major trade relationship will always involve Japan and China.

Some of the predicted effects are beginning to surface. Japanese car exports to China have suffered since the dispute began and according to the latest JPMorgan Chase projections, could decrease by as much as 70 per cent in the final quarter of this year.’

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