Tag Archives: David Hume

Arts, Philosophy, Science

Philosophy: Facts and ideas

REASON AND EXPERIENCE

Intro: Like John Locke before him, David Hume believed that our knowledge derives primarily from experience. However, he also argued that we can never know anything about the world with certainty

Natural assumptions

David Hume (1711–1776) was primarily interested in epistemology (the nature of knowledge), rather than metaphysics (the nature of the universe). In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, he set out to examine the way that human psychology determines what we can and cannot know, and in particular what we can and cannot know for certain.

Although an empiricist – that is, he believed that experience is our primary source of knowledge – Hume conceded that many propositions, such as mathematical axioms, can be arrived at by reason alone and cannot be doubted: to doubt that 2+2=4 is to fail to understand its meaning. However, he argued that such truths tell us nothing about the world: they simply express relationships between ideas. To gain knowledge about the world we need experience, but Hume argues that such knowledge can never be certain. We are therefore caught on the prongs of a fork: on the one hand, we have certainty about things that tell us nothing about the world; on the other hand, our knowledge about the world is never certain.

Hume argues that it is human nature to make assumptions about the world, especially that it is predictable and uniform. We assume, for example, that when a brick is thrown at a window the brick “causes” the window to smash. However, Hume argues that all we know for certain is that throwing a brick at a window is regularly followed by the window smashing. We never perceive causes, he says, but only a “constant conjunction” of events – that is, the regular occurrence of certain events following others. We only imagine a “link” between them.

Hume is not saying we are wrong to make assumptions – life would be impossible without them. Rather, he is suggesting that we should recognise the extent to which assumptions govern our lives, and not confuse them with the truth.

Relations of ideas

Statements of this kind are necessary truths, which means that they cannot be contradicted logically. For example, it is not possible to say that the angles of a triangle do not add up to 180 degrees, or that 2 plus 2 does not equal 4. We can be certain of such truths, but they tell us nothing about the world: they merely express relationships between ideas.

Hume’s fork

For Hume, there are two kinds of truth: “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact”. The former are true by definition, while the latter depend on the facts. Philosophers call this distinction “Hume’s fork”.

Matters of fact

Statements of this kind are contingent, which means that their truth or falsehood depend on whether or not they represent the facts. For example, it is not illogical to deny the statements “It is snowing” or “I have a cat”. Their truth depends simply on the current state of the weather and whether I own a cat or not.

“Custom, then, is the great guide of human life.” – David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)

THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

Hume argued that general statements such as “The Sun rises in the east” are logically unjustified because we cannot prove that the Sun will not rise in the west tomorrow. This also means that scientific claims, such as “The Moon orbits the Earth”, are unjustified because we may discover, for example, that the Moon may also behave in a different way tomorrow. Such statements are known as “inductions”, because they use the inductive method of reasoning – that is, they make general claims based on a limited number of particular cases or events. There are different types of inductive argument which will be examined in detail in a future entry.

NEED TO KNOW

. According to Hume, the difference between mathematics and the natural sciences is that mathematical truths are what he calls “relations or ideas”, or necessary truths, whereas scientific truths are contingent, or conditional, “matters of fact”.

. Half a century before Hume, Gottfried Leibniz made a similar distinction between truths of reasoning and truths of fact. Leibniz was an accomplished mathematician. He invented calculus (which Isaac Newton was also instrumental in) and was characterised as an optimistic philosopher. He believed that God is supremely perfect, and that ours is the best possible world – one in which the modern “monads” exist in harmony. The word “monad” is derived from the Greek word monas, meaning “unit”, which Leibniz borrowed to describe the fundamental units of existence. He distinguished “truths of reasoning” from “truths of fact”.

. Immanuel Kant and later philosophers distinguished between analytic statements, whose truth can be established by reasoning alone, and synthetic statements, which are verified by reference to the facts.

Standard
Arts, Philosophy, Psychology, Science

Philosophy: David Hume

EMPIRICIST & ESSENTIAL THINKER (1711–1776)

– A narrative and critique on the philosophy of David Hume

David Hume is the philosophical hero of modern day sceptics and empiricists, renouncing all knowledge except that which can be gained from the senses. Alas, as Quine would later famously say, echoing Hume, what can be garnered from the senses is, after all, not much.

From Locke, Hume had drawn the conclusion that all human knowledge is based on relations amongst ideas, or “sense impressions”. Anything not given in experience is mere invention and must be ruthlessly discarded. As a result he denies the existence of God, the self, the objective existence of logical necessity, causation, and even the validity of inductive knowledge itself. His aim is twofold: at once demolitionary – to rid science of all falsehoods based on “invention rather than experience” – and constructive, to found a science of human nature. Much impressed with how Isaac Newton had described the physical world according to simple mechanical laws, Hume had a mind to do something similar for the nature of human understanding. His Treatise on Human Nature is a painstaking study in experimental psychology in search of general principles. In this, however, Hume can be seen as being spectacularly unsuccessful, primarily because his whole taxonomy of “impressions” and “ideas” is derived from the much discredited Cartesian model. Nevertheless, Hume’s negative program is a devastating example of the power of logical critique. His sceptical results, especially regarding induction, remain problematic for modern philosophers.

Hume observes that we never experience our own self, only the continuous chain of experiences themselves. This psychological fact leads Hume to the dubious metaphysical conclusion that the self is an illusion, and in fact personal identity is nothing but the continuous succession of perceptual experience. “I am,” Hume famously says, “nothing but a bundle of perceptions”. Following a similar line of thought, Hume notices that the force that compels one event to follow another, causation, is also never experienced in sense impressions. All that is given in experience is the regular succession of one kind of event being followed by another. But the supposition that the earlier event, the so-called “cause”, must be followed by the succeeding event, the “effect”, is merely human expectation projected onto reality. There is no justification for believing that there is any casual necessity in the ordering of events.

Hume’s scepticism does not stop there, and the belief in causation is just a special case of a more general psychological trait: inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning is the process that leads us to make generalisations from observing a number of similar cases. For example, having observed many white swans but no black swans, one might seemingly be justifiably led to the conclusion that “All swans are white”. Equally, being aware that men often die, we conclude “All men are mortal”. But such generalisations go beyond what is given in experience and are not logically justified. After all, black swans were found in Australia, and there is always the logical possibility of coming across an immortal man. Hume claimed that inductive reasoning could not be relied upon to lead us to the truth, for observing a regularity does not rule out the possibility that next time something different will occur. Since all scientific laws are merely generalisations from inductive reasoning, this so-called “problem of induction” has been pressing for philosophers of science. Trying to show how induction is justified has taxed them throughout the 20th and 21st Centuries. Karl Popper is notable for offering the most promising solution to Humean scepticism. Popper’s brand of scientific method, ‘falsificationism’ gave rise to a whole new area of debate in the philosophy of science. According to Popper, the mark of a scientific theory is whether it makes predictions which could in principle serve to falsify it.

Standard
Arts, Britain, Economic, History, Philosophy, Politics, Scotland, Society

Quantum Leaps: Adam Smith (1723-1790)…

‘UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INTENDED ACTION’

Scottish philosopher of morals, politics and economics, Adam Smith was a contemporary of the Empiricist, David Hume (1711-1776), and is very close to him in outlook and philosophic temperament. His lectures on ethics and logic were published under the title Theory of the Moral Sentiments but he is most famous for his work of political economics, The Wealth of Nations.

Favoured philosopher of Margaret Thatcher and darling of Conservative economists, Smith is famous for his views on private property, the free market economy and the doctrine that ‘unintended consequences of intended action’ will be to the benefit of society at large. The idea behind this most fortunate if true of principles is that in intentionally serving one’s interests one unintentionally serves the interests of society as a whole.

'The Wealth of Nations' is one of the most important and deservedly read works of economic and political philosophy in the history of Western thought.

‘The Wealth of Nations’ is one of the most important and deservedly read works of economic and political philosophy in the history of Western thought.

A simple example will illustrate the essence of Smith’s idea. Suppose that Jones, in seeking his own fortune, decides to set up and run his own business, manufacturing some common item of everyday need. In seeking to provide for his own fortune, Jones’ entrepreneurial enterprise has a number of unintentional benefits to others. First, he provides a livelihood for the people in his employ, thus benefiting them directly. Second, he makes more readily available some common item which previously had been more difficult or more expensive to obtain for his customers, thus easing one, if only minor, aspect of their lives. The forces of market economy ensure that these unintentional benefits occur, for if Jones’ workers could find more profitable employ elsewhere they would either cease to work for him or he would have to raise their salaries in order to secure a workforce. Likewise, if Jones’ product was available more readily or less expensively from some other source, Jones would either go out of business or be forced to lower his prices to a competitive rate. The model assumes the absence of a monopoly, both in the labour and economic markets.

The belief that ‘unintended consequences of intended action’ will be of benefit to society held great imaginative power over the industrial philanthropists of the 18th and 19th Centuries and provided the philosophical groundwork for the later ethical theories of Bentham and Mill. However, criticism is not hard to come by. It is surely a blinkered view, if comforting for the entrepreneurial capitalist, to suppose that pursuing one’s own self-interest constitutes a magnanimous and philanthropic act towards society at large. One has only to review the social history of industrial Britain, to witness the treacherous and exploitative working practices of the industrial age, the extreme poverty and degrading social conditions of the suffering working classes, to realise Smith’s idealistic model has far more serious ‘unintended’ consequences. What has largely brought an end to such conditions in the industrialised West is not a triumphant adherence to Smith’s principles in Western economics, but a shifting of the poverty and exploitative working practices from one part of the world to another. In other words, the living conditions of those in the West has improved to the detriment of other countries just insofar as the labour required to support Smith’s economic philosophy has been removed from Western societies and transferred to those of the Third World.

Related:

Regardless of one’s political views on Smith, The Wealth of Nations is one of the most important and deservedly read works of economic and political philosophy in the history of Western thought. It needs to be read and understood by its detractors as much as it does by its supporters.

Standard