Britain, Government, Islamic State, National Security, Politics, Society, Syria, United States

Victory against ISIL can’t mask the incoherent approach in Syria

THE DEFEAT OF ISIL

Intro: The defeat of ISIL has become a cause for celebration, but there are hard security lessons to be learnt as well

FOR those who have participated in the challenging mission to destroy Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) deserve richly awarded plaudits. In the summer of 2014, when ISIL seized control of vast swathes of territory in northern Syria and Iraq to establish its so-called caliphate, removing the fanatical zealots from well-entrenched positions in places like Mosul and Raqqa looked to be a nigh impossible task. At its zenith, ISIL’s caliphate occupied an area approximately the same size as Portugal and controlled the fate of around 10 million people.

Thanks to the relentless efforts of the US-led coalition, ISIL’s empire now consists of little more than a square kilometre of desert scrub on the Syria-Iraq border. ISIL’s barbarous reign of terror is effectively over.

In strictly military terms, the coalition has achieved its stated objectives. With ISIL no longer able to terrorise those living under its control, nor in a position to spread the twisted propaganda that persuaded so many young impressionable Muslims (in Britain and elsewhere) to join the jihadi cause, there is genuine cause for celebration that this brutal death cult is on the verge of annihilation.

It can even be argued, as the former defence secretary Sir Michael Fallon has said, that in prosecuting the ISIL campaign the Western powers have finally found a workable paradigm for implementing military interventions in the Muslim world.

In this instance, the coalition has relied more on the judicious use of air power and special forces to achieve its goal, rather than resorting to the deployment of large-scale, and politically controversial, ground forces, as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Yet, before becoming too carried away with the success of the anti-ISIL mission, it is worth remembering that our initial involvement in the Syrian conflict was aimed at destroying an entirely different foe.

Back in 2011, the primary aim of the US and Britain, the two Western powers that have been most heavily invested in the Syrian tragedy, was the overthrow of tyrant and dictator President Bashar al-Assad, whose minority Alawite clan has run the country since 1971.

It is hard to believe now, but former prime minister David Cameron even signed a joint declaration with the then US president Barack Obama in the summer of 2011 calling for Assad to step aside, arguing that he should “face the reality of the complete rejection of his regime by the Syrian people”.

Mr Cameron’s briefly held enthusiasm for securing regime change in Damascus ended when he lost the 2013 Commons vote to launch military action against Assad over accusations the regime has used chemical weapons on civilians.

And, pertinently, given the way the conflict subsequently developed, Cameron and his anti-Assad acolytes had a fortuitous and lucky escape. For, had they succeeded in overthrowing Assad, the fall of the Syrian government might well have resulted in ISIL taking control of the entire country, rather than confining their Islamo-fascist creed to the less populous northern districts.

It was, after all, the very real prospect of ISIL and its Islamist allies seizing control of Syria in the summer of 2014 that persuaded Iran and Russia to come to the aid of the Assad regime, thereby helping to turn the tide of the war decisively in the dictator’s favour.

So much so that these days the British and American governments accept Assad’s survival as a fait accompli, to the extent that neither country has shown the slightest interest in attending the talks aimed at deciding Syria’s post-conflict future.

Hence, the lesson of the West’s inchoate handling of the Syrian conflict is that, rather than celebrating the demise of ISIL’s caliphate, politicians would be better advised to reflect on their incoherent and muddled approach over the past decade, one that, had events taken a different course, could easily have resulted in the establishment of an uncompromising Islamist regime in Damascus.

That is certainly not the outcome Britain and its allies imagined at the start of the conflict, when they manged to convince themselves that the overthrow of Assad’s regime would result in its replacement by a secular-orientated, Western-style democracy.

Given that Islamist extremists have been Assad’s most committed opponents since the early 1980s, this was wishful thinking in the extreme, and the reason why, when considering any future military intervention in the Middle East (or anywhere else for that matter), it is vital that our parliamentarians properly examine the likely consequences of their actions.

All too often in the recent past we have got ourselves involved in conflicts without fully grasping the possible outcomes. A good benchmark would be to give priority to those threats that directly impinge on our own national security.

On that basis, destroying ISIL – a movement committed to carrying out terror attacks in Britain – always made much more sense than seeking to overthrow the Assad regime.

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Banking, Britain, Economic, Government, Politics, Society

Carney says leaving the EU could restore faith in democracy

BREXIT

THE Bank of England Governor has said that Brexit could restore faith in free trade and democracy if the UK leaves the EU with a deal.

In a statement that is sharply at odds with his previous warnings that Brexit could spark chaos, Mark Carney said that a managed departure would show voters that they matter and encourage them to trust the parliamentary system again.

But he also warned that a No Deal Brexit would spark an economic shock – something which he says the whole world should be trying to avoid.

The Governor said millions of workers feel let down and left behind by globalisation – and the only solution is to give power back to the people.

He added that a Brexit deal may be a step towards a world where families are comfortable with free trade because they feel in control.

The Governor said: “In many respects, Brexit is the first test of a new global order and could prove the acid test of whether a way can be found to broaden the benefits of openness while enhancing democratic accountability.

He said Brexit could lead to new “international cooperation”, allowing for better cross-border trade deals and a more effective balance of “local and supranational authority”.

Mr Carney’s backing for Brexit if a deal is struck marks a major change of tone.

He has long been accused by Eurosceptics of opposing our departure from the EU and whipping up Project Fear.

And in the run-up to the referendum, he was attacked for politicising the Bank of England when he claimed Brexit could trigger a recession.

Last year, Mr Carney claimed the vote to leave had cost households £900 each by damaging economic growth – and he has always been one of the loudest critics of No Deal.

The Bank also claimed No Deal could tip the UK into its worst recession for a century, knocking a third off house prices and triggering a dramatic surge in unemployment.

Mr Carney warns again that a deal is needed to avoid chaos – although he does sound more upbeat about the future following an orderly exit from the EU than he has done previously.

The Governor said Britain’s departure from the European Union comes at a time of growing risks for the global economy. The Canadian also said that No Deal would be “a shock for this economy”, and that UK investment has not grown since the referendum of 2016 was called, saying it had “dramatically underperformed”.

Mr Carney used his speech – given to senior business figures at London’s Barbican – to warn them that China is increasingly risky and businesses around the world are taking on worrying levels of debt.

He said: “China is the one major economy in which all major financial imbalances have materially worsened. While China’s economic miracle over the past three decades has been extraordinary, its post-crisis performance has relied increasingly on one of the largest and longest running credit booms ever.

A 3 per cent drop in the Chinese economy would shave 0.5 per cent off the UK, he warned.

On Corporate debt, he said a surge in high-risk business lending has worrying echoes of the US boom in unsustainable loans which led to the 2008 financial crisis.

Mr Carney also took a swipe at Donald Trump, who has cracked down on imports from China. The US President once tweeted: “Trade wars are good and easy to win.”

Mr Carney batted away Mr Trump’s casual brag, saying: “Contrary to what you might have heard, it isn’t easy to win a trade war.”

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Britain, Economic, European Union, Government, Politics, Society

The EU has a natural propensity to haggle

BREXIT

LONG before the people of the UK voted to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum, before the term Brexit had even been coined, it was Grexit that was preoccupying the minds of Eurocrats.

Greece came close to crashing out of the single currency on at least four separate occasions after a vast black hole opened up in the country’s accounts in 2009.

At one stage in 2012, the British banknote printers De La Rue was asked by the government in Athens to make contingency plans to print new drachma notes (Greece’s pre-euro currency) in preparation for what many called the “Double D” solution to the economic problems Greece was facing: default on the country’s debt and devaluation with the return of the drachma.

Today, Greece remains one of the 17 members of the eurozone – and this fact alone should lift the spirits of the UK negotiators. Armed with her newly acquired Parliamentary majority, Theresa May returns to Brussels seeking at the very least to put a time limit on the Irish backstop deal she signed up to.

Each time a Greek default loomed into view, threatening the stability of the eurozone and raising the possibility that Italy or one of the other member countries might also head for the exit, the main protagonists – the hard-line German-dominated European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt and the European Commission in Brussels – caved in and authorised a bailout.

Last-ditch negotiations, usually conducted over a weekend when the financial markets were closed, would typically go into the early hours of Sunday morning.

Late-night deals were hatched against a backdrop of TV screens showing central Athens on fire and anti-austerity protesters ripping up flagstones in the capital’s Syntagma Square.

The first £38bn bailout was agreed in the dead of the night on April 23, 2010, by the troika of the ECB, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund. It was one of several rescue packages for Greece, some of which required a change of government to get them over the line.

 

WHAT happened to Greece is typical of the Eurocrat tendency to fudge, to muddy the waters and eventually to seek compromise in a crisis situation.

Indeed, the history of the EU is littered with examples of Britain locked into eleventh-hour talks with eurocrats as the UK has sought changes in our terms of membership.

John Major worked through the night in 1991 to secure Britain’s opt-out from the social chapter of the Maastricht Treaty which would have dictated working conditions in Britain and could have undermined the labour market reforms pioneered by his predecessor Margaret Thatcher. Indeed, she herself was a fierce negotiator in organising rebates from Brussels from the UK’s oversized contributions to the EU budget. In 1984, in the imperial grandeur at the historic palace of Fontainebleau in France, European leaders painfully conceded the famous British EU budget contribution rebate – or as the French sarcastically called it “le chéque Britannique”.

And let’s not forget that in the teeth of his promise to hold an in/out referendum, David Cameron returned from Brussels in the early hours one day in February 2016 with draft reform proposals agreed by European Council President Donald Tusk which he claimed would give Britain “special status”.

In the event, the pledges made by Brussels were so anaemic that they failed to convince British voters that sovereignty could be maintained by voting remain – a huge mistake by the eurocrats who failed to recognise the strength of anti-EU feeling among large swathes of the UK population.

Both in national negotiations and in commercial transactions, reaching an accord more often or not comes down to the wire.

With the clock now ticking inexorably to March 29, the desperation of the leaders of the other 27 EU countries to avoid an economic and financial crisis at the very moment that Germany and the eurozone are facing the bleak prospect of recession may be Theresa May’s best hope. This is regardless of how unyielding Brussels negotiators have been to date and their willingness to play havoc with business confidence and financial stability by its brinkmanship.

 

THE potential loss to Brussels of a £39bn one-off payment to a Commission cash starved as it is following years of economic slowdown, could potentially be a bargaining chip for the Prime Minister in the last-chance saloon.

In the final analysis, the anecdotal evidence of what the late-night sessions in Brussels, Nice, Maastricht and other destinations should tell us, is that it’s Germany and, to a lesser extent, France which decide.

Besieged by increasingly hostile populist movements, neither Berlin or Paris will want to make political life tougher than it already is.

The politics of the EU, at their most raw, are little different to those of the bazaar. The natural tendency should be now to relish an aggressive haggle but then, eventually, to compromise.

. See also Should we really despair over Brexit? Europe is in a mess.

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