Tag Archives: Syria

Britain, Foreign Affairs, Iraq, Middle East, Politics, Society, Syria, United States

The dismal choices faced in Iraq: averting the worst scenario must be viewed as a priority…

IRAQ

Intro: Iraq is in a quagmire. The options are dismal, but the West cannot reverse the course of events in Iraq by intervening

The West will take some comfort, as well as to most Iraqis that Iraq’s ramshackle armed forces appear to have stalled the advances towards the capital by Sunni jihadists. The fall of Baghdad to the fighters of ISIS would undoubtedly lead to the termination and dissolution of Iraq as a formal state, as well as providing the jihadists and their putative caliphate with a real capital – forcing millions of Iraqi Shia to flee from their homes. It is inconceivable to believe or imagine the Middle East absorbing the shock.

Such an apocalypse has been averted, for now at least, and the Middle East and the wider world will gasp deep breaths of relief. However, even if the makeshift Iraqi forces succeed in containing the ISIS fighters (some 60 miles north of Baghdad) the long term prognosis for the country and for the region remains desperately worrying.

ISIS is in control of much of north and north-west Iraq. Whilst the insurgents may possibly cede the odd frontline town back to Iraqi forces, it will still be in possession of a de facto state composed of large, continuous chunks of Iraq and Syria. The boundaries that the British and French imposed on the Middle East following the end of the First World War seem soon to vanish, with the dismal fate that both will become failed states, much in the same way that Somalia became on the Horn of Africa. The emergence of such vacuums on the map of the world will be hugely destabilising – drawing in and expelling a range of volatile forces and consequences that will be very difficult to deal with.

The frontiers of Iraq and Syria were drawn arbitrarily to reflect the temporary interests of British and French colonists. It is quite possible, of course, with events unfolding as they are that both countries were only ever going to be viable under despotic rulers, in which case nothing can be done to prevent them from dissolving in the long term, or stop their embittered and hopelessly alienated Sunnis from creating their own entity out of the debris.

One major and worrying problem is that these countries are unravelling in a completely uncontrolled fashion. Another concern is that the heavily armed insurgents of ISIS have no intention of confining themselves to a medium-sized state based in north-west Iraq and the north-eastern parts of Syria. These extremists are religious imperialists, and their hardened and fierce ideology teaches them that they must expand or die. They will soon turn elsewhere if they are forced to consolidate control over their existing territories. The ethnically and politically fractured kingdom of Jordon surfaces as an obvious candidate for their malevolent attention.

The West, starting with the United States, cannot even hope to reverse the course of events in Iraq by intervening on the ground. President Barack Obama was right to rule out any ground incursion by US troops going back into the country.

That doesn’t mean, however, that the US takes up an observer’s seat as the region descends into ever greater chaos and disorder. Washington should encourage the tentative rapprochement between Saudi Arabia (Sunni) and Iran (Shia), both of which are starting to see just how dangerous the Sunni-Shia power struggle is becoming to each of them. The sectarian divisions and widening conflagration could easily have a tendency to draw in others by default if no attempt is made to harness relations between other countries in the region.

Western countries could also afford to be more generous in helping to address the humanitarian aspects of the latest crisis. The UK, for example, has offered an additional £3m to help tens of thousands of fleeing refugees that have been displaced as a direct result of the advances made by ISIS. Most of these refugees are now camping in Kurdish-controlled areas of northern Iraq. Such a meagre sum, given the plight of many desperate people, is hardly an adequate gesture.

A fortuitous outlook might suggest that the Sunnis in Syria and Iraq turn against their self-styled deliverers at some future point. If that is the hope, then it is vital that the Shia-dominated regime in Baghdad is persuaded to keep the door open to talks about some kind of federal option for the Sunnis, and for the Kurds. True, it may be late in the day for Iraq to even try the federalist option, but just possibly that might be the only option remaining in salvaging some kind of gossamer-thin state from the current mess. The options available are far and few between, none of which look particularly good. Despair cannot be allowed to prevail and is not the answer.

 

Standard
Britain, Iraq, Middle East, Military, Society, United States

Iraq and the tinderbox of the Middle East: America weighs up its options…

IRAQ

Intro: Learning the lessons of recent conflicts in the region should provide us with a guide concerning the current situation in Iraq

The paradox of the US and UK cosying up to Iran in light of the chaos in Iraq reconciles well with the age-old adage of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ – an example that demonstrates in comfortable fashion just what is implied by this historical idiom. And, yet, the crisis in the region leaves the US and UK with little choice.

Over the last ten days images of ISIS fighters massacring Shi’ite captives, brought to us most graphically through the medium of social media, are brutally barbaric and shocking – but, that has been their intention all along; horror is, after all, a weapon of war. It is being used by ISIS in ways that is totally depraved and inhumane of reasoned thinking.

We should be in no doubt. There will be more such images as the insurgents intensify their activities. And with that will come increasing calls for the UK to accept its responsibility for Iraq’s grim predicament and to help to do something to alleviate it.

We should not be misunderstood, either, when it is asserted that the UK is, in some measure, culpable in bringing about the grisly events that are being played out in Iraq. That can hardly be denied. There are, of course, other factors which have played their part, most notably the wave of sectarian conflict that has swept across the Middle East as part of the Arab Spring and revolution. Ultimately, though, in supporting the 2003 military invasion, Britain helped to light the fuse.

Pressure for the UK to re-engage militarily in Iraq must, however, be firmly resisted. There is no public or political appetite for an intervention again at this level on this occasion. Two things have emerged that should be crystal clear, and learning the lessons of recent conflicts in the region should provide us with a guide concerning the current situation in Iraq.

The first is that, like all modern warfare, aerial superiority is the key to victory. This was demonstrated through the use of UK/US air support in the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya, and, as it happens, in the way the absence of this support for rebels in Syria has allowed president Bashar al-Assad to continue his onslaught and by surviving as the country’s brutal dictator.

But the second is that air supremacy on its own cannot conclusively defeat an insurgency. Boots on the ground are required – although, crucially, those boots do not need to be US or UK boots. Arguably, those boots can be Iraqi boots. Once the Baghdad military forces regroup following the recent embarrassing defections that ceded so much ground and territory to ISIS, Iraq’s own security personnel should be in a position to claim back much of the lost ground.

For the Iraqi government to regain control, it does look as if US air support will be needed. But such assistance carries significant risks.

With Sunni-Shia tensions already high in the region, how would others in close proximity to events in Iraq react to the US effectively becoming an instrument of Shia might and strength? Middle East conflagrations do have a habit of converging, no more so than in the tinderbox that is Lebanon. US air strikes in Iraq would not auger well for those neighbouring countries that have allegiances with each other.

President Barack Obama continues to weigh up his options. Mr Obama has already approved 300 extra troops to secure the US embassy and Baghdad airport, and calls are mounting in America – notably in Republican quarters – for a more strategic military deployment to help repel the rebels and by restoring order.

In all likelihood the US President will win domestic support for drone strikes. Given what has gone in recent conflicts an air of caution seems certain to be placed over the use of direct air strikes. The use of drones carries risks, too, as innocents caught up in the crossfire, for example, will always consider defecting to the other side for protection. On a calculation of minimising collateral damage to achieve its objectives the use of aerial drones is an option America has at its disposal.

Standard
Foreign Affairs, Government, History, Middle East, Syria, United Nations, United States

The US Secretary of State faces challenges, but is John Kerry sufficiently supported?

US FOREIGN POLICY

John Kerry has illuminated the paradox of current American foreign policy. No where is this more embodied than in the Middle East, the region that continues to consume so much time and effort for the US Secretary of State. Rarely has the diplomacy and energies spent been as active and as bold as they are today. But flamboyant charges that the US is enfeebled and in retreat are also accusations that are running in parallel.

Mr Kerry is tacitly involved on three immensely challenging and overlapping fronts: his efforts to end the bloody civil war in Syria; the continued search for a nuclear deal with Iran that might end more than three decades of hostility between Washington and Tehran; and, the renewed and engaging process to secure a two-state settlement between Israel and Palestinians that has eluded negotiators since 1948.

An analysis of the progress being made will reveal a mixed picture. Encouragingly, the best advances have been made with Iran, with an interim deal that parts of the country’s nuclear programme have been frozen for a period of six months. This deal could yet unravel, but the U.S. and Iran are engaged in a process of constructive dialogue.

To the other extreme, Syria constitutes a total failure. The recent Geneva conference which could not even deliver an agreement on bringing humanitarian aid to tens of thousands of civilians, trapped by the savagery of the conflict, epitomises this rank failure. Vladimir Putin’s Russia continues to arm and supply the regime, while progress on securing Assad’s chemical weapons and stockpiles is, at best, described as being limited. More accurately, it would not be amiss to say that progress in removing Assad’s arsenal has been brought to a stuttering halt.

The current state of play in dealing with the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is less clear. Whilst Mr Kerry has been doggedly determined in keeping talks going, his indefatigability may be perceived from different angles of thought. For those who support him, this involvement and persistent diligence is proof of resolve. It is also recognition of his courage by placing his prestige on the line in a way that many of his predecessors never did. For the detractors, though, the US Secretary of State is merely on an ego trip, driven largely by the naïve belief that hope will triumph over experience. The more impartial may wonder whether Mr Kerry’s goal of a ‘framework’ plan – an agreement by the two sides on the shape of the final agreement with the details being worked out later – is really any different from the other diplomatic formulae’, such as the ‘road maps’, that have littered nearly seven decades of futile peacekeeping.

Underpinning Mr Kerry’s efforts on all three fronts is the ‘damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don’t’ scenario faced by the US in the Middle East. Most expect America to lead, even if its ability to shape and bend the region to its will is often grossly exaggerated. When the U.S. has taken decisive action, as in Iraq or Afghanistan, it has been accused of being a blundering warmonger. Following on from these two long and costly interventions, Americans will have no appetite for another. Yet, when it steadfastly refuses to robustly intervene in Syria (or to a lesser extent in Egypt), it is denounced for abandoning its responsibilities, and of condoning and supporting human rights abuses. It can hardly wave a magic wand and expect all to be well.

American history tends to suggest that the most effective Secretaries of State tend to be those that have been closest to their respective Presidents. Henry Kissinger, for instance, under President Richard Nixon, or James Baker who held post during the reign of President George HW Bush, spring to mind. Secretary of State Kerry is barely a year into his tenure, and so it is too early to say whether he will join this company. Success, however, on one of the three major challenges he is faced with would amount to a distinguished and noteworthy achievement.

Standard