Category Archives: Politics

Government, Iran, Politics, Society, United Nations, United States

Iran and nuclear talks…

IRAN

Intro: Yet whatever comes of these negotiations will make it unlikely they will be seen as historic. If a comprehensive agreement is signed by the end of June it will be regarded as an important milestone passed on the way

The lengthy and protracted talks in Lausanne between Iran and six world powers in forging a deal to constrain its nuclear programme ran straight through the March 31st deadline. The cause of the overrun (and hence the need for more haggling) has been due to the tension between the fuzzy declaration of principles that the Iranians would prefer and the detailed framework agreement that the United States would need to persuade a sceptical Congress to postpone a vote on new sanctions on April 14th.

For Iran, any deal would require the staged lifting of sanctions. The Americans want precise numbers on how many uranium enrichment centrifuges Iran can activate, the exact quantities of uranium held and how much plutonium can be discharged at the reactor at Arak. At this stage, though, the Iranians want to avoid the specifics on its nuclear limits, while eager to secure firm commitments on the lifting of sanctions – particularly those imposed by the United Nations. For its part, the West wants automatic ‘snap-back’ on sanctions if any serious violation by Iran is detected, but Iran has rejected this demand.

Yet whatever comes of these negotiations will make it unlikely they will be seen as historic. If a comprehensive agreement is signed by the end of June it will be regarded as an important milestone passed on the way. But if the process collapses, the accord would amount to no more than a brave effort that met with failure.

The broad aim in Lausanne is to leave Iran free from most of the sanctions and far enough from acquiring a nuclear weapon. But the apparent inability to nail down critical details and the number of issues that remain unresolved means that the next phase of talks are likely to be even tougher. For America and its allies, forestalling Iran on the building of a nuclear weapon is first and foremost, as this would reduce the incentives for other regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to move towards the nuclear threshold themselves.

The yardstick is Iran’s ‘breakout capability’. This is the time it would take to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one device. Extending it from a couple of months, the situation today, to at least a year is a sensible and quantifiable goal. Iran had previously indicated it would cut its number of operating centrifuges to about 6,500. Not yet agreed is the amount of low-enriched uranium Iran will be allowed to stockpile – a variable which directly links to the number of centrifuges it can keep.

Iran requires low-enriched uranium for its medical and other civilian projects, but such stockpiles can easily be enriched to weapons grade material. However, the biggest problems which still need to be tackled lie elsewhere. There remains ambiguity about what rights the Iranians will have to continue nuclear research and development. Iran is working on centrifuges up to 20 times faster than today’s which they want to start deploying when the agreement’s first ten years are up. Better centrifuges would reduce the size of the covert enrichment facilities that Iran would need to build a weapon if it were so intent on escaping the agreement’s scriptures. That’s a real concern, as detection by the West would be far more difficult.

This leads to the issue on which everything else will eventually hinge. Iran has a long history of deception about its nuclear programme. For instance, it only declared its two enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow following exposure by U.S. intelligence. A highly intrusive inspection and verification regime is thus essential, and would have to continue long after other elements of an agreement expire. Compliance would mean inspectors from the IAEA being able to inspect any facility, declared or otherwise, civil or military, on demand.

IAEA powers are far more sweeping than those which exist under the safeguard agreements that are part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the ‘additional protocol’ granted to the IAEA, inspectors are allowed not only to verify that declared nuclear material is not being squirrelled away for military use but also to check for undeclared nuclear material and activities. In Iran’s case, such powers for the IAEA are seen as essential.

For a deal to be concluded in June, Tehran will have to consent to such a rigorous inspection regime. It will also have to address a string of questions posed by the IAEA over the ‘possible military dimensions’ of its nuclear programme. On March 23rd IAEA’s director, Yukiya Amano, said that Iran had only replied to one of those questions. Parchin, a military base which the IAEA believes may have been used for testing the high-explosive fuses that are needed to implode, and thus set off, the uranium or plutonium at the core of a bomb, remains strictly out of bounds. Nor has the agency been given access to some of Iran’s leading scientists such as Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the physicist and Revolutionary Guard officer who is alleged to be at the heart of the research on weapons development.

The IAEA’s report on Iran in February stated that it ‘remains concerned about the possible existence – of undisclosed nuclear-related activities – including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.’ Iran insists it will only sign up to strict new inspections when all the main elements of the deal are in place.

II

IT WOULD APPEAR that the talks in Lausanne concerning Iran’s nuclear ambitions are nearing a deal. But there will be questions as to whether the agreement is a good one, or whether indeed it allows Iran to keep a stockpile of centrifuges that can then be used to produce weapons grade enriched uranium. Analysts will be scrutinising the deal for signs of how this agreement will help move towards global security.

Iran continues to insist that it wants the nuclear technology for power plants and peaceful purposes only. It would be fair to say that there is a degree of scepticism around that as, Israel, for instance, remains very concerned and has threatened to attack Iran if it feels that is the only way to protect itself from nuclear attack. Israel’s rhetoric should not just be taken as soundbites. Israel has carried out a number of airstrikes in protection of its sovereignty over the years as far back as 1981. Then it carried out the world’s first airstrike against a nuclear plant when its jets bombed a French-built site in Iraq. Perhaps under US pressure Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has not played up past threats to attack Iran.

Whilst the Israelis are not party to the talks that is not to say they are in favour of how the talks are going. The deal being proposed in Switzerland now has taken some 18-months to arrive at. Mr Netanyahu has reiterated his opposition to the draft, saying it ‘bears out all of our fears, and even more than that’. Others, like the British, insist that any deal must put the bomb beyond the reach of Iran. But the problem here is that Israel does not believe that the restrictions being imposed would do that if Iran chose to suddenly abandon the agreement and gear up its nuclear programme through clandestine means.

There are only eight countries that have successfully detonated nuclear weapons – the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan and North Korea. It is widely believed that Israel also has nuclear weapons, a point the country is deliberately vague about.

The sceptics will always say that any deal will simply legitimise parts of the process and therefore make it easier for Iran to build a nuclear weapon should it choose to do so. There will also be long-term doubts about keeping all the necessary equipment and expertise for bomb-making out of Iran. How can we ever be sure the sanctions being applied are effective and fully-working for which they were intended?

In a passive sense, and in the long-term, it is surely better to have negotiations that keep Iran talking to the international community, as isolation would probably work against long-term peace and security.

Putting the bomb beyond reach is imperative. And the processes involved to make sure that does indeed happen must be verifiable, with confidence and accountability in that verification process.

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Aid, Government, Politics, Society, United Nations

Food, hunger and undernourishment…

ENOUGH TO GO AROUND

Global undernourishment shouldn’t exist. Each day the world’s farmers produce the equivalent of 2,868 calories per person on the planet – enough to surpass the World Food Programme’s recommended intake of 2,100 daily calories and enough to support a population inching toward nine billion. The world as a whole does not have a food deficit, but individual countries do.

Why do 805 million people still have little to eat? Access is the main problem. Incomes and commodity prices establish where food goes. The quality of roads and airports determines how easily it gets there. Even measuring undernourishment is a challenge. In countries with the highest historical proportions of undernourishment, it can be hard to get food in and data out.

Things are slowly getting better. Since the early 1990s world hunger has dropped by 40 percent – that means 209 million fewer undernourished people, according to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. Future progress may prove difficult, but it will be critical to first improve overall food production and availability in places like sub-Saharan Africa. Once that is secure, the focus can then turn to access.

What causes hunger?

Although there are enough calories for everyone alive, people go undernourished for a variety of reasons – virtually all of which are related to access. Reasons and specific examples include:

Natural Disasters – In Haiti, a series of events, including an earthquake (2010), hurricane (2012), and a drought (2014), have severely limited Haiti’s capacity to ease undernourishment.

Erratic Weather – Almost two-thirds of Bolivians living in rural areas of western South America depend on subsistence crops. Recurring droughts and floods bring food deficits. Undernourishment has stunted the growth of one-quarter of all children under five.

Civil War – In the Central African Republic, fighting between government forces and Muslim rebels has led to wide displacement. Farm yields decreased by 40 per cent from 2012 to 2013. Nine out of ten households report eating just one meal a day.

Economic Swings – Since the 2008 recession, Tajikistan has seen reduced prices for its main exports – cotton and aluminium – which has led to lower incomes. A majority of its people spend up to 80 percent of their income on food.

Poor Infrastructure – In Zambia, unreliable roads are the biggest barrier for Africa’s food imports and exports, according to the World Bank. Only 17 percent of the rural population has access to an all-weather road.

Restrictive Leaders – Strained diplomatic ties have resulted in severe sanctions on nearly all North Korean trade. Much of the population of North Korea relies on food rations. The country has received food aid from China, South Korea, and the United States.

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Britain, European Union, Government, Politics, Society

Should Britain leave the EU?

(From the archives) Originally posted on January 17, 2012 by markdowe

THE UK AND THE EU

Argument for the UK to leave the EU… The European Union was sold to the British people as an economic proposition. In exchange for giving up a measure of democratic self-government, it was assumed that the UK would be part of a flourishing trade bloc. The credibility of that argument has been seriously eroded – if not mortally wounded – as most British people associate the EU with a loss of sovereignty and a loss of prosperity. The argument for saying that the UK should leave the EU goes much deeper than the euro crisis – though that has certainly damaged the credibility of those EU pragmatists who, a decade ago, were assuring us that we would be ruined if we kept pound sterling. When Britain joined the European Union in 1973, Western Europe accounted for 40% of world GDP. Today that figure is 25%, and in 2020 it is projected to be just 18%. In retrospect, we could not have picked a worse moment to join. Western Europe had grown spectacularly during the three decades after the Second World War, the years of Germany’s Wirtschaftswunder. But following the OPEC oil crisis in the 1970s, it never properly got going again. Far from joining a dynamic market, we have confined ourselves in a cramped and declining customs union. In doing so, we have stood aside from the parts of the world which are still growing—not least the Anglosphere markets to which we are connected by affinities of habit, outlook and commercial practice. The inauguration in the 1950s of the European Economic Community (EEC) allowed a strong case to be made for regional blocs. Now, though, that case has been undermined and overtaken by technology. With the internet having removed the problem over distance, geographical proximity is not an issue in a globalised market in which Capital can surge around the planet at the mere touch of a button. A company located in the UK can deal as easily with one located within its own shores as it can with a firm located anywhere else. London has the benefit of being English-speaking. Others around the world will have similar accountancy techniques and use compatible common-law arbitration methods. The alternative to EU membership is a free-trade arrangement, along the lines of that enjoyed by Switzerland. Under a series of bilateral accords negotiated in the 1990s, along with the more recent Schengen Agreement, the Swiss participate fully in the four freedoms of movement of the single market – goods, services, people and capital. However, the Swiss are outside the common agricultural and fisheries policies and the EU’s political structures, and pay only a token contribution to the EU budget. Whilst true, of course, that Swiss exporters must meet EU standards when selling to the EU – just as they must meet standards when selling to anybody else – they are not obliged to apply every EU directive or diktat to their domestic economy. But, critically, they are also free in signing trade accords with third countries, and often do so when they feel that the EU is being pedantic or excessively protectionist. Britain, by contrast, is bound by the common external tariff, and is often prevented from adopting a more liberal position by the interest of a cosseted producer elsewhere in the EU. In 2010, the Swiss exported four times as much per head to the EU as the British did. What credibility does that give to the argument that the UK’s exports to the continent depends on its participation in the EU’s political structures? It can hardly be the case that other member states might discriminate against those exports if the UK were to leave the EU. The UK would still be covered by World Trade Organisation (WTO) and European Economic Area (EEA) rules. More to the point, perhaps, is that Britain’s trade with the EU, which was in surplus before it joined, has been in deficit in all but one of the subsequent years. In 2010, the UK ran a deficit of some £52.4 billion with the EU, but a net surplus of £15.7 billion with the rest of the world. Over the period to which Britain has held membership of the EU it has had a cumulative surplus with every continent except Europe. The UK’s trade deficit would not be a reason for leaving the EU. But it gives the lie to any notion that the other members would seek to restrict cross-Channel trade when they are the chief beneficiaries. Some might say that the EU is showing its age. Essentially, it is a 1950s construct, and is falling rapidly behind in a competitive and globalised world. If Britain were to leave there is nothing stopping it from maintaining its trade links with other countries in the EU, its intergovernmental co-operation and its commitment to the military alliance. Argument for the UK to stay in the EU… The pro-Europeans would start this debate against the backdrop of much negative public polling. Nevertheless, for the UK to cut itself off from a market of some 500m people generating in excess of £10 trillion would not just say we had lost faith in Europe, it would say we had lost faith in the ability of British companies to ever out-compete, out-innovate and out-think their European competitors. To consider how the debate has shifted in recent years, we should look no further than in comparing two ICM polls ten years apart. According to one poll, today, 49% of the public would vote to get the UK out of the EU, against just 40% who would prefer that Britain stayed in. When the pollster asked a slightly different worded question in May 2001, some 68% to 19% of the public indicated Britain should remain a member of the EU, a 49 percentage point lead for the pro-Europeans. One might suggest that there is an implicit propensity among some pro-Europeans to blame the media, or even the voters, for the fact that support has been deteriorating. But are pro-European propositions being rejected because they are not being proposed anywhere near enough in a pro-European way? Not that this will help those advocates win the argument as to why Britain should be firmly embedded within the European Union. For those who support the UK as an active member doesn’t necessarily imply that they will be defending the status quo in Europe or saying that Europe does not need to reform and change. By being part of a wider and integrated union gives a member nation within it influence and real power. There are two dominant arguments that resonate in terms of Britain’s continued EU membership. The first is on access to the single market, and being a powerful voice in shaping rules by which it is governed. Only those who want to compete on low-skill, low-value added production could argue that having access to these markets without a voice in shaping the rules would be sufficient for Britain. But that’s lubricious. Clearly, with a market of 500m people, Britain needs its companies to be competitive, innovative and by being in a position to out-think their competitors across the EU. Having a voice means engaging in a pragmatic way that benefits contributory nations. The position of the British Government has become a little difficult to understand. It is now understood that, despite the prime minister’s assurances, the new draft EU treaty does include references to the single market – but, for reasons not yet clear, David Cameron has decided to walk away from the table. Laws on common standards, educational property and competition need to be underwritten – such as those involving the law, business and financial services, medical technology and within creative industries – but if the UK is not in the room when critical decisions are being made on such matters, it will lose the ability to shape them in a way that is most advantageous to British business. The second most pressing argument for the UK remaining part of the EU relates to finding ways in which the British voice can be heard. In an era of billion-person countries and multi trillion-dollar economies, this is most likely to happen if the UK is part of a £10 trillion economy rather than just a £1.5 trillion economy. The only logical way to change the rules of the game with large emerging economies (such as China) is to work closely with our European partners. That’s the only way, surely, that markets will be prised open in these countries. Political and economic leadership is about doing what you think is right rather than what you think might get you short-term popularity. See also:

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