Category Archives: Government

Britain, Culture, Government, Politics, Society

The threats to Press freedom in the UK should be ditched

PRESS FREEDOMS

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Intro: IPSO commands confidence among all but the most blinkered of anti-Press campaigners

Following the phone-hacking scandal and Lord Justice Leveson’s Inquiry into the Press, Parliament passed legislation by trying to force the newspaper industry to sign-up to a state-backed regulator. The primary device for achieving this is Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, a pernicious and damaging measure that would see libel costs awarded against any newspaper which is not a member of a Government approved regulator. This would even apply where a newspaper has successfully defended a claim and thus proved its reporting was justified.

Most newspapers in the UK subscribe to an independent regulator, IPSO. Since the costs in legal actions are invariably higher than the damages, this device will act as a deterrent to newspapers, especially local ones, from carrying stories or conducting investigations that bear even a remote risk of being sued. The measures are a direct challenge to the freedom of the Press, but, they are still yet to be enacted, as former Culture Secretary John Whittingdale declined (or perhaps even refused) to trigger the provisions within the Act.

However, there are growing indications that the Government may be about to bow to pressure to proceed with Section 40. Crucially, ministers now need to ask what damage this would inflict. The chairman of IPSO, Sir Alan Moses, has described the possible commencement of Section 40 as a blatant attempt by “the powers that be” to confine and restrict a free Press. A former judge, Sir Alan said a Press that acts under compulsion from the state “is doomed” and MPs should be aware that the very independence that makes the British press “viable and precious” would be lost.

Sir Alan heads a regulator that has shown itself to be tough, robust and independent. IPSO commands confidence among all but the most blinkered of anti-Press campaigners. The Government should now let it get on with the job it is doing – and scrap Section 40 for good.

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Africa, Government, Politics

The fragility of political reform in Africa…

AFRICA

Intro: African countries need to diversify away from their dependence on exporting commodities, which in turn would mean reforming and liberalising markets and bolstering independent institutions

SINCE the end of the cold war multiparty democracy has spread far and wide across the African continent, often with a moving and impressive intensity. Some have referred to it as Africa’s second liberation. Following freedom from European colonisers came freedom from African despots. 1994 is etched into history when many South Africans queued for hours to bury apartheid and the election of Nelson Mandela as president in their country’s first all-race vote.

The start of the liberation saw many of Africa’s Big Men swept away. Ethiopia’s despot Mengistu Haile Mariam fled in 1991; Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) decamped in 1997; and, a year later Sani Abacha of Nigeria died in suspicious circumstances. In parts of Africa autocrats are still in power and wars still rage. But most leaders now seek at least a veneer of respectability, elections have become more frequent and economies have opened up.

Yet, African democracy has stalled – or even possibly gone into reverse. Often, the continent has become an illiberal sort of pseudo-democracy in which the incumbent lavishly attacks the opposition, exploits the power of the state to stack the electoral contest in his favour and by removing any constraints on his power. That bodes ill for a continent where institutions are still fragile, corruption rife and economies weakened by the fall of commodity prices. One of the previous fastest-growing economies of the world has now become one of the slowest. For Africa to fulfil its promise, the young, dynamic continent must rediscover its zeal for democracy.

Zambia is the latest worrying example. It was one of the first African countries to undergo a democratic transition, when Kenneth Kaunda stepped down after losing an election in 1991. Just last month Edgar Lungu was re-elected president with a paper-thin majority in a campaign that was marred by the harassment of the opposition, the forced closure of the country’s leading independent newspaper, and accusations of vote-rigging and street protests.

Central parts of Africa appear most troubling. Incumbent leaders are changing or sidestepping constitutional term limits to extend their time in office, which often provokes unrest. Kenya, where political tension is rising, is facing concerns over threats of violence in next year’s general election. Freedom House, an American think-tank, reckons that in 1973 some 30% of sub-Saharan countries were ‘free’ or ‘partly free’. In its most recent report that share now stands at 50%. Whilst a big improvement it is down from the 71% which was reported in 2008. Countries that are ‘not free’ still outnumber those that are. A big chunk in the middle is made up of flawed and fragile states that are only ‘partly free’.

The people of Africa deserve much better. For democracy to work, the elected must not be greedy with those losing seats or failing to win accepting defeat. There must also be trusted institutions that invariably act as arbiters and stabilisers for democracy to flourish. In many places, some or all of these basic elements are missing.

Expanding and strengthening Africa’s middle class is the best way for democracy to thrive. Increasingly interconnected to the world, Africans know better than anyone the shortcomings of their leaders. Consider South Africa. Despite its model constitution, vibrant press and diverse economy, it has been tarnished under its president, Jacob Zuma. Whilst he has hollowed out institutions, some of which were tasked with fighting corruption, moves which were an attempt to strengthen his own position, South Africa has also demonstrated the power of its voters. In recent municipal elections, the powerful African National Congress lost control of many major cities. For the first time, a plausible alternative political party of power has emerged in the liberal, business-friendly Democratic Alliance.

Societies and economies which are free reinforce each other. African countries need to diversify away from their dependence on exporting commodities, which in turn would mean reforming and liberalising markets and bolstering independent institutions. The rest of the world can help by expanding access to rich-world markets for African goods, particularly in agriculture.

Other than promoting a middle class, diversification mitigates the ill-effects of a winner-takes-all politics. When a country’s wealth is concentrated in natural resources, controlling the state gives its leader access to the cash needed to maintain power. The problem is aggravated by the complex, multi-ethnic form of many African states, whose national borders may have been created by colonial whim. Voting patterns often follow tribal customs rather than class or ideology, which tends to lock in the advantage of one or other group. Political defeat at an election can mean being cut out of the spoils indefinitely. Dealing with variegated polities require structural changes in society such as decentralisation (as in Kenya), federalism (as in Nigeria) and requirements for parties or leaders to demonstrate a degree of cross-country or cross-ethnic support.

For those democracies which are fragile, the two-term rule for heads of government is invaluable, as it forces change. Nelson Mandela set the example by stepping down after just one term. The two-term rule should be enshrined as a norm by Africa’s regional bodies, just as the African Union forbids coups.

It’s also worth considering what else the outside world can do other than providing African countries with access to markets. China, for instance, has become Africa’s biggest trading partner, supplying aid and investment with few or no strings attached in terms of the rule of law and human rights. Even China, however, now that its own economy has markedly slowed, will not be in the business of propping up financially destitute African autocrats.

This means that Western influence, although diminished, remains considerable – for historical reasons, and because many African countries still look to the West for aid, investment and sympathy from international lending bodies. With the commodity boom at an end, a growing number of countries are facing a balance-of-payments crisis. Any fresh liquidity, particularly in the form of loans, should be conditional on strengthening independent institutions.

Yet, the West has flagged in its efforts to promote open and accountable democracy, especially in places such as those around the Horn of Africa (see appendage) and the Sahel, where the priority is to defeat jihadists. That is myopic. Decades of counter-terrorism teaches that the best bulwarks against extremism are states that are prosperous and just. That is most likely to come about when rulers serve at the will of their people.

Appendage:

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Map depicting countries that make up the Horn of Africa.

 

 

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Books, Foreign Affairs, Government, Politics, United States

Book Review: The Long Game

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER BARACK OBAMA

The Long Game

The Long Game is an apologia by Derek Chollet: a vindication of Mr Obama’s distinctive approach to grand strategy.

WHEN Barack Obama demits presidential office and comes to write his political memoirs they will no doubt be an elegantly persuasive account of the ideas that guided his presidency. But until then “The Long Game”, an apologia by Derek Chollet, is a vindication of Mr Obama’s distinctive approach to grand strategy and is likely to be the closest that anyone will come to understanding the thinking behind U.S. foreign policy that has many critics.

Mr Chollet is qualified and well placed in delivering such a resounding defence of the Obama leadership. He has served in senior positions in the State Department, the National Security Council and the Pentagon and has been close to the action during Mr Obama’s tenure of the White House. His contention is that the foreign-policy establishment in Washington has underestimated the extent of the president’s achievement. Policymakers at home lambast Mr Obama for having overlearned the lessons of Iraq, for his extreme caution and aversion to the use of America’s hard power in support of global order and for a reluctance and unwillingness to shoulder the burdens of leadership. This, say some, has dismayed allies and emboldened foes.

Detractors on the left have been horrified by his cold-bloodied use of drones to kill America’s enemies, his determination to commit to a costly nuclear modernisation programme and his bombing of more countries than George W. Bush. So which is he, asks the author: a woolly-headed liberal idealist or an unsentimental realist?

The answer, as it happens, is neither. Chollet argues that Mr Obama is misunderstood because he likes to play what the writer calls the “long game”. The book portrays the analogy of a president trying to be Warren Buffett in a foreign-policy debate that is dominated and driven by day traders. He has an unwavering view of what is in America’s long-term interests and refuses to be forced by impatient demands for action to intervene in ways that may be temporarily satisfying but have little prospect of success at acceptable cost.

To this end, Chollet asserts with reasonable conviction that Mr Obama has formulated what amounts to a long-game checklist, a series of principles that should be applied to managing American power and making strategic choices. The first of these is balance: balance between interests and values, between priorities at home and abroad, between declared goals in different parts of the world, and between how much America should take on and how much should be borne by allies. And balance, too, in the use of the whole toolbox – military power, diplomacy, economic leverage, and development. Mr Chollet openly contrasts this with the lack of balance Barack Obama inherited from George W. Bush: a tanking economy, more than 150,000 troops deployed in two wars and sagging American prestige.

The other key principles of the Obama checklist drawn upon are: sustainability (avoiding commitments that cost too much to stick with); restraint (asking not what American can do but what it should do); precision (wielding a scalpel rather than a hammer); patience (by giving policies the time and effort to work); fallibility (the modesty of what can be achieved); scepticism (a caution of being wary of those peddling easy answers to difficult questions); and, exceptionalism (the recognition that because of its enormous power and attachment to universal values America has a unique responsibility in the world that cannot be ducked).

For the author this mix of cautious pragmatism and realism finds an echo in the approach of two Republican predecessors, Dwight Eisenhower and the first George Bush, whose reputations have grown considerably since their departure from office. Mr Chollet believes that this president’s foreign policy will look pretty good too once hindsight kicks in.

Perhaps. Eminently sensible, however, the checklist appears to be, rather than setting the appropriate conditions for action, it might also be used as a way to do too little, too late. By and large, and it is worth acknowledging, Mr Obama did manage to get right his policies towards China (the ‘rebalancing’ towards Asia was timely and has been quite effective) and Russia (the ‘reset’ of the first term delivered some benefits; when Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea and opted for confrontation with the West, Barack Obama responded accordingly). But in Afghanistan, Iraq and, significantly, in Syria, the Obama doctrine has had terrible consequences.

In Afghanistan, Mr Obama’s long-debated troop surge was fatally undermined when he announced that U.S. forces would start to come home in 18 months. He repeated the error in May 2014, announcing that the residual American force in Afghanistan would be fully withdrawn by the end of 2016. He has had to reverse that false promise. By setting timetables for forced reductions unconnected to conditions on the ground, Mr Obama has given encouragement to the Taliban and left Afghan security forces wilfully exposed.

President Obama’s decision to pull all American forces out of Iraq at the end of 2011 was even more disastrous. He used the excuse of the difficulty of negotiating a new status-of-forces agreement with the Iraqis to do what he wanted to do all along. Had a few thousand American troops been left in Baghdad, Mr Obama and his administration would have known much more about the Maliki government’s subversion of the US-trained and US-equipped Iraqi security forces, as well as having had some leverage to prevent it. Some might argue that the emergence of Islamic State in 2014, an organisation that has been able to take and hold Iraqi cities, is a direct result of Mr Obama’s insouciance. Right wing elements in America certainly think so.

The catalogue of errors in Syria is far too long to itemise. Mr Obama’s extreme reluctance to do anything to help the moderate rebels, as well as his failure to punish the regime for crossing his previously declared ‘red lines’ on the use of chemical weapons were turning points that has contributed to the scale of the catastrophe which has since unfurled in the country. While Mr Chollet is reluctant to blame Mr Obama, he was among those arguing for the president to take a different course of action.

Undoubtedly, though, the one clear unambiguous policy success that Mr Obama’s long game can claim is the nuclear accord and deal with Iran. Patient and tactful diplomacy, along with the building of international support for a crippling sanctions regime, combined with a credible threat of military action if all else failed, resulted in an agreement that has effectively dealt with concerns about Iran acquiring a nuclear bomb over the next decade or so. If the deal holds, it will be the defining achievement of the Obama presidency. Not every problem facing American resolve can be approached in the same painstaking, deliberative way.

The president is far from being the inept wuss portrayed by his critics. But nor is he the master of grand strategy that Mr Chollet makes him out to be. His loathing and contempt of the interventionist excesses exploited by his predecessor, his wariness of arguments of “doing more”, a disdain for military advice and his ingrained pessimism about the utility of hard power have had the effect of reducing America’s capacity to do good in a brutally torn world. If Mr Obama is succeeded by Hillary Clinton, she is likely to provide a modest and welcome corrective. If Donald Trump is the next president, the long game that has underpinned most of the Obama doctrine, whatever its defects, will be sorely missed.

– The Long Game: How Obama Defied Washington and Redefined America’s Role in the World. By Derek Chollet. $26.99 and £17.99.

 

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