Asia, China, Japan, Politics, Society, United States

The embroilment over the Senkaku Islands between Japan and China…

SENKAKU ISLANDS

Intro: Japan and China, and America’s delicate balancing act

The row between Japan and China over the Senkaku islands is escalating. It has implications for almost everyone.

The Senkaku (or to China the Diaoyu) is an obscure archipelago comprising a tiny chain of five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks, located hundreds of miles from land. To an outside observer this might seem an unlikely prize given the awkwardness of the island’s geographical position, but with everything from oil revenues to regional clout at stake, the dispute in Asia is cause for grave concern.

The history concerning ownership of the islands is important to understand. Whilst Beijing maintains that the islands were claimed by China in the 1300s, Tokyo insists they were classed as an international no man’s land until Japan seized control and took them over in 1895. The political dispute has been rumbling on since the 1970s, but the pressure has steadily increased in recent years as a newly rich and empowered China has sought to flex its regional muscles by attempting to extend its influence in the US-dominated Pacific.

Last year, Japan stoked tensions with the announcement by the Governor of Tokyo of plans to use public money to purchase the islands from their private owner. That hardly gave notice of Japan’s intention to defuse ongoing tensions. Now, though, it is China that has upped the ante. Last week, Beijing declared a new ‘air defence identification zone’ covering a swathe of the South China Sea, including the disputed islands. The order from China requires all aircraft entering the sector to submit flight plans or face ‘defensive emergency measures’. This was always going to be contentious, if not provocative for Tokyo, as the area overlaps with one of Japan’s own air defence zones.

Indeed, Tokyo’s response was swift and uncompromising. The Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, derided the plan as being ‘unenforceable’ and of having ‘no validity’. Two Japanese long-haul airlines which initially complied with Beijing’s demands were soon persuaded to withdraw their co-operation.

The reaction of the United States, however, has been imperative here. Because Washington has a post-war commitment to the defence of Japanese territory (which includes the Senkaku Islands), and given its recent foreign policy ‘pivot to Asia’, Beijing’s moves are increasingly being interpreted as a test of resolve for Barack Obama and of Mr Abe. America’s orientation towards Asia has stemmed from China’s rising power.

The U.S. has acted decisively. This week, it sent two unarmed B52s through the zone without notifying the Chinese authorities.

In an attempt to pacify tensions being inflamed still further, the Pentagon quickly claimed the flight was a long-planned training mission. For many analysts, though, the message is crystal clear – particularly given that it came days after the Defence Secretary, Chuck Hagel, denounced Beijing’s move as a ‘destabilising attempt to alter the status quo in the region’. Mr Hagel stated, too, that American military operations or its foreign policy on Asia would not change.

America’s intervention and move has been the right one, simply on the premise that China cannot be allowed to throw its weight around. If Beijing has a case then it must be sought through the correct legal channels, not implemented and administered unilaterally because of its desire to control.

Japan must also bear some responsibility in provoking tensions as flashpoints have become commonly frequent. In equal fashion it has shown itself too ready to indulge in rhetorical chest-beating with Mr Abe at times exhibiting disturbingly nationalist leanings. For the U.S., maintaining regional balance is paramount, and it should not been seen to be endorsing posturing from either side.

The diplomatic task facing the US in Asia is as difficult and perilous as any it is currently faced with. The Senkaku Islands may be just a few distant and remote rocks, but the chances are they could become the fulcrum upon which one of the greatest challenges of 21st century geopolitics lie. With both Beijing and Tokyo under growing domestic pressure for a show of strength abroad, and with the inevitable disruption that China’s economic rise will cause, America must be sure of its approach in maintaining regional balance.

At the heart of the dispute are eight uninhabited islands and rocks in the East China Sea. They have a total area of about 7 sq km and lie north-east of Taiwan, east of the Chinese mainland and south-west of Japan's southern-most prefecture, Okinawa. The islands are controlled by Japan.

At the heart of the dispute are eight uninhabited islands and rocks in the East China Sea. They have a total area of about 7 sq km and lie north-east of Taiwan, east of the Chinese mainland and south-west of Japan’s southern-most prefecture, Okinawa. The islands are controlled by Japan.

Related issue:

In response to an article published on The Economist, dated 20 October, 2012, entitled: ‘Rattling the supply chains’, MD wrote:

‘The simmering tensions between Beijing and Tokyo over the Senkaku islands has prompted questions over what the high-profile dispute could mean for proposed trade talks between Asia’s two largest economies and South Korea, as well as for regional trade overall.

An announcement in May of this year was made of plans to open formal trade negotiations between Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing. They agreed to begin the talks by the end of 2012 but this deadline has lately been called into question, with many analysts believing that two of the three parties might not even make it to the negotiating table.

The tensions between China and Japan stem from a territorial dispute over a series of tiny islands in the East China Sea, an area to which both countries have now laid claim. The islands – known as Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China – have symbolic significance, with their surrounding waters said to be rich in natural gas deposits.

The row, which has intensified rapidly in recent weeks, reached new heights in the past few days when Chinese finance officials pulled out of attending annual meetings with the IMF and World Bank that were being hosted by Tokyo. How the disagreement will be resolved remains unclear, as well as what the broader trade implications could be. The tri-lateral trade agreement with South Korea, for instance, might be under threat.

However, despite their disagreements, Chinese and Japanese officials have made clear that the proposed free trade agreement could have major benefits for both economies. Regardless of his insistence that his country will not cede sovereignty of the disputed territory, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda has openly acknowledged the value of eliminating trade barriers with Asia’s most powerful country. In the last decade alone, trade between the two nations has tripled, reaching more than $340 billion. A continuing row is not only likely to damage what has been a healthy relationship over the past ten years but could prove troublesome for the wider Asia region. Regional trade could be affected; ties between many countries could radically change because, invariably, any major trade relationship will always involve Japan and China.

Some of the predicted effects are beginning to surface. Japanese car exports to China have suffered since the dispute began and according to the latest JPMorgan Chase projections, could decrease by as much as 70 per cent in the final quarter of this year.’

Standard
Britain, Government, Iran, United Nations, United States

The Iranian deal exposes concerns but it’s worth the risk…

GENEVA AGREEMENT

Whilst the initial period of the Geneva agreement lasts only six months, and much of what has been agreed is based on trust, there is no doubt that Iran could have been in a position to assemble a nuclear device by next summer. Even a modest hiatus in its atomic preparations should be embraced as it pretty much ensures Israel will take no precipitate action.

Related:

The interim agreement is a good way of testing if Iran can be trusted to keep its word. Tehran has agreed to give UN and IAEA inspectors’ better access to its reprocessing facilities, a promise that will be difficult to fudge or renege on without exposing bad faith or some covert hidden agenda. Critics are right in their assertions that the accord does nothing to dismantle Tehran’s capability to process weapons grade uranium whenever it wants, but securing the right to inspect the regime’s nuclear plants is a necessary and vital concession. This establishes a clear diplomatic tripwire that Tehran crosses at its peril.

There is, though, still much to worry about in this deal. The Iranian economy has been brought to its knees by western sanctions and the regime has been more than desperate to win a respite to mollify internal dissent and unrest. In many ways, President Hassan Rouhani has achieved that objective at comparatively modest cost, and has subsequently strengthened the grip of Iran’s religious dictatorship.

Israeli fears are well known in letting Iran off the hook. But others, too, notably Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, have greeted the Geneva agreement with stony silence. They fear that a diplomatic win for Tehran will strengthen the resolve even further of President Assad in Syria, Iran’s client state and political ally.

On the balance of things, the Geneva deal should be deemed a worthy risk. Tehran has felt the full throttle of western sanctions and the sharpness of its teeth. It must also realise that having offered Iran diplomatic concessions and held Israel in check, President Obama will have no option but to take punitive military action if Iran reneges on its nuclear promises.

The onus in turning this interim deal into something permanent is now on Barack Obama and William Hague, Britain’s Foreign Secretary. Their job will be to tame and dismantle Tehran’s nuclear threat once and for all. Any final agreement must see Iran disband its tens of thousands of uranium processing centrifuges – far more than is needed for any purely civilian atomic energy programme. Iran’s plant for making plutonium – which can only have a military intent – must also be dismantled. It would also make sense for Tehran to dispose of the excessive amounts of low enriched uranium it already possesses – enough to make at least six atomic bombs if those stocks were sufficiently enriched to weapons grade material.

Standard
Government, Iran, Israel, Middle East, Politics, United Nations, United States

The Geneva agreement between the U.S. and Iran…

INTERIM DEAL

The interim deal between the United States and Iran has made significant progress that will halt the advancement of the Iranian nuclear program, but it is also weak in some important respects.

The deal makes no mention of potential military action if Iran does not live up to its obligations. However, the deal is a ground-breaking agreement that will attempt to resolve longstanding concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The interim deal ties Tehran to an ongoing diplomatic process whose primary rewards remain deferred until a far more ambitious and comprehensive agreement can be achieved.

Describing the agreement as an ‘initial, six-month deal’, President Obama said it includes ‘substantial limitations’ that will deter Iran from creating a nuclear weapon.

U.S. negotiators said the deal addresses Iran’s ability to enrich uranium and its existing enriched uranium stockpiles, but details on this remain unclear. It also dealt with Iran’s centrifuges, a component part needed which can enrich uranium for fuel for a bomb, and its ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium using the Arak reactor.

Mr Obama, both in his televised statement to the nation and the fact sheet issued by the White House, committed to no additional nuclear-related sanctions against Iran as long as Iran abides by it. Many in Congress, though, have said new sanctions are necessary to make sure Iran abandons what they consider a path toward developing nuclear weapons. Others say that whilst they share Mr Obama’s desire to resolve the nuclear dispute with Iran through diplomacy continuity for stronger sanctions against Iran is still needed to make sure diplomacy succeeds. Bipartisan legislation is expected in the United States that will impose tough new economic sanctions if Iran undermines the interim accord or if the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is not underway by the end of the six-month period.

For some, the interim deal provides the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism with billions of dollars of cash in exchange for cosmetic concessions which will neither freeze nor significantly roll-back its nuclear infrastructure.

Whilst there is also a perception that this is a deal that reflects Iran buckling under the weight of international sanctions which has truly bowed to global pressure, there is also a risk of the final deal being buttressed if factors such as a hard deadline for a final agreement is pursued, a caveat previously imposed by the United Nations Security Council. The UN has passed multiple resolutions demanding that Iran suspend its production of nuclear fuel, with a threat of military force if terms are not met.

Contentiously, before the deal in Geneva had been announced, Iranian officials said that any interim deal must declare production of nuclear fuel as an ‘Iranian sovereign right’. But even limited enrichment facilities will allow Iran to still be in a position to build all the elements to acquire a nuclear infrastructure without ever actually turning it on. The permission to enrich will ensure that the Iranian nuclear program remains an international issue for many years.

ISRAEL

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu now appears to have little choice but to accept this deal that he has derided as deeply flawed.

Mr Netanyahu believes the six-month deal leaves Iran’s military nuclear capabilities largely intact, while giving Iran relief from painful economic sanctions, undermining negotiations on the next stage. At the same time, Israel’s strongest piece of leverage, the threat of a military strike on Iran, seems to be out of the question despite Netanyahu’s insistence it would remain on the table. Mr Netanyahu has referred to the deal as a ‘historic mistake.’

He said Israel was not bound by the agreement, and reiterated Israel’s right to ‘defend itself by itself,’ a veiled reference to a possible military strike against Iran.

Mr Netanyahu has spent years warning the world against the dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran, calling it an existential threat due to Iranian references to Israel’s destruction, its support of hostile militant groups on Israel’s borders and its development of missiles capable of reaching Israel and beyond.

Israel also believes that a nuclear-armed Iran will provide militant groups like Lebanon’s Hezbollah an ‘umbrella’ of protection that will embolden them to carry out attacks.

Netanyahu had said that any deal must ensure that Iran’s enriching of uranium — a key step toward making a nuclear bomb — must end. He also said all enriched material should be removed from the Islamic Republic, and called for the demolition of a plutonium reactor under construction.

A deal that would satisfy Israel was never likely from the outset due to differing ‘red lines’ between Israel and the U.S.

While Israel sees any enrichment as a cause for concern, the U.S. was willing to tolerate nuclear development as long as it was unable to produce weapons.

U.S. negotiators have said that the relief from sanctions was minimal and that the most biting economic measures, including sanctions on Iran’s vital oil industry, remained in place and more could be imposed if Iran fails to follow through.

Israel’s relationship with the U.S. will be critical as it conducts peace talks with the Palestinians in the coming months. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who is mediating the talks, has set an April target date for reaching an agreement, and there is widespread speculation that the Americans will step up their involvement as the deadline approaches. Given this, Israel’s main card – military action against Iran – appears to be out of the question despite some hard hitting Israeli rhetoric on the Geneva agreement.

Enrichment is at the heart of the dispute because it can be used for peaceful purposes or for producing a nuclear bomb. Tehran insists its nuclear program is for civilian usage such as energy production and for use in medical treatment.

Uranium at low levels of enrichment, up to 20 percent, is used in research or generating electricity. Uranium must be enriched to a far higher level — above 90 percent — to produce a warhead. So far, Iran is not known to have produced any at that level, but Israel argues that the technology for doing so is the same as that for enriching at lower levels.

Under the compromise, enrichment would be capped at the 5 percent level, and Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent uranium would be ‘neutralised,’ effectively preventing it from reaching weapons-grade level. Also construction on the plutonium reactor is to be suspended. The White House also promised ‘intrusive monitoring’ of Iranian nuclear facilities.

Israel says any enriched uranium in Iranian hands is potentially dangerous, since its centrifuges can quickly convert it to weapons grade. Israel believes that Iran’s ability to keep its nuclear infrastructure intact will allow it to quickly resume the program if the talks fail.

In all, about 250 kilograms (550 pounds) of highly enriched uranium is needed to make a weapon. Iran already has about 200 kilograms (440 pounds) of enriched uranium.

The Geneva accord is not all bad for Israel, since Iran is deemed to have capped enrichment activity and slowed construction of the plutonium reactor. However, Iran’s ability to ‘break out and make a nuclear explosive device does remain intact, and is a concern being expressed by Israeli officials.

Standard