Arts, Books, Britain, Government, History, India, Politics

Book Reviews: The spectre of Amritsar

Intro: A hundred years ago British soldiers opened fire on a crowd of unarmed Indians. The massacre still haunts the history of empire today.

ON the morning of 10 April 1919, the city of Amritsar in Punjab found itself in the fiery grip of anti-colonial protests. The day had begun peacefully enough, but by early afternoon the town was up in arms as mobs of baying men shouting nationalistic slogans embarked on a spree of pillaging and burning. Britons who actually held power and sway over them were beyond reach, and so anybody with white skin became a target. Officials at the National Bank were severely beaten and stabbed, their bodies badly burned in a heap of office furniture and stationery. At the Alliance Bank, too, the manager was thrown out of the window, his decapitated and mangled corpse set on fire afterwards. While others began to rain blows on a statue of Queen Victoria, this was tempered somewhat as it had been argued that Her late Majesty ought not to be held responsible to the faults of her successors. With only marginal damage, most of her iconic image was spared. Throughout these protests, the air rang with cries of “Gandhi ki jai” (victory to the Mahatma), an irony which had taken a leave of absence at the very first eruption of disorder and violence.

As it happens, this is one of the many striking scenes that emerges from Kim Wagner’s excellent new book on the Amritsar Massacre of 1919. It is, undoubtedly, an intelligent and unsentimental insight into one of the most horrifying moments in the history of the Raj.

The events at Jallianwala Bagh on 13 April are well documented. Brigadier-General Dyer of the British Indian Army, one of the great villains of India’s colonial experience, had his soldiers open fire on a gathering of between 5,000 and 10,000 unarmed civilians in a confined garden. Hundreds were killed, while a thousand more lay wounded, unable even to seek aid due to curfew orders. As Wagner writes, the episode became “one of the best-known items on the imperial butcher’s bill” – not least because Dyer and his superiors showed little remorse. But while they were quick to telegram support, “Your action correct and Lieutenant Governor approves”, Dyer was lambasted in the House of Commons although he was lauded as a good soldier in the Lords. And as late as 1978, a subordinate defended him: he “killed, yes”, but “massacred, no”. The number of fatalities remains uncertain: Dyer claimed 200-300, estimated loosely from the 1,650 rounds fired, while the Indian National Congress suggested 1,000 people perished. An official commission into the massacre settled for 379, including a six-week-old baby.

A principle intention of Wagner’s study is to make historical and scholarly sense of this tragedy (as opposed to political or emotional). Some might suggest that both parties thought their actions legitimate. But, how did a massacre of this scale resemble justifiable military action for the Raj’s officials? Despite the atrocity he authored and approved, how did Dyer become the man who “Saved India”? To any neutral observer or reader of the situation this is a perfectly reasonable question to ask. He will be perceived in some quarters as butcher rather than saviour. And, how was it that thousands of people who set out with Gandhi’s name on their lips, could burn and loot, assaulting a middle-aged white woman and leave her for dead?

The nuanced approach applied by Wagner attempts to explain the inner workings of both sides. The Indians were certainly the victims, that there is no doubt: despite their violence on the eve of Jallianwala Bagh. Bricks and sticks ought never to have provoked any government to prepare air power against the people it governed. In the end, Amritsar narrowly escaped being bombed, but at nearby Gujranwala gunfire was indeed opened from above, with as many as eight bombs dropped on villagers. It was a disastrous overreaction, but one borne-out of paranoia that was as old as the empire itself.

Wagner scrutinises this paranoia with careful deliberation. Too often, he notes, Amritsar is viewed in isolation or as a catalyst for the concluding chapter in India’s struggle for freedom: it was in response to Jallianwala Bagh that Gandhi launched his movement of non-cooperation. He turns the focus on the decades that preceded Dyer, casting his actions as the culmination of a previous chapter. It is a compelling argument, and it helps us understand the gap between ruler and ruled more fully. The British were, it should be remembered, aliens in a large and complicated country, conscious that their power was never secure. Confidence where it did not exist was feigned. Confronted by bewildering diversity, the British introduced rigid one-size-fits-all rules and a cumbersome bureaucracy that eschewed face-to-face interactions with its people. Racial fallacies and misconceptions, missionary polemics and changes at home all affected India, but instead of bridging gaps, distances were exacerbated by a ruling class that remained perpetually aloof.

Sporadic small-scale mutinies occurred, but in 1857 northern India rose in revolt in the Great Rebellion, when Hindus joined with Muslims under the banner of an emasculated Mughal emperor. Whilst British power had clearly been rattled, instances of violence against British women and children were deliberately exaggerated. Such rumours led to horrified reactions at home and a brutal military response. The debacle saw power transferred from the East India Company to the Crown, and Queen Victoria issued a proclamation with several guarantees to her Indian subjects (later innovations such as income tax were resisted by citing the proclamation). The essential preoccupation of the British in India – of “the men on the ground” – was to maintain control and resist any challenge to what they feared was a tenuous authority.

A great deal came to depend on the attitude of the viceroys appointed by the Crown. Some won popularity among Indians – Lord Ripon’s progressive reforms, for example, alarmed his own countrymen – but, for nearly all of them, concessions would not be traded for control – which, in effect, limited their actions to tokenisms and kind words. Theoretically, rule under the Crown was meant to be more liberal than during the East India Company era. In reality, it soon became business as usual.

Wagner offers an explanation for the unyielding attitude of the Raj’s officials. In 1857 British power had come close to being extinguished: it was reasserted only with spectacular violence. The Mughal emperor was packed off to Burma on a bullock cart and violent punishments were designed for the rebels. In the 1870s, it was proposed that “blowing from a gun is an impressive and merciful manner of execution,” for it was “well-calculated to strike terror into the bystanders.” Or, in other words, for the British to control an unpredictable people, the colonial state had to be prepared to deploy violence – and to make it a public affair. When some openly criticised such methods, there was the press to ramp up support. “The truth is we want omelettes without the breaking of eggs,” declared the Anglo-Indian newspaper the Pioneer. In the years and decades preceding the Amritsar Massacre, these fears played in the minds of colonial officials: as Wagner writes, “In the British colonial imagination, the ‘Mutiny’ [of 1857] never ended.” In the circumstances, it was not surprising that mass gatherings began to look like founts of sedition.

In 1907, for instance, the government imagined local leaders in Punjab as being part of a Russian-Afghan conspiracy – and, in 1915, an unlikely revolt organised by Indian expatriates in America reinforced such fears. The Rowlatt Act of 1919 set the stage for crisis as political liberties were curtailed: people could be arrested without warrant and detained without trial, and the press was gagged, all in the name of security.

Public meetings were planned in Amritsar by prominent figures, but on the 10 April, they were taken into custody. The crowds gathered and protested and demanded a meeting with the authorities. The sheer size caused such concern to British officials that shots were fired. Several Indians were killed: the riots, in which bank officials were lynched and the banks looted, was the response. “Just as the British misread the nature of the protests,” writes Wagner, “so too did the population of Amritsar fail to grasp the extent to which their mass protests sent the authorities into paroxysms of panic.” Officials were hardened by seeing a “fanatical” mob; the masses saw nothing but arrogant officialdom. Add to this mix “the brute reality of popular politics” and the “dynamics of crowd violence”, and the stage was set for Dyer.

Dyer, the head of the 45th Brigade at Jalandhar, some 50 miles away, was not summoned to Amritsar, he appeared uninvited. He told his son: “There is a big show coming.” Martial law was imposed, and all public gatherings banned, but the men sent out to announce this did a hopeless and poorly executed job of the orders. Most people remained oblivious as to what was happening. A meeting previously planned went ahead, with Dyer promptly decreeing this as undisguised provocation. “I was conscious of a great offensive movement gathering against me,” he later wrote, “and knew that to sit still… would be fatal… I knew a military crisis had come and that to view the assembly as a mere political gathering…was wholly remote from the facts.”

For Dyer, Amritsar was “the storm centre of a rebellion”. Other officials, too, interpreted every hint of discontent as the rumblings of a treacherous conspiracy. “My mind was made up… If my orders were not obeyed, I would fire immediately.” To not act would entail the military losing face, and this would embolden refractory “natives”. Dyer insisted that he was simply doing his “horrible, dirty duty”.

There was another figure, aside from the synonymity of Dyer with Amritsar, whose views shaped British responses at that time: the man who telegrammed Dyer his words of approval, Sir Michael O’Dwyer, Lieutenant Governor of Punjab. Born and raised in Ireland to dislike nationalists in his own country, O’Dwyer brought his imperious style to India. As Anita Anand writes in her new book on Amritsar, ever since his arrival, “the new Lieutenant Governor had been categorising Indians like a botanist documenting interesting but potentially dangerous specimens”. The Mahratta Brahmin was “intelligent… but often treacherous”. O’Dwyer’s language was often putrid and unseemly labelling many in India as “virile” and, unless firmly and tactfully handed, “obstinate to the point of fanaticism.” When legal obstacles were raised, the trenchant O’Dwyer dismissed the courts as taking “too technical and narrow” a view of evidence. It should come as no surprise that he and Dyer got along just fine.

The Patient Assassin by Anand is primarily the story of Udham Singh, the revolutionary who would assassinate O’Dwyer in 1940 in belated retaliation for Jallianwala Bagh. The narrative is dramatic and fast-paced, with the protagonist bringing everyone together from the Soviets to the Americans. Very little is known about Udham’s early life, and what is known is enveloped in myth and misconception. When Udham claimed he was in Jallianwala Bagh on that fateful day in 1919, it was unclear whether he was even in the city. Either way, as he put it after shooting O’Dwyer, “For full 21 years [sic] I have been trying to wreak vengeance.” For him “the real culprit” who wanted to “crush the spirit of my people” was not Dyer but the ex-Lieutenant Governor.

Udham Singh began life as Sher Singh – and, in his lifetime, would also become Ude Singh, Frank Brazil, Mahomed Singh Azad, and finally Prisoner 1010. He had lost both his parents and his brother by the age of 16. Raised in an orphanage, he acquired carpentry as his only skill. Towards the end of 1917, he enlisted into the British Army, serving briefly in Basra before being deemed unfit for service. There was an impetuosity and impulsiveness about him, a yearning for greatness, a confused but determined love for his country, and a charm that often got him out of tricky corners.

It was thanks to his powers of persuasion that in 1918 he managed to re-enlist in the army, before retiring to Amritsar in more honourable circumstances after the war, in 1919. He was attracted to the politics of the Ghadar Party – that network of expatriates who sought unsuccessfully and often amateurishly, to liberate India by force – and became a pamphlet mule, spreading their message around Amritsar and in the wider Punjab. The urge to make a difference, though, had to be carried alongside that other urge to feed himself, so that by 1920 in was in Africa working for a railway line like thousands of “coolies”.

Anand does a meticulous and determined job of tracing his steps and is able to debunk more than one theory about him. Surprisingly, given that the Ghadars are integral to Udham Singh’s tale, Anand doesn’t offer anywhere near as a complete treatment of the political party as one would reasonably expect. He encountered them again in Africa: later sailing back to India with more sedition in his suitcase. By 1922, he embarked to the United States, where he rose in their underground ranks while working as a mechanic. Whenever immigration caught up with him, Udham moved, until 1927 when he quit the country. Returning to Amritsar, he was apprehended, and, after confessing to his political activism with the Ghadars, was imprisoned.

In another mystifying twist, he had acquired a fresh passport by 1933, and set out for London. In the years that followed, he found himself a mysterious English girlfriend, working as a peddler of clothing and household goods, sang the praises of the revolutionary hero Bhagat Singh, appeared as an extra in the 1937 movie Elephant Boy, and in 1940 finally accomplished what he had pledged to do: by assassinating Michael O’Dwyer.

On the afternoon of 13 March, O’Dwyer attended Caxton Hall in Westminster to hear a lecture on Afghanistan. His assassin was waiting in the audience. When at the end of the event, the 75-year-old rose to talk to the speakers, Udham approached and shot him twice through the heart at close range, before turning his revolver on three other senior Raj officials, who were injured but not killed. One of the first things Udham did after being taken into custody was to ask police for a cigarette.

After he was hanged in an English prison, Udham laid for decades buried under English soil. In 1974, his remains were handed over to the Indian government, and in 2018, a statute was installed at Jallianwala Bagh. But Udham Singh remains an enigma: he was resident in London in the 1920s when he could easily have achieved his goal – why he didn’t we cannot say. Despite the almost impossible task of truly understanding Udham’s motivations, Anand does produce an engaging account of the times and of this unlikely hero. And though she is gripped by her subject, the author does not shirk away from his human failings. His legend now has it as picking up the bloodied earth from Jallianwala Bagh and vowing revenge for his murdered “brothers and sisters”. That his how his new statue depicts him. A century on, understanding the events of 1919 in a dispassionate historical sense, is essential. Anand achieves that in diligent and studious literary style.

 

HOW these two remarkable books will be received in India is uncertain. A hundred years later, Amritsar is still a deep wound that has still not healed. There are portions in Wagner’s book which will sit especially uneasily with hyper-nationalists. Visiting British dignitaries, from Queen Elizabeth to David Cameron, have expressed regret about 1919 – the former called it “distressing” while the latter saw it as “deeply shameful” – but an outright apology has never been offered.

Perhaps this year the British government might be inspired to say the words it has so far avoided. So central has Amritsar become in collective memory that a sincere expression of remorse would not only offer closure for relatives of those who suffered from the orders issued by Dyer but could encapsulate all other acts of injustice sponsored by the Raj. Surely this is something worth the British government’s attention, 100 years after one of its own instigated a massacre against unarmed civilians.

Appendage:

Amritsar 1919: An Empire of Fear & the Making of a Massacre, by Kim A Wagner, is published by Yale University Press, for £20, 360pp

 

The Patient Assassin: A True Tale of Massacre, Revenge and the Raj, by Anita Anand, is published by Simon & Schuster, for £20, 384pp

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Britain, European Union, Government, Politics, Society

The tawdry show of Brexit goes to the brink

BREXIT

The decision by Prime Minister Theresa May to delay the “meaningful” Commons vote on her Brexit deal until March 12 – just 17 days before the UK is due to leave the EU – is, unquestionably, a gamble that takes things to the very brink. It is a colossal gamble, but one in which Mrs May had little option but to take.

MPs on all sides will finally have to choose between Mrs May’s deal, No Deal, or effectively no Brexit. This has removed all bluster and political manoeuvring. It leaves just stark choices.

A rehashed motion from Labour’s Yvette Cooper and Tory Nick Boles which is expected to pass the chamber tomorrow is likely to concentrate minds further. That motion says that if no deal is agreed before March 13, Article 50 – our formal departure from the EU – should be delayed, taking No Deal off the table.

But this has two huge drawbacks. It removes a crucial bargaining chip with Brussels. And while saying what Brexit shouldn’t be, the motion offers no viable plan for what it should be. Those who support Mrs May’s withdrawal agreement will suggest, as they have consistently done, that the only plan that is viable, honours the referendum result and averts No Deal, is the Prime Minister’s plan.

Whilst the odds are daunting, there may still be a way in which she is able to get it through.

First, the EU must offer legally binding assurances over the so-called Irish backstop to satisfy the Democratic Unionist Party that Northern Ireland’s place in the UK is not under threat. Without that, the deal is dead – with potentially calamitous consequences for the whole of Europe.

If the DUP is assuaged, Tory hardliners in the European Research Group (ERG) led by Jacob Rees-Mogg, may be persuaded to back their leader – especially in light of the Cooper-Boles amendment which could stop Brexit altogether.

True, some ERG members appear so implacably opposed to the deal that almost nothing would change their minds.

But with Labour in open rebellion against its leader, some Opposition MPs – especially those from Leave-voting areas – may be prepared to defy the Corbyn whip and make up the numbers needed to push the agreement through.

To be realised, this will require good faith on all sides – something conspicuously lacking so far. No one is totally happy with the deal, but it provides a pragmatic compromise. Tory MPs especially need to rediscover the virtues of party loyalty and service to their constituents if they wish to stay in office and by remaining the ruling party – by backing it.

The clock is ticking louder than ever towards March 29.

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Britain, Government, Internet, Politics, Society

Internet safety: The era of tech self-regulation is ending

SOCIAL MEDIA

THE safety of the internet has been at the forefront of people’s minds in recent weeks. We have all heard the tragic stories of young and vulnerable people being negatively influenced by social media. Whilst the technology has the power to do good, it is clear that things need to change. With power comes responsibility and the time has certainly come for the tech companies to be held properly accountable.

. See also: Probe launched into online giants

The UK Government is serious in wishing to tackle many of the negative aspects associated with social media, and the forthcoming White Paper on online harms is indicative of their concern.

The world’s biggest technology firms, including Facebook, Twitter, Google and Apple are coming under increasing pressure from ministers who have made clear to them that they will not stand by and see people unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed to harm. They insist that if it wouldn’t be acceptable offline then it should not be acceptable online.

Safety is at the forefront of almost every other industry. The online world should be no different. Make no mistake, these firms are here to stay, and, as a result, they have a big role to play as part of the solution. It’s vital that they use their technology to protect the people – their customers – who use it every day.

It’s important not to lose sight of what online harms actually are. Yes, it includes things like cyberbullying, images of self -harm, terrorism and grooming. But disinformation – which challenges our ideas of democracy and truth – must be tackled head on, too.

Disinformation isn’t new. But the rise of tech platforms has meant that it is arguably more prevalent than ever before. It is now possible for a range of players to reach large parts of the population with false information. Tackling harms like disinformation is to be included in the Government’s White Paper. That will set out a new framework for making sure disinformation is tackled effectively, while respecting freedom of expression and promoting innovation.

In the UK, most people who read the news now do so online. When it is read across platforms like Facebook, Google and Twitter and then shared thousands of times, the reach is immense. False information on these platforms has the potential to threaten public safety, harm national security, reduce trust in the media, damage the UK’s global influence and by undermining our democratic processes.

To date, we’re yet to see any evidence of disinformation affecting democratic processes in the UK. However, that is something that the Government is continuing to keep a very close eye on.

Tools exist to enable action to be taken, particularly through the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI). We’ve already seen welcome moves from platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, which have developed initiatives to help users identify the trustworthiness of sources and which have shut down thousands of fake sites. Because voluntary measures have not been enough, the UK Government wants trustworthy information to flourish online and for there to be transparency so that the public are not duped. Parliament is said to care deeply about this, as a recent report from the Select Committee into disinformation shows.

But more needs to be done. One of the main recommendations in the Cairncross report on the future of journalism was to put a “news quality obligation” on the larger online platforms – placing their efforts to improve people’s understanding of the trustworthiness of news articles under regulatory supervision.

Online firms rely on the masses spending time online. Individuals should only really do that if they feel safe there. A safer internet is surely good for business too.

It seems apparent that we can no longer rely on the industry’s goodwill. Around the world governments are facing the challenge of how to keep citizens safe online. As the era of self-regulation comes to an end, it would now seem that the UK can and should lead the way.

 

THE internet is a liberating force, but also potentially a malign one. MPs and ministers have been all too happy to expound upon the undoubted benefits brought by the rapid growth of the digital economy. Yet they have struggled to come up with measures that would address the damage that it can cause – from social media addiction and the abuse of online platforms by child groomers and terrorists, to the links between internet use and poor mental health among children.

There are promising signs that action may be imminent, however. A new report recently released by the House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee calls for technology companies to be required to adhere to a Code of Ethics overseen by an independent regulator. The code would set down in writing what is and is not acceptable on social media, and the regulator, crucially, would have teeth: the power to launch legal action against firms that breach the code.

This is, undoubtedly, a welcome proposal. Much of the trouble that children and their parents have experienced online in recent years has been a consequence of a failure by the technology companies to take responsibility for the damage that their products and services can cause. They have continued to host harmful and sometimes illegal material, for example, and it is still too easy for young children to access their sites despite age limits.

As we can no longer rely on the industry’s goodwill, self-regulation has evidently failed. The photo sharing site Instagram, for instance, committed recently to banning all images of self-harm on its platform, but only after the outcry following the tragic death of a young and vulnerable person. Without legally-enforceable penalties, such companies – with their ‘move fast and break things’ cultures – face little incentive to prioritise the safety of their users, particularly young people and the vulnerable.

The Committee’s proposal currently remains just that, and the Government has pledged to produce a White Paper setting out how it intends to take the regulation of social media forward.

Half-measures will not be enough. Ministers must impose a statutory duty of care on the social media giants.

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