Tag Archives: Vladimir Putin

Britain, Defence, Europe, Foreign Affairs, Government, Military, National Security, NATO, Politics, Society, United States

Being prepared for war is essential, but war is not cheap…

ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE STUDY

A study released by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) shows that Britain’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan has cost the UK Treasury more than £29 billion. In the report, the think tank argues that the wars were “strategic blunders, spreading terrorism, drumming up resistance and increasing the opium trade”.

The conclusions, though, are controversial. For instance, the authors of the study assert that various terrorist groups would not be infiltrating Syria or threatening Britain had Saddam Hussein stayed in power. Yet, Hussein was a bloodthirsty tyrant and despot, who clearly acted as a state sponsor of terror. Tens of thousands of lives were lost, thousands more were gassed in ethnic style cleansing in northern Iraq, and Saddam Hussein would certainly have had vast stockpiles of nerve and chemical agents at his disposal left over from his 8-years war with Iran. Many of these stockpiles still remain unaccounted for. Had Hussein not been toppled he doubtless would have continued to persecute his own population. The tyrant’s bloody wars against the Kurds in the north and Arab populations of the south should never be forgotten.

Putting aside the arguments about Britain’s role in the ‘War on Terror’, one uncontroversial fact emerges from the report which is indisputable: war is not cheap. The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) has witnessed massive cuts to our Armed Forces budget. Army numbers have been drastically cut back, aircraft have been withdrawn, tank battalions diminished, and even our last aircraft carrier decommissioned. Further cuts are imminent. Many of these cuts are being justified by the theory that we would never have to engage in the variety of long-term overseas military adventures that typified our activities and engagements during the Cold War era.

Since 2001, however, we have actually been involved in two such operations at a significant cost. And within the last few days, President Barack Obama announced that he would like America to act more as part of an international coalition rather than taking unilateral action. This implies, at least, a continued British role in Western security.

The UK has to be prepared for all eventualities, and adequate contingencies should be in place. As relations with Russia continue to worsen, for example, it might prove necessary for the UK to play a part in the wider campaign of checking Vladimir Putin’s belligerence. Only last month, Britain sent four Typhoon fighter jets to the Baltics as part of a NATO deployment, a sign that the West is unwilling to allow Europe to disintegrate at the hands of the Russian president. Nobody wants a conflict, but the potential for a tough offence remains the best defence.

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China, Economic, Foreign Affairs, History, Politics, Russia, Society, United Nations, United States

The new and emerging Russia-China pact bodes ill for the United States…

GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

It was in 1972, at the height of the Cold War, when President Nixon made his impromptu (but famous) visit to China in an attempt to normalise relations with Beijing. His aim was for the United States to gain an advantage over its superpower rival, the Soviet Union. In recent days, Russia’s Vladimir Putin made his journey to China. The countries in this geopolitical strategic triangle may be the same, but their roles are far different from what they once were.

Transformation in Russia, the successor state of the former Soviet Union, has been huge. Moscow is a diminished power now and not the threat it once posed. The US, the only remaining superpower, is also in decline, at least in relative terms. But this trend in turn reflects the emergence of China, almost dormant 40 years ago, but now accepted as being a mighty global force on the world stage. China’s economy is soon expected to surpass that of the US, and many economists suggest that China’s currency poses a serious challenge to the US dollar, the world’s main currency reserve.

In the 1970s, the odd man out in the triangle was Moscow. Now, though, Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping are trying to forge an alliance that will cut the US down to size.

Symbols of intent are apparent in this new and emerging joint partnership. The launch of the current joint naval exercises, for example, was attended by both leaders. And, far more importantly, is the massive 30-year deal signed this week for the sale of Russian gas to China. This will start in 2018, but the deal also contains contractual terms which allows for substantial Chinese investment in Russia’s infrastructure. The agreement will provide a new outlet for the energy exports on which the Russian economy largely depends. More broadly, Moscow’s orientation is being seen as part of a ‘pivot to Asia’, with a focus on deepening ties with the East (rather than the West).

The driving force and logic behind this new alignment has been accentuated when we consider the sharply deteriorating relations between America and its emerging eastern superpower rivals. In the case of Moscow, the annexation of territory in Ukraine has raised tensions with the West to levels not seen since the Reagan era. Ongoing difficulties have generated a fear of a looming second Cold War, which are by no means fanciful. Mr Putin’s unconcealed ambition to restore a de facto Russian empire continues to fuel such suspicions.

China and the United States, economic and increasingly geopolitical rivals, could well be described as being at loggerheads. Notwithstanding Beijing’s perceived expansionism in South-east Asia, which has brought it into direct conflict with several close American allies in the region, this week’s announcements of unprecedented criminal indictments in the US against Chinese military officials for cyber spying has raised the political stakes even further. Not surprisingly, Beijing has referred to a major setback in relations with Washington, while simultaneously proclaiming that relations with Moscow have never been better.

In some respects, however, this Sino-Russian rapprochement may make little difference. Economically, Russia needs China far more than the other way round: not just as an export energy market, but also as a source of vital capital.

When Russia’s economy is slowing and tensions over Ukraine threaten future financing and investment by the West, having Beijing as a strategic partner could unsettle relations with the West much further. China is already increasingly supportive of Russia’s position on Ukraine and, with both countries being permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, with the right to exercise the power of veto, the prospects of resolving the crises in Syria and elsewhere seems remoter than ever. Between them, too, they could also make it even harder to secure a satisfactory nuclear deal with Iran. Whichever way we turn, the loser in this changing eternal triangle of geopolitics is the United States.

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Foreign Affairs, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, United Nations, United States

The west’s inaction in Syria highlights the impotence of the international community…

SYRIA

The West’s inability (or even insouciance) in becoming embroiled to counter the aggression of the regime of Bashar al-Assad against his own people in Damascus has led to the crumbling of resistance in the city. It was here that the rebel army had its stronghold. The evacuation of Homs is the personification of Western diplomatic failure.

It was a year ago now when the appalling bloodshed and mayhem of the civil war in Syria drew unanimous condemnation from the West. Assad’s use of chemical weapons against his own people last August added to the anger as the ‘red lines’ pronounced previously by President Obama had been crossed. America insisted that would trigger a military intervention in the event of that happening. But politicians then baulked as the Labour Party in Britain defeated the Government in the House of Commons on proposed military intervention. Those feelings rippled across to the United States, as politicians on either side of the Atlantic became forced into embracing a new isolationism born of years of war weariness in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The result has been a rebellion that can justly claim to have been let down by a collective failure of will in the West. It is a failure which could yet bear bitter fruit in Islamist anger exported by the disillusioned Syrian rebel fighters to the wider world. With the death toll spiralling with at least 150,000 dead, it is right to ask what has happened.

In looking for an answer, we should focus on two countries which have kept the Assad regime afloat for their own narrow and precarious interests – Iran and Russia. Tehran’s religious Ayatollah’s see Assad as an essential Shia bulwark against the power of Sunni forces in the region. Vladimir Putin’s motivation is as much to do with Russia’s current power games with the West as it is with the Syrian conflict on its own terms.

It was Mr Putin’s intervention last autumn that halted Western military action against Assad’s forces, preventing the opportunity that a decisive intervention could have brought by affording the rebels a chance to triumph. They needed at least to have secured a corner of a divided and disparate nation. Whilst the regime’s chemical weapons and capabilities appears to be on-course for being dismantled by the UN set deadlines, the cost – a real and tangible one in terms of geopolitics – has been the survival and, indeed, the strengthening of Assad’s reign in power, as its poorly-equipped rebel opponents fade. Recently, for instance, the Syrian tyrant has spoken of holding on to power for another six years, inconceivable to the West who had all but in name considered regime change a fundamental tenet in Syria three years ago.

President Putin’s observations would have noted the West’s stalemate and inaction in Syria, as well as calculating a likely similar reticence on intervention elsewhere by both Washington and London. The annexation of Crimea and continued power games in Ukraine, particularly in the east of the country, are proof of that.

Mr Putin, clearly emboldened, regards the West as weak. There is no real counter to Russian aggression and expansionism, other than the ranking up of political rhetoric by Western leaders. Yet, the harder Mr Putin acts abroad the stronger his position at home has become, where growing nationalist sentiment has garnered support for their president’s actions – a useful distraction given Russia’s floundering economy and weakening currency, clear effects of western imposed sanctions.

The rebels of Homs will be one of many aggrieved by the West’s inaction in Syria.

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