Afghanistan, Britain, Economic, Government, Politics, Society, United Nations, United States

Afghanistan is a booming narco-state…

Intro: Afghanistan is an affluent narcotic state despite the country being invaded to liberate it from the drugs trade

Prior to the war in Afghanistan, the then British prime minister, Tony Blair, said that one of the most compelling reasons for going to war was to curtail the trade in narcotic drugs such as heroin and opium. However, if one was to examine the facts it would be shown that the Taliban government had already started to deactivate Afghanistan’s drugs trade. In 2000, the Taleban were the ruling authority in the country and had declared the heroin trade as being ‘un-Islamic’. Following that decree the fundamentalist regime managed to reduce production by 99 per cent in the areas that it controlled. Yet, by contrast, the war with the West has witnessed a lucrative market for Afghan’s poppy farmers. After more than 12 years of fighting – which has cost Britain dear in terms of lost lives and resources expended – opium production in Afghanistan is at a record high. The United Nations drugs agency says that the area under cultivation rose by 36 per cent in 2013 and that Afghanistan now provides 90 per cent of the world’s heroin. The country Britain invaded partly to liberate it from the drugs trade has become a flourishing and affluent narcotic-state.

Was there a way in which this now booming trade could have been stopped? Arguably, if the West had put all its resources and efforts into eradication the likelihood of crushing the drugs trade in Afghanistan  would have been high. Unless that task is approached with the ruthless methods and barbarism of the Taliban, any other approach would likely falter. The planting of an alternative crop may have been another consideration but even that would have been troublesome because Afghanistan’s environment makes it perfect for poppy cultivation but inhospitable to almost anything else.

A genuine alternative, however, might be to turn the situation to the world’s advantage. Four years into the Afghan campaign, the Senlis Council, a think tank, suggested buying the crop and using it to manufacture palliative medicines for Western consumers – turning Afghanistan’s poppy farmers into legitimate businessmen.

If we consider that opium poppies are already grown under strict legal controls in India, and also in Britain, the idea is not as radical as it might sound. The world has a shortage of pharmaceutical painkillers, such as morphine and codeine, and the Afghan farmers could easily meet that demand. Whether the country has the ability to police such an ambitious programme, though, does raise doubts. One thing above all else is certain: the West has lost its war on the poppy.

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European Union, Government, Iran, Middle East, Politics, Society, United Nations, United States

Negotiations between Iran and the West on Tehran’s nuclear ambitions…

A NEED FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

Expectations of an agreement over the Iranian nuclear programme have been high ever since the recent trip to Washington by Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s president, who declared to the United Nations he wanted better relations with the West. It is little surprise, however, that such a realisation has not been met. The immense difficulties facing the negotiations in Geneva in the last few days faded into the background amid speculation of a ‘historic deal’ and an imminent end to decades of mutual suspicion and misunderstanding. The Geneva talks concluded last weekend without any deal in sight, with many analysts branding the discussions a failure.

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There is still some cause for optimism. Since Mr Rouhani took over the Iranian presidency from the bellicose and belligerent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June, the rhetoric emanating from Tehran has been markedly softened in tone and style. With international sanctions – both EU and US – biting hard on ordinary Iranians, domestic pressure for a deal on its nuclear programme with the West cannot be ignored. Particularly so given that inflation is running at 40 per cent, and that Iran’s economy has shrunk by more than 5 per cent since the imposition of sanctions took effect. The number of families below the poverty line has doubled to four in ten, exasperated by several currency devaluations that have had an adverse effect on the net worth of many Iranian families. Assets have depreciated and net incomes have been seriously eroded. Focusing minds, too, is the threat of Israeli air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, not to mention the Islamic Republic’s pivotal position in a volatile and unstable region, including that of Syria.

The difficulties for the West in reaching a mutual agreement with Tehran still rest upon two primary sticking points. One is the question about the future of the heavy-water reactor being built at Arak. The other is what to do with Iran’s existing stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and centrifuges. Tehran appears determined to retain its ‘rights to enrichment’ (enriched uranium is required and allowed for its medical programmes), though the international community, not unreasonably, remains sceptical. Enriching uranium to weapons grade material that would fit into the head of a ballistic missile is easily enough done.

Yet, we are far from stalemate. Just as those predicting immediate success were unduly hasty, so are those now rendering and calling for defeat. John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State, spent eight hours at the negotiating table, the longest such high-level talks between the US and Iran since 1979 – no small achievement in itself. Mr Kerry’s assertion that ‘we are closer now than when we came’ cannot simply be dismissed out of hand. With negotiations to restart in a week’s time – albeit between diplomats rather than foreign ministers – the process is far from over.

Coupled into the equation is the danger of the moment. Barack Obama’s critics in Congress, largely fuelled by Israeli’s inflammatory opposition to a deal, are already pushing for more sanctions. In Iran, the frustration of public demands for immediate relief could well erode support for further discussions that many Iranians feel infringe on national sovereignty. Apparent divisions in the international community, exemplified by France’s outspoken warnings about a ‘fool’s game’ before the Geneva talks were concluded, will not help either.

Perseverance in seeking a deal along current lines remains key as no other constructive alternative exists, but in reaching an agreement concessions will be required from both sides. The notion that the Islamic Republic continues with some degree of uranium enrichment may not be palatable and will be contested by those who remain deeply sceptical of Iran’s objectives. However, it is allowed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and – in return for close controls and even closer oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – it is a better and plausible option than either accepting an Iran with nuclear weapons or by attempting to bomb them out of existence.

A deal with Iran may have a high price, but the value will be enormous. This will not only patch up one of the world’s most dangerous and intractable disputes but, an accord between Iran and the West could also help to resolve any number of issues bedevilling the Middle East, not least the internecine civil war and bloody conflict in Syria.

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Britain, Government, Intelligence, National Security, Society, Technology, United States

The appearance of the heads of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Services before Parliament…

A WELCOME STEP

Yesterday, the heads of the three intelligence services in Britain – MI5, MI6 and GCHQ – gave evidence in public for the first time before Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC).

Underlying the examination was one of the oldest questions about the nature of state-sponsored surveillance: who monitors and regulates the watchers? An analysis of what was said should glean that we did not learn a great deal that we did not already know. The transparency element, for example, went only so far. They appeared suitably nondescript, too, with faces you would quickly forget in a crowd, a prerequisite for any spymaster.

MI6 chief Sir John Sawers, GCHQ chief Sir Iain Lobban and Andrew Parker, who handles intelligence agents in the UK, deserve some credit for showing up, given their keen professional aversion to public exposure in a political theatre. This should be seen as a welcome step in the right direction if the work of the agencies is to be more open and less susceptible to caricature by conspiracy theorists.

Three developments compelled yesterday’s momentous public appearance. The first is the leaks by the former US national security contractor Edward Snowden which revealed extensive spying by GCHQ and the US National Security Agency. The scope and extent of this surveillance, its modus operandi and authorisation frameworks are matters of high public interest and concern given our historic traditions of personal privacy and public angst over the monitoring activities of government into citizens’ lives.

The second is the revolution wrought by communications technology with subsequent and resultant concerns over data protection. And the third is the sizeable increase to the budget of the security services to combat ‘terrorist’ threats. Balancing the duty to protect the public from dangerous and highly-organised would-be killers with how that objective is achieved by SIS (Security & Intelligence Services) is bound to create conflicts.

For spymasters, whose stock in trade is secrecy, it is perhaps too much for others to expect answers to be given in public about what they do. Such shortcomings soon became apparent during exchanges about the impact of the leaks perpetrated by Mr Snowden. Sir Iain Lobban denounced the way the disclosure of thousands of covert documents had hampered his agency’s efforts to thwart the nation’s enemies. Sir Iain claimed it had put the security effort back many years. In a similar vein, Sir John Sawers insisted our adversaries were ‘rubbing their hands with glee’ as a result. When asked, though, for specific details they retreated behind a cloak of secrecy, saying that to divulge such information would compound the damage.

Because of the synthetic nature of the exercise, the imperfections exposed matters that could not be revealed and which the public would not expect to be told. It is from this point, then, where we have to rely on systems of parliamentary oversight and surveillance protocols to work effectively.

It is indicative that the parliamentary committee for security and intelligence hold the chiefs accountable in private for the allegations they have made and to establish whether their concerns are substantively genuine. The ISC should then report its findings to the public.

The issue of mass surveillance was also raised at a time when it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep an appropriate balance between intrusion and security because communications technology is developing so rapidly. On being asked how legislation setting out their powers can possibly be relevant today when it was last updated 13 years ago, Mr Parker of MI5 said the law was a matter for parliament, not the intelligence chiefs. They also punctured the notion that simply because something is secret does not mean it is also sinister.

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