Britain, Europe, European Union, Government, Greenland, Military, NATO, Society, United States

UK troops could be sent to Greenland to ease fears

GREENLAND

Intro: European allies have been in talks to deploy a force to Greenland in countering the growing threat from Russia and China. Sending a NATO force might help to ease President Trump’s security fears

The UK is in talks with European allies about deploying a force to Greenland that would guard the Arctic and ease anxieties in Washington.

Military chiefs are drawing up plans for a possible NATO mission on the island, which President Trump has threatened to seize for security reasons.

Officials from Britain have met with counterparts from countries including Germany and France in recent days to start the preparations.

The plans, still at an early stage, could involve British soldiers, warships, and planes being deployed to protect Greenland from Russia and China.

It is hoped that by significantly stepping up their presence in the Arctic European nations would persuade Mr Trump to abandon his ambition to annex the strategic island.

It is believed this would allow him to claim a victory for American taxpayers by arguing that Europe was paying more for the cost of policing the Atlantic.

Mr Trump has threatened to take ownership of Greenland through the use of force. It is a self-governed island but is territorially part of Denmark, a NATO member.

He has cited concerns that Moscow or Beijing will seize the island if he does not, insisting that “we’re not going to have Russia or China as a neighbour”.

Greenland is also rich in natural resources – including copper, nickel, and rare earth minerals crucial for powering modern technology.

Sir Keir Starmer is taking the threat from Russia and China in the area “extremely seriously” and is said to have agreed that action must be taken. There is increasing acceptance by the UK Government of President Trump’s view that growing aggression in the High North must be deterred, and Euro-Atlantic security be strengthened.

Mr Trump has also floated the idea of effectively buying the territory by offering each of its 30,000 citizens up to $100,000 to switch allegiance to the US.

Purchasing Greenland may be Mr Trump’s preferred option, but he has not ruled out using military force in annexing the island, insisting that “we are going to do something on Greenland whether they like it or not.” Ominous language.

His pursuit of the territory has plunged NATO into crisis and prompted speculation that the 75-year-old alliance could fall apart.

While plans are at an early stage, European countries are hoping to pull Mr Trump back from the brink by offering to station a military force on the island. This idea was discussed at a meeting of NATO allies in Brussels.

Members instructed the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, the alliance’s military headquarters in Belgium, to determine what more could be done to secure the Arctic.

It could be a full-blown troop deployment or a combination of time-limited exercises, intelligence sharing, capability development, and re-routed defence spending.

Any operation would likely be carried out under NATO’s banner and would be separate and distinct from existing missions in the Baltic and Poland.

Preparations in Britain for a greater role in Arctic security have already started. These include commandos and Royal Navy ships taking part in Exercise Joint Viking, a joint NATO drill in Norway’s sub-zero temperature.

This year, 1,500 Royal Marines will also deploy to Norway, Finland, and Sweden for Exercise Cold Response, a training mission on defending frozen terrain.

It is also understood the European Union is drawing up plans for sanctions on US companies should Mr Trump reject the offer of a NATO deployment.

US technology giants such as Meta, Google, Microsoft, and X could be restricted from operating on the Continent, as could American banks and financial firms.

A more extreme option could be to evict the US military from its bases in Europe, denying it a key staging post for operations in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Analysts said the president’s actions were typical of his negotiating strategy, which involves making maximalist demands to extract money from other countries.

Examples include his threat to impose massive tariffs on European pharmaceuticals but exempting countries, including Britain, that agreed to pay more for US drugs.

In recent months, the White House has also suggested that it wants Japan to pay more towards covering the cost of the 55,000 American troops based there.

Sibylline, a risk analysis firm, said Mr Trump was “likely weighing the unity and resolve of European nations” over Greenland. It said allies could “call Trump’s bluff” by proposing a NATO force in Greenland, implying security wasn’t the president’s real reason for wanting the island.

It came as a former RAF chief cast serious doubt over Britain’s ability to protect the Arctic, saying the nation’s defences had become “a flimsy façade”.

Air Marshal Edward Stringer said that the gap between the perception of the UK’s military strength and its actual capabilities had become cavernous.

In a report for Policy Exchange, he warned that not a single formation in the British military was currently sustainable in combat in its own right.

He wrote: “Now the US is signalling strongly that it is putting ‘America First’ and the rest of NATO will have to look after its own defences.

This fundamentally challenges the model that we had semi-accidentally slipped into – our national defences have been revealed to be a flimsy façade.

The ‘Say-Do’ gap between the image of ourselves we have come to believe, and the reality of the hard power we can project in practice, is stark.

The first necessary step is to recognise that, and recognise that the methods that got us into this mess have to be discarded ruthlessly.”

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Britain, Economic, European Commission, European Union, Government, Politics

UK-EU trade deal: a logical step forward

BRITAIN

Intro: The agreement made with the European Union will have limited tangible gains, but at least the tone set by the prime minister is a positive one

MUCH is being made of Sir Keir Starmer’s deal with the EU, but many things still remain to be worked out. The agreement which was announced in London should be regarded as a staging post rather than a final destination. It was, in effect, a commitment to have more meetings at which negotiators will try to make more deals.

On the issue of visa for young people and the UK’s mooted return to the Erasmus university-exchange scheme, there is little clarity beyond the rebranding of “youth mobility” as “experience”. A decision on the level of fees that European students must pay has also been kicked into the long grass. So have some details of how the UK will work with the bloc on policing and security, including the use of controversial facial-recognition technology in tackling drug and people smuggling across borders.

Increased cooperation on defence is significant and timely, given the ramping up of geopolitical instability under Donald Trump – although British arms manufacturers will have to go on pushing for access to the EU’s £150bn fund. On food and fishing, terms have been decided. Fewer checks on exports, including meat, will benefit UK food producers, particularly the smaller ones that were worst affected by Brexit. For Europeans, mainly the French, the big win is a 12-year agreement on fishing in British waters.

The 41% of UK goods exported to the EU, worth £385bn, are more than is sent to the US and India combined – making this by far the most important trade deal so far. Though the UK remains outside the customs union, and regulations governing other goods including medicines have not been relaxed, the new measures mark a significant easing of trade.

By contrast, the new dispensation for UK travellers to join European passport queues, and looser rules about pets, are more about style than substance. But while conveniences like these will not bring the economic benefits that the PM seeks, they do send a signal. For ministers, any hint of an interest in rejoining the EU remains taboo. Instead, this modest scaling back of Tory-erected barriers is designed to show voters that Sir Keir is operating a rational and responsible government that puts the interests of British businesses and consumers first.

It should not have taken nine years since the referendum to reach this point. A group of around 60 Labour MPs is rightly pushing for the government to be more ambitious, emboldened by polling showing that most voters now think Brexit was a mistake. Free movement, however, remains a red line, and one inked in all the more vividly after the strong showing of Reform UK in recent local elections and national polls. This was also Starmer’s real chance to counter anti-immigration sentiment, not capitulating to it. He may yet come to rue his decision on this.

Among disappointing omissions is the lack of a mechanism to make touring by our creative artists, like musicians, easier. Nonetheless, the agreement is a much-needed step forward, even though the actual gains for the UK have been overstated.

Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, was more accurate when she spoke of the deal as “framing” an improved future relationship. If Sir Keir wants to reverse the damage done to the country since Brexit, he will require to paint a picture of why an outward-looking, interconnected UK is more likely to succeed. Not one that has become an insular nation under Brexit.

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Britain, China, Economic, Europe, European Union, Government, Politics, Society, United States

UK-China relations: The Brexit dilemma

BRITAIN-CHINA

Intro: Trump’s trade wars have exasperated the Eurosceptic model, which is more outdated than ever

WHEN the transatlantic alliance was more functional than now, there was never a united view of China. Beijing has always been perceived as a commercial rival and potential security threat, and a common wariness has existed. For hawks in Washington, however, the idea of an alternative superpower closing in on economic and technological parity feels existential. More dovish Europeans have been openly compromising and readier to leaven caution with engagement.

Britain has veered between the two poles. In 2015, David Cameron promised a “golden era” of open trade with China. In 2020, under pressure from the US, Boris Johnson banned Huawei, a Chinese telecoms company, from UK 5G infrastructure.

In opposition, Conservative politicians have become increasingly hawkish against Beijing. Keir Starmer’s Labour government has tilted back towards cooperation. Several Labour ministers have visited China, including the chancellor. Other ministers, including the business secretary, will go there later this year, to revive a trade commission that has been dormant since 2018. Despite being manifestly frustrated with the Chinese owners of British Steel during the recent dash to keep Scunthorpe’s blast furnaces operating, the UK government has retreated from intimations of deliberate sabotage.

At some point, a reckoning has to be made. The pursuit of economic growth and investment will inevitably come into conflict with a national security interest in keeping China at arm’s length. The question is where to draw the line. The official line is that judgment is deferred pending a Whitehall “audit” of relations with Beijing. That is due in June.

A UK government decision is also imminent on China’s status under the foreign influence registration scheme – a system for keeping tabs on international organisations and companies exercising political influence in Britain. China is not expected to be named in the “enhanced tier” of risky states, alongside Russia and Iran, but some Chinese institutions might have that designation.

Calibrating these judgments – choosing when to prioritise security over commerce – is much harder with Donald Trump in the White House. What used to be a difference of emphasis between the US and Europe looks like an irreparable fracture in the west.

Trump has started a ferocious trade war with Beijing without a convincing strategic rationale. His officials have told Europeans they will have to choose a side when it comes to vital communications technology. Yet, what we see is a US president who has become routinely aggressive in his rhetoric towards the EU, dismissive of NATO, and reliably emollient towards Putin’s Russia.

From that pattern it is clear in Brussels and other continental capitals that Washington is no longer a reliable ally and the trajectory must be “strategic autonomy” for Europe. That is changing the calculus of risk and potential benefit from a more pragmatic China policy. The authoritarian character of Xi Jinping’s regime hasn’t changed, but it presents itself as a more predictable force in international affairs while US democracy declines in harsh and sporadic spasms.

Such changes illuminate a crisis of international orientation for Britain that has been building since Brexit. Economic detachment from Europe was promised on a model of the UK as a lone sovereign agent in an open, free-trading globalised world. That concept has aged very poorly, and it stands more of an outdated concept now than it ever has. Britain is not alone in struggling to navigate relations with China in the turbulent new geopolitical climate, but choosing loneliness and isolation in a world of rival continental blocks is making the struggle much harder.

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