Category Archives: Politics

Britain, Economic, European Union, Government, Ireland, Politics, Society

Brexit always leads back to the issue of the Irish border

BREXIT: UK – IRELAND

ONE of the most persistent myths about Brexit is that the Irish border issue was bounced on to an unsuspecting British prime minister by her cunning – or, perhaps, reckless – Irish counterpart. According to this narrative, Theresa May signed up to the December 2017 agreement that committed the UK to avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland without fully understanding the implications because she was desperate for a transition deal.

Yet, what has become clear since is that the necessity of avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland matters as much to Theresa May as it does to Leo Varadkar. Just as no Irish prime minister could ever agree to the renewed partition of the island, Mrs May remains determined not to be the British prime minister who presided over the restarting of the Troubles, still less the disintegration of the United Kingdom.

The British government may have been slow – some might say shamefully slow – to appreciate what was at stake, but it is the Irish border issue, rather than the demands of business, that now drives Mrs May’s entire Brexit policy, as expressed in her Chequers proposal.

But the fact that Mrs May is no less sincere than Mr Varadkar in her desire to keep the border open doesn’t make a solution any easier.

As things stand, the Irish border is the single biggest obstacle to an orderly Brexit and the two sides are as far apart as ever. EU officials say that no progress whatsoever has been made since March in negotiations over the backstop that Mrs May agreed in December. The withdrawal agreement was to ensure that no hard border emerged regardless of the future trading relationship between the UK and EU.

The EU insists that there can be no withdrawal agreement without a functioning backstop. The UK is adamant, however, that the problem can be solved only via a framework trading relationship that makes a backstop unnecessary. Hence the Chequers plan for a “facilitated customs arrangement”, which would see the UK pursue a dual-tariff system, collecting EU tariffs on the EU’s behalf for imported goods for the EU market, but charging only UK tariffs on goods destined for the UK market; and a proposed “common rule book” covering trade but not services.

Neither side shows the slightest sign of budging. Mrs May continues to insist that the EU’s backstop suggestion would amount to introducing a border in the Irish Sea, which she says no UK prime minister could accept. Downing Street believes that Brussels is badly underestimating the degree of cross-party support for its position. Officials note that an amendment to the EU Withdrawal Bill tabled by Jacob Rees-Mogg ruling out a customs border in the Irish Sea was accepted by the House of Commons without a vote. Downing Street argues that the only way to unblock the situation is for Brussels to drop its opposition to Chequers.

EU officials have countered and have said Mrs May is underestimating opposition to her proposals across the European Union. Brussels is also baffled by the UK’s position on the backstop. EU officials have pointed out that some checks already take place at Northern Irish ports and airports and that the EU’s proposal simply would build upon them. Indeed, civil servants in Northern Ireland produced a draft paper this year in what they dubbed a “Channels” approach, under which goods entering Northern Ireland from the UK could pass through either a red or green channel at ports or airports depending on whether those goods were destined for local consumption or export to the EU. Such a system would depend on some level of risk-based checks combined with appropriate documentation, cross-border cooperation and tough penalties for infringements. The paper concludes that such “a pragmatic extension of present reality . . . seems infinitely preferable to a return to the border of the past”. Yet the UK government has blocked publication and refuses to share with Brussels any underlying data on volumes of goods entering Northern Ireland.

Of course, how this situation plays out will in part be determined by how all sides perceive the consequences of a no deal. Both the UK and Ireland would be hit hard economically. The IMF estimates that both would suffer similar hits to GDP of about 4 per cent by 2030, although Ireland’s far higher rates of growth would make such a shock easier to absorb. British officials believe that Mr Varadkar would pay a political price because he has done little to prepare public opinion for the prospect of the EU at some point obliging Dublin to start introducing customs and regulatory checks at the Northern Irish border, something Britain has said it would not do. But while Dublin is convinced it would win any blame game, the bigger risk may be to the UK. After all, the case for allowing the people of Northern Ireland to decide their own fate before any border checks were imposed and as provided for under the Good Friday Agreement would surely be strong. A recent poll published earlier this month suggested that a majority of Northern Irish under such circumstances would vote for reunification by a margin of 52 per cent to 39 per cent.

The risk for Mrs May is that the very outcome that her entire Brexit policy has been seeking to avoid will have come to pass. A political paradox if there ever was one.

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Britain, European Union, Government, Politics, Society

(In Brief) What are the UK’s Brexit Options?

BREXIT

The Chequers Plan – The Prime Minister has made clear that her July 2018 blueprint remains Britain’s negotiating position and expects her ministers in Cabinet to promote it.

But officials at No 10 know that if the EU continues to stonewall, the internal Tory Party voices who have never liked the deal will only get louder. The agreement would see the UK collect tariffs on behalf of the EU and follow a “common rulebook” for goods but not services.

Canada – Canada’s free trade deal with the EU came into force last October, following seven years of negotiation.

It grants preferential access to the single market without signing up to the EU’s four fundamental freedoms – goods, services, capital and labour.

It removes 99 per cent of customs duties and trade tariffs, but it would not give British financial services the access to the EU market they currently enjoy and does not solve the Northern Ireland border question.

Norway – Under the Norway model, the UK would sit alongside Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein as part of the European Economic Area (EEA).

It would give Britain the freedom to strike trade deals with countries around the world. But free movement of people would continue, which would be unacceptable to many Tory Eurosceptics.

No Deal – The nuclear option. But the Prime Minister has repeated her pledge in the last few days that “no deal is better than a bad deal”.

Britain would make a clean break from the EU and fall back on its membership of the World Trade Organisation. It could also save Britain paying the £39 billion “divorce bill”.

Blind Brexit – This would involve a vague November statement on future trade in a bid to finalise the divorce payment and transition deal. The details of the future trading relationship would be sorted out at an unspecified later date.

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Britain, Economic, Financial Markets, Government, Politics, Society

The real crisis of capitalism

ECONOMIC

THE past week has been a time for recalling the events of September 2008, their long shadow over the economics and politics of the past ten years and for drawing the right lessons for the future.

In particular, did the financial crisis prove that capitalism is fundamentally unstable and that a new model involving greater control and a much bigger role for the state, as favoured by Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party, is a better one? Or, the fact that the guilty men and women mainly got away with it, meant that public anger over the crisis was never assuaged?

We should understand that the financial crisis did not begin on the weekend of September 13-14, 2008, which saw frantic but unsuccessful efforts to save Lehman Brothers, the Wall Street investment bank. The crisis had been simmering for well over a year, a period that saw the run on Northern Rock and the start of Britain’s deepest recession in the post-war period.

The bankruptcy of Lehman, announced on September 15, turned a smouldering crisis into a ravaging forest fire that spread rapidly around the world. Banks were bailed-out by free-market governments using public funds. Alongside near-zero interest rates, central banks including the Bank of England did things they never would have contemplated in normal circumstances, most notably quantitative easing (or the printing of free money). Governments spent vast sums of money that ran into the billions boosting their economies to ease the impact of the crisis, but on the basis that they would cut back later. Austerity, on a scale and duration not seen in this country since the Geddes axe of the 1920s, was the course chosen by the coalition government in 2010.

 

MOST of what people think they know about the past decade is wrong. The danger in 2008 was of a prolonged period of deflation – falling prices and economic depression, a modern version of the 1930s. The reality is that both were avoided. After the shock of the crisis the economy grew more slowly than had been the norm, but it grew. All advanced economies were afflicted by weaker growth.

Income inequality in Britain has fallen since the crisis, not least because the burden of tax faced by the highest earners has increased. This financial year, 2018-19, the top 1% will pay almost 28% of all income tax, compared with just over 24% in 2007-08, paying £12bn a year more in tax than before the near meltdown. The top 10% accounts for 59.7% of all income tax revenues, up from 54.3%.

Austerity, as practised by the coalition led by David Cameron and now by a Tory minority government under Theresa May, was never about shrinking the size of the state for ideological reasons. The coalition’s mantra before the crisis was that after the spending splurge under Gordon Brown, the “proceeds of growth” would in future be shared between tax cuts and increased public spending.

Even faced with the task of reducing an out-of-control budget deficit, Mr Cameron ring-fenced NHS spending and imposed a target of spending 0.7% of gross national income on foreign aid. A better criticism of Tory austerity is that too much of it involved cuts to government investment and that the process has dragged on for too long, partly because it was leavened with tax cuts, mostly for working people.

 

THE financial crisis and its aftermath were painful but too many Tories seem to have been cowed by it from making a robust case for capitalism. This leaves the way open for Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell, Labour’s anti-capitalist chancellor. When a privatised rail company messes up, or a housebuilding boss is awarded a bonus running into tens of millions of pounds, there is rightly an outcry. The crisis itself was the product, yes, of many greedy bankers and a few in handcuffs might have satisfied public opinion, but it was also the consequence of regulators whose job it was to stop them failing. In many cases, including the recent collapse of Carillion, many of these problems arise at the interface between the public and private sector.

Of course, we all want to return to a time when living standards are rising at a decent pace. That will be achieved only when productivity growth also returns to something approaching past norms. Capitalism in Britain has, since the crisis, delivered something like seven times the number of new jobs as those cut by the public sector. Unemployment is at its lowest since the mid-1970s. It is the private sector, not failed prescriptions of anti-capitalism, that will deliver prosperity in the future.

 

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