Category Archives: Europe

Europe, European Commission, Government, Politics, Society, Technology, United States

The EU must lay down the law on big tech

DIGITAL MARKETS

Intro: Donald Trump’s administration is seeking to bully its way to the deregulation of US digital giants. In the interests of EU citizens, these attempts must be resisted

HENNA VIRKKUNEN, the European Union’s most senior official on digital policy, has fired a broadside when she said: “We are very committed to our rules when it comes to the digital world”. Such sentiments bring with it the near certainty of a future confrontation with Elon Musk. Ms Virkkunen , who is the EU vice-president responsible for tech sovereignty, also added that: “We want to make sure that our digital environment … is fair and it’s safe and it’s also democratic.”

In recent days, these words were followed by deeds. In the first sanctions handed down since the establishment of the EU’s Digital Markets Act, the European Commission fined Apple Euros500m and Meta Euros200m, after finding them guilty of unfair business practices that exploited their entrenched online “gatekeeper” position. Apple, for example, was judged to have unfairly restricted developers from distributing apps outside its own App Store, where it takes a cut from sales.

Are we to perceive these fines as being a form of tough action or nothing more than tokenism? It is safe to say these fines will not overly concern either company’s accountants. Apple’s revenue last year was Euros344bn. There are also indications that, in other areas, Brussels may be seeking to dial down tensions with the US tech giants as it seeks to avoid a full-on trade war with Washington.

A separate investigation into X (formerly Twitter) under the auspices of the Digital Services Act – which deals with content moderation – found it in preliminary breach of EU rules, following Mr Musk’s takeover in 2022. No fine has yet been issued. Meanwhile there are growing fears that EU regulations on artificial intelligence, intended to reduce the risk of disinformation and political manipulation, are in danger of being diluted under pressure from the Trump administration.

Given the current volatility of transatlantic relations, it is understandable that a degree of cautious restraint is needed. But US bullying of Brussels over its regulation of big tech on behalf of EU citizens must be robustly resisted. Trump’s senior adviser for trade and manufacturing, Peter Navarro, has mischaracterised European digital regulation as a non-tariff barrier and form of “lawfare” against American companies. The reality, though, is more mundane: US market dominance means its tech giants will inevitably be the most affected by efforts to govern a space that is now part of the architecture of everyday life.

That task, vital to maintaining a healthy public sphere, should be kept distinct from fraught trade negotiations with the White House. Easier said than done perhaps, given the US President’s all-embracing mercantilism. Nonetheless, EU politicians – and British ones – must not be intimidated into an ill-judged deregulatory path with potentially damaging implications for democracy.

These fines might have been financially small given the size of the revenues they generate but they do at least represent a necessary statement of intent. Alongside its investigation into X, the commission has inquiries ongoing into TikTok and Meta, also relating to content moderation. MEPs are now calling for those too to be pushed to a conclusion.

This may be the acid test. The US vice-president, JD Vance, has made it clear that the White House intends to act as the political wing of US big tech, and has compared European attempts to combat online disinformation and illegal content to Soviet-era censorship. Ms Verkkunen should remain adamant and stick to her guns – and ignore the flak flying from Washington.

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Europe, Russia, Ukraine, United States

US-Russian bilateral talks on Ukraine: Europe is alarmed

UKRAINE

DONALD Trump’s latest attack on Volodymyr Zelensky, and the US administration’s last-minute snub of London peace talks, is the clearest evidence yet that what matters to Mr Trump is not Ukrainian sovereignty and safety, nor the transatlantic alliance, but a deal with Vladimir Putin. The US president says an agreement is close, with Washington recognising annexed Crimea as Russian with Moscow conceding little if anything in return. For Mr Trump, it is Ukraine’s president who is once again harming negotiations by saying he will not recognise Russia’s control.

Putin is fervent in his desire to maximise Russian interests, attentive to every detail, adept in negotiations, and strongly believes that time is on his side. Trump does not care about the outcome as long as he can claim he has ended the war. He has little interest in the detail and has a habit of handing over the prize at the start of the process.

Just prior to the 2022 full-scale invasion, Trump described Russian aggression towards Ukraine as “genius”. His administration is also now abandoning efforts to hold Moscow accountable for war crimes. He holds a grudge against Mr Zelensky, and believes Putin would “keep his word” on a peace deal. Above all else, Trump is in a hurry. Having pledged before coming to the White House for his second presidency that he could end the war “in 24 hours”, he wants something to boast about as he nears the end of his first 100 days in office.

After so many deaths and so much devastation, no one wants peace more than Ukrainians. Kyiv understands that there will be no magical restoration of territorial integrity, but the indications are that it is ready to negotiate, not to surrender.

JD Vance, the US vice-president, has a simple answer: it is time for the two sides to “either say yes or for the US to walk away from this process”. US military aid to Ukraine is already reaching its end, intelligence could soon follow, and Washington could also restrict arms purchases even if Europe was willing and able to fund them to the extent needed.

Putin has played an expert hand so far, throwing expediency to the cause at opportune moments – as with the offer of an “Easter truce”, which did not halt attacks. His most recent gambit is reportedly to offer to cede claims on Ukrainian land that Russia does not actually control – concessions that Trump will undoubtedly laud. He does not want a European “reassurance force” in Ukraine, said to be part of the US proposal, but may also conclude that its significance would be limited without a US security guarantee.

The timing of the US plans, as well as demeaning Europe’s diplomatic efforts – meaning London’s discussions were downgraded – reinforces the European understanding that a US-brokered deal may be a beginning, not the end, for Russian ambitions. But such a grotesquely one-sided, imposed agreement would encourage territorial aggression elsewhere too. It isn’t surprising that Putin sees Europe as an obstruction and prefers bilateral talks. It should continue to alarm and appal us that the US, too, now sees its old allies as the problem, and not part of any solution.

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Britain, China, Economic, Europe, European Union, Government, Politics, Society, United States

UK-China relations: The Brexit dilemma

BRITAIN-CHINA

Intro: Trump’s trade wars have exasperated the Eurosceptic model, which is more outdated than ever

WHEN the transatlantic alliance was more functional than now, there was never a united view of China. Beijing has always been perceived as a commercial rival and potential security threat, and a common wariness has existed. For hawks in Washington, however, the idea of an alternative superpower closing in on economic and technological parity feels existential. More dovish Europeans have been openly compromising and readier to leaven caution with engagement.

Britain has veered between the two poles. In 2015, David Cameron promised a “golden era” of open trade with China. In 2020, under pressure from the US, Boris Johnson banned Huawei, a Chinese telecoms company, from UK 5G infrastructure.

In opposition, Conservative politicians have become increasingly hawkish against Beijing. Keir Starmer’s Labour government has tilted back towards cooperation. Several Labour ministers have visited China, including the chancellor. Other ministers, including the business secretary, will go there later this year, to revive a trade commission that has been dormant since 2018. Despite being manifestly frustrated with the Chinese owners of British Steel during the recent dash to keep Scunthorpe’s blast furnaces operating, the UK government has retreated from intimations of deliberate sabotage.

At some point, a reckoning has to be made. The pursuit of economic growth and investment will inevitably come into conflict with a national security interest in keeping China at arm’s length. The question is where to draw the line. The official line is that judgment is deferred pending a Whitehall “audit” of relations with Beijing. That is due in June.

A UK government decision is also imminent on China’s status under the foreign influence registration scheme – a system for keeping tabs on international organisations and companies exercising political influence in Britain. China is not expected to be named in the “enhanced tier” of risky states, alongside Russia and Iran, but some Chinese institutions might have that designation.

Calibrating these judgments – choosing when to prioritise security over commerce – is much harder with Donald Trump in the White House. What used to be a difference of emphasis between the US and Europe looks like an irreparable fracture in the west.

Trump has started a ferocious trade war with Beijing without a convincing strategic rationale. His officials have told Europeans they will have to choose a side when it comes to vital communications technology. Yet, what we see is a US president who has become routinely aggressive in his rhetoric towards the EU, dismissive of NATO, and reliably emollient towards Putin’s Russia.

From that pattern it is clear in Brussels and other continental capitals that Washington is no longer a reliable ally and the trajectory must be “strategic autonomy” for Europe. That is changing the calculus of risk and potential benefit from a more pragmatic China policy. The authoritarian character of Xi Jinping’s regime hasn’t changed, but it presents itself as a more predictable force in international affairs while US democracy declines in harsh and sporadic spasms.

Such changes illuminate a crisis of international orientation for Britain that has been building since Brexit. Economic detachment from Europe was promised on a model of the UK as a lone sovereign agent in an open, free-trading globalised world. That concept has aged very poorly, and it stands more of an outdated concept now than it ever has. Britain is not alone in struggling to navigate relations with China in the turbulent new geopolitical climate, but choosing loneliness and isolation in a world of rival continental blocks is making the struggle much harder.

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