THE DEFEAT OF ISIL

Intro: The defeat of ISIL has become a cause for celebration, but there are hard security lessons to be learnt as well

FOR those who have participated in the challenging mission to destroy Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) deserve richly awarded plaudits. In the summer of 2014, when ISIL seized control of vast swathes of territory in northern Syria and Iraq to establish its so-called caliphate, removing the fanatical zealots from well-entrenched positions in places like Mosul and Raqqa looked to be a nigh impossible task. At its zenith, ISIL’s caliphate occupied an area approximately the same size as Portugal and controlled the fate of around 10 million people.

Thanks to the relentless efforts of the US-led coalition, ISIL’s empire now consists of little more than a square kilometre of desert scrub on the Syria-Iraq border. ISIL’s barbarous reign of terror is effectively over.

In strictly military terms, the coalition has achieved its stated objectives. With ISIL no longer able to terrorise those living under its control, nor in a position to spread the twisted propaganda that persuaded so many young impressionable Muslims (in Britain and elsewhere) to join the jihadi cause, there is genuine cause for celebration that this brutal death cult is on the verge of annihilation.

It can even be argued, as the former defence secretary Sir Michael Fallon has said, that in prosecuting the ISIL campaign the Western powers have finally found a workable paradigm for implementing military interventions in the Muslim world.

In this instance, the coalition has relied more on the judicious use of air power and special forces to achieve its goal, rather than resorting to the deployment of large-scale, and politically controversial, ground forces, as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Yet, before becoming too carried away with the success of the anti-ISIL mission, it is worth remembering that our initial involvement in the Syrian conflict was aimed at destroying an entirely different foe.

Back in 2011, the primary aim of the US and Britain, the two Western powers that have been most heavily invested in the Syrian tragedy, was the overthrow of tyrant and dictator President Bashar al-Assad, whose minority Alawite clan has run the country since 1971.

It is hard to believe now, but former prime minister David Cameron even signed a joint declaration with the then US president Barack Obama in the summer of 2011 calling for Assad to step aside, arguing that he should “face the reality of the complete rejection of his regime by the Syrian people”.

Mr Cameron’s briefly held enthusiasm for securing regime change in Damascus ended when he lost the 2013 Commons vote to launch military action against Assad over accusations the regime has used chemical weapons on civilians.

And, pertinently, given the way the conflict subsequently developed, Cameron and his anti-Assad acolytes had a fortuitous and lucky escape. For, had they succeeded in overthrowing Assad, the fall of the Syrian government might well have resulted in ISIL taking control of the entire country, rather than confining their Islamo-fascist creed to the less populous northern districts.

It was, after all, the very real prospect of ISIL and its Islamist allies seizing control of Syria in the summer of 2014 that persuaded Iran and Russia to come to the aid of the Assad regime, thereby helping to turn the tide of the war decisively in the dictator’s favour.

So much so that these days the British and American governments accept Assad’s survival as a fait accompli, to the extent that neither country has shown the slightest interest in attending the talks aimed at deciding Syria’s post-conflict future.

Hence, the lesson of the West’s inchoate handling of the Syrian conflict is that, rather than celebrating the demise of ISIL’s caliphate, politicians would be better advised to reflect on their incoherent and muddled approach over the past decade, one that, had events taken a different course, could easily have resulted in the establishment of an uncompromising Islamist regime in Damascus.

That is certainly not the outcome Britain and its allies imagined at the start of the conflict, when they manged to convince themselves that the overthrow of Assad’s regime would result in its replacement by a secular-orientated, Western-style democracy.

Given that Islamist extremists have been Assad’s most committed opponents since the early 1980s, this was wishful thinking in the extreme, and the reason why, when considering any future military intervention in the Middle East (or anywhere else for that matter), it is vital that our parliamentarians properly examine the likely consequences of their actions.

All too often in the recent past we have got ourselves involved in conflicts without fully grasping the possible outcomes. A good benchmark would be to give priority to those threats that directly impinge on our own national security.

On that basis, destroying ISIL – a movement committed to carrying out terror attacks in Britain – always made much more sense than seeking to overthrow the Assad regime.