Tag Archives: Sanctions

Britain, Economic, Europe, European Union, Financial Markets, G7, Government, Politics, Russia, Society, Ukraine, United States

Ukraine: Imposing tougher sanctions on Russia is needed…

UKRAINE

Intro: Sanctions, if stringent enough, could bring pressure to bear on Vladimir Putin

A strongly worded statement by the heads of the G7 leading nations condemning Russia for provoking civil unrest in eastern Ukraine was met with pro-Russian militias kidnapping eight international observers. The statement given, largely as a result of diplomatic protocol, said the G7 leaders ‘have now agreed that we will move swiftly to impose additional sanctions on Russia’. But the response of the pro-Russian activists and gunmen seems to be illustrating the clear ineffectiveness of applying any kind of western sanctions policy on the ground.

Some may well argue that to be the case. We should, however, be clear. Sanctions, if stringent enough, could bring pressure to bear on Vladimir Putin. Pragmatically, there is a limit to what the United States and the European Union can actually achieve.  The guarantors of Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity are not only down to the wishes of the western axis and what they hope for, but also of Russia given its close historical connections in so many different ways that it has with the country.

Travel bans on Russian officials and other minor irritations imposed on Russia are so far much weaker than they could have been, and on this a dichotomy of reasons has been laid bare. On the positive side, a reason for the less than tenuous sanctions applied will be that much of the EU, including Germany, is wholly dependent on Russian gas. Though there has been talk of the US diverting some of its rich supplies of shale gas to Europe in reducing this dependence, to instigate such an operation has neither been practical nor affordable.

On the downside, the reasons are perhaps cowardly. Governments, for instance, including our own, have been sensitive to business lobbying, particularly from those Russian oligarchs who would be severely punished if sanctions were tightened. Last month, a government document was caught on camera by a photographer as an official of the British government was about to enter Downing Street. It suggested that the UK should ‘not support, for now, trade sanctions … or close London’s financial centre to Russians.’

The G7 statement was notable for its absence to specify in detail what ‘additional sanctions’ might or could be. Yet, whilst not mere cowardice that has prompted EU governments to hold back from tougher measures, there is a principled argument, albeit slightly cynical, that Mr Putin is doing so much damage to the Russian economy through his own actions that he needs no help from the West in making it any worse. Mr Putin’s nationalist adventurism has certainly seriously eroded his country’s economic interests. Indeed, if trade and other financial sanctions were imposed, it would allow the Russian president to blame ‘the West’ for Russia’s hardship rather than his own folly.

The problem for Mr Putin now is whether he realises that he is biting off more than he can chew. If he tries to assimilate populations into Russia who do not want to be assimilated he will only add to Moscow’s predicament and costs. Although the West should not have accepted Crimea’s annexation without a fight, its population is mostly Russian. Eastern Ukraine is entirely different; the region is quite against Russia’s interest to incite separatism there.

The historical cynic would no-doubt quote Napoleon and say that the West should not interrupt their enemy when he is making a mistake of this magnitude. Financial markets, for example, have already downgraded Russia’s credit rating to just above junk status. Mr Putin’s assertion of Russian power may have won him the support of his domestic audience at home meantime, but this could well change once the bills start arriving.

Given that Mr Putin’s rhetoric is already turned-up against the West, blaming the fall of Ukraine’s government on US and NATO-backed ‘fascist elements’, the notion that Britain, the EU and the US should hold back for fear that the Russian leader would blame us fails to persuade. Sanctions do not always work, that’s true. But they can work, and there is no other option open to those protagonists who support Ukraine’s independence and integrity. Now that Moscow’s proxies have started to abduct and hold hostage international observers, harsher economic pressure remains the best hope of bringing Vladimir Putin to his senses. There is no good reason for not upping the ante on Russia.

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Britain, European Union, Foreign Affairs, Government, Russia, Society, Ukraine, United States

Ukraine: Any further acts of Russian aggression must be dealt with by the West…

FEARS OF AN ESCALATION IN UKRAINE

The warning by John Kerry, US Secretary of State, that Russia is actively seeking to destabilise yet more of Ukraine – with a view to staging another Crimea-style military intervention – increases significantly the prospects of a deeper escalation inside the country. Mr Kerry has directly accused the Kremlin of using provocateurs and undercover agents to encourage pro-Russian activists to seize control of key cities in the eastern part of the country. This is a view equally shared by William Hague, the British Foreign Secretary, who claims the latest flare-up in violence bears ‘all the hallmarks of a Russian strategy to destabilise Ukraine’.

Given the evidence, these warnings need to be taken seriously. Pro-Moscow activists have attempted to occupy government buildings in eastern cities such as Donetsk, Kharkiv and Lugansk. Similar tactics were employed by Moscow in the build-up to last month’s illegal annexation of Crimea. It is also known that the FSB, Russia’s overseas intelligence service, is active in the region, with its agents encouraging ethnic Russians to revolt against the Ukrainian government. The interpretation by Secretary of State Kerry is that Vladimir Putin is no doubt seeking to lay the foundations for a broader intervention aimed at annexing more of Ukraine’s territory.

The West needs to make clear that it will not tolerate any further occupation of European soil by the Kremlin. The seizing of Crimea led to a fairly limited response from the US and EU, through the targeting of assets of a small group of government officials and oligarchs, due to accusations that they had orchestrated the operation. Any further acts of aggression, however, by Moscow towards its vulnerable neighbour should result in Western powers implementing a broad range of sanctions and penalties. That would not only inflict severe damage on the Russian economy, but deepen Moscow’s status as an international pariah.

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Britain, Economic, European Union, Financial Markets, Government, Politics, Russia, Society, Ukraine, United States

What will happen next following the crisis in Ukraine?

ECONOMIC REALITIES

Intro: Economic havoc and a global slump could materialise from the crisis in the Crimea

So far, financial markets in the West have remained remarkably undisturbed in the face of the crisis unfolding in Ukraine. Following Crimea’s referendum at the weekend, which effectively sealed Vladimir Putin’s grip of the Ukrainian peninsula, sanctions were always likely to follow. Whilst, then, we may anticipate just how long the sanguine calm will continue, Western leaders should also be careful of supplanting diplomacy with threats to Russia that they are unwilling or unable to back up. The decision by the European Union and United States to impose sanctions on several Russian officials is a limited response to the breach of international law that has taken place in Crimea. The measures include travel bans and the freezing of assets against individuals who were deemed to have played a major role in the referendum – a vote, officials say, in which 97 per cent of voters backed a breakaway from Ukraine and, instead, opted to join the Russian Federation.

In the years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has steadily become more integrated into the global economy. We know that many rich Russians have shifted their gains (ill-gotten or otherwise) into more stable and secure environments, such as investing on the London Stock Exchange or by diversifying their stocks in the UK property market. In actual fact, more money has flowed into Russia than out. According to data from the Bank for International Settlements, foreign owned banks have lent the country at least $260 billion. That is nearly double the value of its estimated assets in the West. As a consequence, Russia’s bilateral trade has risen to more than $100 billion annually. Almost a third of Europe’s gas, coal and oil imports come from Russia, and there has been a huge upsurge in direct investment by foreign firms.

Rhetoric used by the international community implied that there would be consequences if the referendum went ahead while the peninsula was still occupied by Russian troops. No doubt, Mr Putin will have considered the penalty a price worth paying. The question now, though, is what will happen next. Washington insists the screw will be tightened if the situation were to escalate in Ukraine – a distinct possibility that could happen fairly swiftly since the aim of the Crimean separatists is to secede from Ukraine within a month. They also aspire to adopt the rouble and by joining the Russian time-zone.

Whilst a military response to Russian aggression has already been ruled out by Western leaders, meaningful sanctions are not really much of an option, either. A full-blown trade-war would inflict serious damage on both sides. However, capital flows between Russia and the West are already in a parlous state in anticipation of lesser action, including assets freezes and travel restrictions already imposed. In order to defend the rouble, Russians are withdrawing billions from Western banks and selling off US Treasury Bonds. Mr Putin also raised interest rates to 7 per cent; a move that will discourage capital outflights from Russia to the West, a rate of interest that will be far more attractive for Russians to invest at home. The West seems certain to reciprocate by dumping Russian assets.

Yet, this all comes at a particularly delicate time for the world economy. Emerging markets, including China, have rapidly slowed down; the Eurozone is expecting a period of deflation to start anytime soon; and, America’s economy has started to inflict severe withdrawal symptoms to many countries around the world following its tapering of quantitative easing. The global economy may be just one sharp shock away from lurching into another recession.

A standoff with Russia over Crimea’s breakaway is the last thing the world needs. Economic considerations cannot surpass the higher purpose of defending international law, and as such must be secondary to it. Nonetheless, the interplay between politics and economics is what is making this situation so dangerous and destabilising. All concerned should be aware of just how very much more disruptive this crisis could yet become.

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