THE EMERGING NEW SUPERPOWERS

Easternisation: War and Peace in the Asian Century by Gideon Rachman is published by Bodley Head (£20)

Intro: As eyes look East, can Gideon Rachman’s new book predict what will happen next? By the year 2025, some two-thirds of the world’s population will be living in Asia.

THIS summer’s Olympic Games in Rio surprised many when the UK pipped China to second place in the overall medal table. That aside, we should be under no illusions as to who the big players are when it comes to global affairs. The British Government’s decision under prime minister Theresa May to review its plans for the Hinckley Point C nuclear power plant suggests that Mrs May has erred more on the side of caution when it comes to dealing with China than David Cameron and George Osborne. Mrs May’s initial prevarication was met by a warning from the Chinese state news agency that her apparent ‘suspicion towards Chinese investment’ threatened the arrival of the ‘China-UK golden era’ that President Xi Jinping declared on his trip to London last year. On her first trip to China as Prime Minister earlier this month, our American friends would have been watching closely. The U.S. was left frustrated last year when the UK announced it was to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

In 2014, the IMF announced that China had become the world’s largest economy in terms of purchasing power. There are, though, many indices by which the United States remains way out in front: mineral wealth, oil and other energy sources, and its geopolitical neighbourhood is far more secure and stable.

At the end of this insightful book which focusses largely on the ‘Asian century’ that lies ahead, Gideon Rachman makes the point that the current position of the West is supported by certain inbuilt advantages, such as its representative institutions and open (albeit increasingly fractious) societies.

The reader is enlightened to the well-grounded assertions that the tectonic plates of global influence is changing. By 2025, some two-thirds of the world’s population will be living in Asia, with 5 per cent in the United States and 7 per cent in Europe. Even the US National Intelligence Council warns that the era of Pax Americana is ‘fast winding down’. Despite Barack Obama’s announcement in 2011 of America’s ‘pivot’ towards Asia, however, such policies are yet to assume a tangible form. Washington’s approaches to Asia remain torn, ranging from ‘primacy’ to ‘offshore balancing’ and from ‘containment’ to ‘accommodation’. Better political fluidity is needed rather than a bumper-sticker approach.

For the UK, the rise of China is likely to trigger a harbinger of dilemmas. Hinkley Point and the collapse of the British steel industry are just the mere tip of an economic revolution that will become far reaching. For example, to what extent will Britain seek to synchronise its approach with the next US administration (especially given its stated position of seeking a bespoke trade deal and strong defensive alliance with Washington)? The irreconcilable should not be overlooked. Instructive in the argument here is the experience of Australia, which also lives under the US security umbrella but is umbilically tied to Asian markets. In July of this year, when an international tribunal at The Hague ruled against China’s territorial claims to sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, Australia joined the U.S. and the Japanese in calling for the Chinese to respect the verdict. Australia has now become a source of major Western irritation for Beijing. Like many other countries, Australia has become increasingly wary of Chinese investment in its energy infrastructure.

Earlier this year in Washington, the Australian prime minister, Malcolm Turnball, gave a speech and expressed concern about the ‘Thucydides Trap’. Named after the classical Greek historian, this notional concept is a creation of the Harvard political scientist Graham Allison. He determined that in 12 of the 16 cases in which a rising power has confronted a status quo power over the last 500 years, war has always prevailed. Former and past iterations of Chinese strategy under Xi’s predecessors, Deng Xiaoping and Hu Jintao, spoke in terms of China’s “peaceful rise”, its amenability to international rules and its apparent willingness to fit in with the existing order. But the period of “hide and bide” may now have passed. Fu Ying, a former Chinese ambassador to the UK, has said that the US-led world order is a suit that no longer fits for China and the emerging Asian markets. Close observers and analysts of Chinese reform even suggest that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is exerting a growing influence on decision-making, and that the Communist Party has sought to shore up its legitimacy by riding on the back of nationalist sentiment.

Politically, both Washington and Beijing have very long-term and all-encompassing definitions of what their peripheries and first line of defences are. War games, for example, often scope out a series of alarming scenarios. The Pentagon views Chinese defensive strategy as “anti-access and area denial” and has developed its own “air-sea battle” doctrine in response. And, concurrently, China’s “belt and road” strategy, by which it aims to reconstitute a Silk Road through the Eurasian landmass, can be explained partly by historical fears of Western blockades of Chinese ports or incursions into its territorial waters.

The historical enmities and divisions in Asia are marred with flashpoints that could ignite a larger conflagration on land or sea. There are territorial disputes in the South China Sea over a series of uninhabited islands – those such as the aptly named Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs – which, according to Beijing, fall within the “nine-dash line” by which China’s territorial waters are defined. There are large numbers of ethnic Chinese in places such as Malaysia and Indonesia for whom Beijing feels some responsibility. Meanwhile, however, Japan, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, has assumed a much more offensive posture in response to Chinese claims to the uninhabited Senkaku Islands (as the Japanese call them) in the East China Sea. South Korea has endeavoured to reach an understanding with Beijing but Vietnam has looked to the US for protection as relations with China have soured.

In Easternisation, Rachman calls for a rapid improvement in the West’s situational awareness. The book is a welcome rebuttal of the tendency to view Asia through the prism of the markets alone. Although it has become fashionable and customary to speak of the “Pacific century”, the author suggests that an “Indo-Pacific” lens might be a more helpful way of viewing Asian geopolitics from the West. For instance, the development of the relationship between China and India – which share a contested land border and are highly suspicious of each other – is worthy of focus and attention.

India has already emerged as a global powerhouse in its own right. It has a similar size population to China, but a much healthier demographic balance and more established and experienced military.

Whilst still something of a geopolitical outsider, with India having no seat on the UN Security Council, there is gathering consensus that it could become a “swing state” and be harnessed to form part of a newly constituted democratic alliance. For the new superpowers in the East, the learning curve for tilting global powers in its favour might still be steep and perilous, though the West does appear to have tacitly accepted that the certainties of the past are passing. The US “pivot” towards Asia is a clear acknowledgement of this shift.