Category Archives: Government

Arts, Books, Britain, Government, History, NATO, Society

The Labour Party, Soviet intelligence and the Cold War

BRITAIN: LABOUR & THE COLD WAR

THE postwar government of Clement Atlee was instrumental in the founding and formation of NATO, which binds together the defence of North America and Europe. Attlee’s successors as leader of the Labour Party have not all been as staunch as he was in the national interest. Amid the Cold War tensions of the early 1980s, for example, Labour’s candidate as a potential prime minister was a man who had willingly taken money from the Kremlin. Michael Foot, a hero of the Labour left who served as party leader from 1980 to 1983, was paid the equivalent of £37,000 in today’s money from the KGB, the Soviet intelligence agency, while he was a backbencher in the 1960s.

A new book, The Spy and the Traitor by Ben Mcintyre, recounts the remarkable public service of Oleg Gordievsky, a senior KGB officer who was a double agent for MI6. Gordievsky was recalled from the Soviet embassy in London when his cover was blown in 1985. In peril, and with the help of western intelligence, he escaped the Soviet Union. Macintyre’s book details evidence that Gordievsky gave to his British spymasters. It includes the revelation that Foot was paid as being a KGB contact.

The information has topicality as well as historical significance. Every British government since Attlee’s has treated the transatlantic alliance as the bedrock of defence policy. The current Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn, claimed in 2014 that NATO had been “set up to promote a Cold War with the Soviet Union”. This is nonsense. NATO was created in 1949 as an alliance of free nations to deter Soviet expansionism and aggression.

Communism collapsed a generation ago having turned the former Soviet Union and its satellite states into lands of penury and oppression. And the current regime in the Kremlin likewise threatens western interests, alters internationally recognised borders by force and pursues lethal violence against its critics at home and abroad. In the nerve agent attack in Salisbury on Sergei and Yulia Skripal, which has left one British woman dead and three people seriously injured, the prime suspects were recently disclosed as officers of Russian military intelligence (the GRU).

Any government faced with an attack on British soil ought to be able to count on bipartisan support. Yet, affecting a façade of continued open-mindedness, Mr Corbyn at every stage cast doubt on Russian culpability for the crime, despite the circumstantial evidence that was overwhelming. It also emerged earlier this month that two Russian agents were expelled from the Netherlands this year for spying on a laboratory where samples of the poison used on the Skripals were being tested.

Michael Foot was on the left of the party and advocated an irresponsible policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain. Paradoxically, however, he has never been widely regarded as being sympathetic to communist autocracy. He denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. When a British newspaper published Gordievsky’s claims in 1995 that the KGB held a file on him, Foot successfully sued for libel and was awarded substantial damages.

Inconsistencies do, however, remain. Whilst is known that Foot served as a confidential contact for the KGB, had Labour won the general election of 1983, Gordievsky would have been faced with the bewildering task of serving a prime minister who he knew to have taken money from Soviet intelligence. There is also the point of Gordievsky’s testimony which shows that Jack Jones, leader of the transport workers’ union in the 1970s, was regarded by the KGB as a disciplined agent, whom the spy agency had paid until 1968.

In explaining why he had not shared information about Britain’s nuclear deterrent with any but a few trusted cabinet colleagues, Atlee said bluntly: “I thought that some of them were not fit to be trusted with secrets of this kind.” His judgment of senior Labour figures was acute and accurate, and resonates today.

Standard
Britain, Economic, European Union, Government, Ireland, Politics, Society

Brexit always leads back to the issue of the Irish border

BREXIT: UK – IRELAND

ONE of the most persistent myths about Brexit is that the Irish border issue was bounced on to an unsuspecting British prime minister by her cunning – or, perhaps, reckless – Irish counterpart. According to this narrative, Theresa May signed up to the December 2017 agreement that committed the UK to avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland without fully understanding the implications because she was desperate for a transition deal.

Yet, what has become clear since is that the necessity of avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland matters as much to Theresa May as it does to Leo Varadkar. Just as no Irish prime minister could ever agree to the renewed partition of the island, Mrs May remains determined not to be the British prime minister who presided over the restarting of the Troubles, still less the disintegration of the United Kingdom.

The British government may have been slow – some might say shamefully slow – to appreciate what was at stake, but it is the Irish border issue, rather than the demands of business, that now drives Mrs May’s entire Brexit policy, as expressed in her Chequers proposal.

But the fact that Mrs May is no less sincere than Mr Varadkar in her desire to keep the border open doesn’t make a solution any easier.

As things stand, the Irish border is the single biggest obstacle to an orderly Brexit and the two sides are as far apart as ever. EU officials say that no progress whatsoever has been made since March in negotiations over the backstop that Mrs May agreed in December. The withdrawal agreement was to ensure that no hard border emerged regardless of the future trading relationship between the UK and EU.

The EU insists that there can be no withdrawal agreement without a functioning backstop. The UK is adamant, however, that the problem can be solved only via a framework trading relationship that makes a backstop unnecessary. Hence the Chequers plan for a “facilitated customs arrangement”, which would see the UK pursue a dual-tariff system, collecting EU tariffs on the EU’s behalf for imported goods for the EU market, but charging only UK tariffs on goods destined for the UK market; and a proposed “common rule book” covering trade but not services.

Neither side shows the slightest sign of budging. Mrs May continues to insist that the EU’s backstop suggestion would amount to introducing a border in the Irish Sea, which she says no UK prime minister could accept. Downing Street believes that Brussels is badly underestimating the degree of cross-party support for its position. Officials note that an amendment to the EU Withdrawal Bill tabled by Jacob Rees-Mogg ruling out a customs border in the Irish Sea was accepted by the House of Commons without a vote. Downing Street argues that the only way to unblock the situation is for Brussels to drop its opposition to Chequers.

EU officials have countered and have said Mrs May is underestimating opposition to her proposals across the European Union. Brussels is also baffled by the UK’s position on the backstop. EU officials have pointed out that some checks already take place at Northern Irish ports and airports and that the EU’s proposal simply would build upon them. Indeed, civil servants in Northern Ireland produced a draft paper this year in what they dubbed a “Channels” approach, under which goods entering Northern Ireland from the UK could pass through either a red or green channel at ports or airports depending on whether those goods were destined for local consumption or export to the EU. Such a system would depend on some level of risk-based checks combined with appropriate documentation, cross-border cooperation and tough penalties for infringements. The paper concludes that such “a pragmatic extension of present reality . . . seems infinitely preferable to a return to the border of the past”. Yet the UK government has blocked publication and refuses to share with Brussels any underlying data on volumes of goods entering Northern Ireland.

Of course, how this situation plays out will in part be determined by how all sides perceive the consequences of a no deal. Both the UK and Ireland would be hit hard economically. The IMF estimates that both would suffer similar hits to GDP of about 4 per cent by 2030, although Ireland’s far higher rates of growth would make such a shock easier to absorb. British officials believe that Mr Varadkar would pay a political price because he has done little to prepare public opinion for the prospect of the EU at some point obliging Dublin to start introducing customs and regulatory checks at the Northern Irish border, something Britain has said it would not do. But while Dublin is convinced it would win any blame game, the bigger risk may be to the UK. After all, the case for allowing the people of Northern Ireland to decide their own fate before any border checks were imposed and as provided for under the Good Friday Agreement would surely be strong. A recent poll published earlier this month suggested that a majority of Northern Irish under such circumstances would vote for reunification by a margin of 52 per cent to 39 per cent.

The risk for Mrs May is that the very outcome that her entire Brexit policy has been seeking to avoid will have come to pass. A political paradox if there ever was one.

Standard
Britain, European Union, Government, Politics, Society

(In Brief) What are the UK’s Brexit Options?

BREXIT

The Chequers Plan – The Prime Minister has made clear that her July 2018 blueprint remains Britain’s negotiating position and expects her ministers in Cabinet to promote it.

But officials at No 10 know that if the EU continues to stonewall, the internal Tory Party voices who have never liked the deal will only get louder. The agreement would see the UK collect tariffs on behalf of the EU and follow a “common rulebook” for goods but not services.

Canada – Canada’s free trade deal with the EU came into force last October, following seven years of negotiation.

It grants preferential access to the single market without signing up to the EU’s four fundamental freedoms – goods, services, capital and labour.

It removes 99 per cent of customs duties and trade tariffs, but it would not give British financial services the access to the EU market they currently enjoy and does not solve the Northern Ireland border question.

Norway – Under the Norway model, the UK would sit alongside Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein as part of the European Economic Area (EEA).

It would give Britain the freedom to strike trade deals with countries around the world. But free movement of people would continue, which would be unacceptable to many Tory Eurosceptics.

No Deal – The nuclear option. But the Prime Minister has repeated her pledge in the last few days that “no deal is better than a bad deal”.

Britain would make a clean break from the EU and fall back on its membership of the World Trade Organisation. It could also save Britain paying the £39 billion “divorce bill”.

Blind Brexit – This would involve a vague November statement on future trade in a bid to finalise the divorce payment and transition deal. The details of the future trading relationship would be sorted out at an unspecified later date.

Standard