Category Archives: Russia

Britain, Military, Russia, Ukraine, United States

A daring strike. Reason why we must keep sending arms

UKRAINE-RUSSIA

THE surprise factor has always been critical in war. And once again, Ukraine has displayed it with audaciousness – just as the country did when fighting back so valiantly against the world’s second biggest military power 30 months ago after Vladimir Putin tried to crush their country with his invasion.

Kyiv’s troops have made a lightning-fast thrust into the Kursk region of Russia with tank and mechanised units that no one anticipated – especially not the Kremlin.

It was clearly well prepared and planned, with cyber attacks stifling Russian communications and drones, aided by substantial artillery firepower. These are regular Ukrainian military forces – not the militia involved in previous incursions.

Russian convoys hastily transferring troops to the region after the initial raid seem to have been hit hard by Ukraine. Minefields were laid to protect the attack force. Social media suggests more Ukrainian tanks and troops are going in, plus significant captures of enemy soldiers.

It is difficult to determine precise numbers of the troops involved, let alone the aims of this daring strike that has taken them possibly 20 miles over the border. Whatever the case, it all shows an impressive level of operational planning and diligence.

It also bears similarities in style to the rapid advance by Ukraine two years ago that recaptured big chunks of the Kharkiv region. That was led by General Oleksandr Syrskyi, who has since been promoted to overall commander of Ukraine’s armed forces.

To take the fight into Russia with the first invasion of its terrain since 1941 is a bold and risky move. And it seems Western allies were left as surprised as the Kremlin when it was launched from Ukraine’s Sumy region.

Putin, the architect of so many bloodstained atrocities in this hideous war, has been silent so far. His aides are appealing to the United Nations for support, and bleat pathetically about “large-scale provocation”, and seemingly are threatening a “tough response”.

Only time will tell if this was a brave and foolhardy move by Ukraine – or a smart move that will force Moscow to shift forces from other parts of the frontline, thereby aiding Kyiv’s defence of its terrain while raising much needed morale among citizens and Western allies.

The attack certainly demolishes any suggestions that the war was settling into a stalemate, with Russia’s remorseless military steamroller making grinding gains in eastern Ukraine despite massive causalities.

Kyiv has demonstrated its military capabilities again when sufficiently equipped with modern weapons – just as it has in its remarkable defeat of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, where it used drones and missiles to sink or damage at least one third of the ships, forcing the rest to retreat from Crimea. This has frustrated Moscow’s ability to bomb Ukraine from warships.

In this latest operation, Ukraine has hit two airbases used to launch the glide bombs that are causing horrific carnage among Ukrainian civilians and soldiers with massive blasts.

The sluggish Russian response shows (again) the failings of a top-down, Soviet-style command structure under a power-crazed dictator. Moscow’s propaganda has been reduced to showing footage of “successful” strikes repelling Ukraine in Kursk – footage that was in reality filmed elsewhere.

We do not know if Ukraine intends to press on or try to hold this captured terrain for trading in future negotiations for its own stolen lands – or to retreat having shaken the enemy, rattled the Russian regime, and forced it to place more security and troops all along the border regions.

Military strategists are, however, right to point out that Moscow has held a big advantage in this war until now because it has not needed to commit military resources to defend its border – that’s an amazing thing during any war.

This advantage was down to the West’s ridiculous determination from the start to restrain Ukrainian efforts to fight back inside Russia. Washington even complained to Kyiv about attacks on fuel dumps supplying the Kremlin’s military machine.

The West’s pathetic fear of escalation, stoked ceaselessly by Russian threats of nuclear war, has been a powerful weapon for Putin because it has limited military aid for Kyiv and severely shackled Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

Now, though, Kyiv has dramatically challenged this stance and shown the absurdities of such timidity in this epochal confrontation between dictatorship and democracy. It feeds into the dictum expressed by Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz, who said: “Enemy blows must be returned in war”.

. 14 August 2024

A sign negotiated peace is edging closer

IN the last few weeks, Kyiv had been signalling it was open to peace talks with Moscow. This was not an attempt to surrender, but to arrange a settlement that preserves Ukraine’s independence and by recovering as much ground as possible.

Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, had even gone to see Vladimir Putin’s allies in Beijing to sound out whether China would act as an intermediary.

If Putin took Zelensky’s willingness to talk as a sign that his resolve to fight was weakening, he surely suffered the greatest shock of his presidency in the early hours of August 6.

A week ago, an elite Ukrainian unit stormed the border and its forces have since seized some 400 square miles of Russian territory in the Kursk region.

It appears that the Ukrainians have adopted the great Soviet art of “maskirovka” – deception in warfare – and taught the Russian tyrant a lesson in over-confidence.

The claim that Kyiv’s allies were caught by surprise is disquieting. The presence of NATO advisers and technicians helping the Ukrainians deploy Western weaponry – including F16 fighters, French and British cruise missiles, and German armoured vehicles – must have been seen along with the preparations being made for the sudden offensive. The West is treading carefully, mindful of the cost the war is extracting from its taxpayers. Its leaders are more than happy to see Putin embarrassed by Ukraine’s surprise attack, but they’ve kept the triumphalist rhetoric to a minimum (for fear of burning bridges with the Kremlin were it to open talks on a ceasefire).

Through its successful invasion into Russian territory, Ukraine has dramatically gained more leverage for any impending talks. Zelensky now has the basis for bargaining Russian land not only for peace but also for the return of areas of the Donbas overrun by the enemy.

Seen in that light, this act of aggression is not an escalation of the war but a signal that a negotiated settlement might be edging closer. It will be tempting for Zelensky to push further. With new American F16s at his disposal, Russian targets in the Black Sea will be vulnerable.

Potential propaganda coups like destroying the bridge linking Russia to Crimea, or by targeting Putin’s palace near Sochi on the coast, could be strategic options. Such gains, however, could also be counter-productive, for they would enrage and infuriate Putin so much that any prospect of a peace deal would be dead in the water.

The important point is that being good at war is not just about fighting well.

As the Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz argued after fighting with the Russian army against Napoleon in 1812, the ultimate purpose of war is to achieve a political objective.

Political and military leaders have to keep their eyes on the great prize of attaining that ultimate goal – whether they call it victory or peace – rather than just tactical victories on the battlefield.

The choice of invading Kursk was hugely symbolic given the emotional resonance the region holds over Russians.

On the very same terrain in 1943, the heroic Red Army routed the retreating Nazis in the biggest tank battle ever seen. That involved some 6,000 tanks and almost two million troops. The Battle of Kursk became a decisive turning point in the defeat of Hitler in the east.

The ill-fated submarine that was named in its honour has also imprinted itself on the Russian psyche. In August 2000, just eight months after Putin won his inaugural presidency, the nuclear-powered K-141 Kursk sank in the Barents Sea, taking with it all 118 souls on board.

Therefore the invasion of Kursk in particular, the first foreign incursion into Russia since the Second World War, will have hurt Putin.

That war ended in total victory; this one will end with a messy compromise.

Diplomacy is an unseemly business best kept secret from squeamish publics. A lot can go wrong, even with diplomacy behind the scenes. Trust is in short supply to put it mildly. Yet, there is now a glimmer of hope that Ukraine can get to hold its essential territory and rebuild its society and economy.

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Books, China, Government, Politics, Russia, Society, United States

Book Review: Autocracy, Inc

LITERARY REVIEW

Intro: Standing up to the tyrants in the East

THERE isn’t a more rigorous and engaging analyst of the crimes of the erstwhile Soviet dictatorship than Anne Applebaum, the acclaimed author of the Pulitzer prize-winning history of the Gulag, and also of Red Famine: Stalin’s War On Ukraine.

For her gifts, the historian is also rooted in the present, as a fearsomely active journalist, and the writer’s latest work is an up-to-the moment examination of how modern-day autocracies, not just that of Russia’s President Putin, but also including China, North Korea, and Iran, act as a kind of informal bloc to challenge what they see as the West’s “hegemony”.

It’s unfortunate that the phrase “axis of evil” has already been taken, since that would be a befitting description. Alas, it was inappropriately used by George W. Bush in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to join together Iran, Iraq, and North Korea – which actually had no military or financial links at all.

Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, do, however, connect in this way, accelerated by Moscow’s war on Ukraine.

The only minor criticism of Applebaum’s formidable book is that it never mentions the Iraq War of 2003–2011 or the later Western intervention in Libya. For these were the developments which not only gave fuel to the anti-Western agenda, but also convinced many – including in the West itself – that we had little moral authority to criticise the military escapades launched by the Kremlin.

Applebaum is especially adept, however, in setting out the remarkable success of modern Russian propaganda – beyond the scope that Stalin could ever have dreamed of – using the worldwide web, and of China’s ability both to control its own people through technology and to censor what was thought to be unstoppable.

At the dawn of the millennium the ever-optimistic U.S. President Bill Clinton proclaimed that the internet would liberalise China, by exposing its people to all the possibilities and opportunities the free world had to offer.

When arguing, on similar grounds, for China to be admitted to the World Trade Organisation, he gave an address in which he ridiculed the idea that Beijing could keep a lid on things.

“Now, there’s no question that China’s been trying to crack down on the internet,” he declared. At that point, as Applebaum records, Clinton gave a wry smile, adding: “Good luck!” – and his audience joined in the laughter.

They are not laughing now. The Great Firewall of China, and even more sophisticated tools than that, have allowed Beijing to succeed, keeping billions of its citizens in a form of intellectual slavery.

In a similar vein, the German political establishment had long believed in the doctrine known as Wandel durch Handel – “change through trade” – the idea that making nice with Moscow in terms of market access would inevitably lead to political and cultural liberalisation. This was most notable with pipelines taking Russian gas to Europe. That dream, or self-interest, in terms of the aspirations of German business, has also been shattered. The kleptocracy just got richer and far  more ruthless. 

As the deputy mayor of St Petersburg in 1992, and in his first public role, the former KGB officer Putin argued that “the entrepreneurial class should become the basis for the flourishing of our society as a whole”. That was music to the ears of Western investors, but Putin was then, already, creaming off vast sums for himself and his associates, via his control of local export licences for raw material.

As Applebaum notes, under Putin’s perpetually renewed presidency this ultimately developed into “a full-blown autocratic kleptocracy, a Mafia state built and managed entirely for the purpose of enriching its leadership”. It was for his leading role in exposing this that Alexei Navalny paid with his life.

Despite his apparent personal austerity and regular crackdowns on colossal financial corruption within the Chinese Communist Party – the inescapable consequence of permanent one-party rule – Xi Jinping is only too happy to make common cause with the multibillionaire plutocrat Putin.

Central, this is because they share a primordial terror of a popular uprising against their regimes: in this context, it was striking how in 2022 Xi suddenly abandoned his hitherto iron-cast Covid lockdown measures after a public revolt threatened to spread to the streets of Beijing and Shanghai.

And the “no limits” friendship which Xi entered into with Putin on February 4, 2022, was specifically designed to demonstrate a kind of solidarity among autocracies, against what they both constantly refer to as the West’s “attempts at hegemony”.

Their joint communiqué denounced “the abuse of democratic values and interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states”. Weeks later, Putin sent his tanks towards Kyiv.

There was a tantalising glimpse of a possible fracture in the relationship at that moment: it seems likley that Xi was not given a warning by Putin of what was about to happen and, some months later, Beijing made public its grave concern about the Kremlin’s threats to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, as Anne Applebaum concludes, the challenge to “Autocracy, Inc” must come from within the West itself.

And, yet, if the forecasts are right, the American people seem likely to elect to the White House (again) their own version of Autocracy Inc: Donald J. Trump.

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Britain, Government, NATO, Politics, Russia, Society, Ukraine, United States

Give President Zelensky what he needs to defeat Putin

UKRAINE WAR

EUROPEAN leaders gathered at Blenheim Palace recently in a symposium that was a conduit for European solidarity. They surrounded Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in an image of steadfast support.

For Zelensky, he must be wondering how stalwart those allies really are. Two and a half years into Putin’s bloody and violent war, it must increasingly seem to Zelensky that NATO is offering just enough to keep Ukraine limping on – but not enough, anywhere near enough, in smashing Russian forces completely. What else could explain the West’s ambiguity and indecisiveness over the use of long-range weapons to attack targets inside Russia?

The British prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, has rebuffed Zelensky’s plea that he ditch the UK’s veto on Storm Shadow “bunker-buster” weapons, which have a range of up to 190 miles, easily capable of striking targets in Russia.

As it currently stands, the UK and other allies allow Ukraine to fire long-range missiles defensively at targets on Russian soil near the border, but not offensively or deep into Russian territory.

Such a position is, of course, calculated to avoid provoking Putin into wider retaliation. At the heart of that fear is the ultimate and terrifying prospect that the dictator might reach for the nuclear button, but even less apocalyptic concerns help to dictate policy.

Success in armed conflict can only be achieved if all the elements of the battlefield are dominated. In the traditional doctrine of NATO, this means winning “deep, close, and rear” battles – that is long-range strikes and raids on infrastructure (deep), front-line combat (close), and the essential support mechanisms such as logistics and headquarters (rear).

Just as Russia is hitting Ukrainian cities, factories, and infrastructure, any military general knows it is perfectly reasonable for Ukraine to do the same in order to degrade its enemy’s military capability. But with the current restrictions on missile use in place, Ukraine’s fighting forces can’t execute the “deep” battle. Zelensky is being forced to fight with one arm tied behind his back.

That’s why many are now pressing decision-makers in Washington, London, Berlin, and Paris to authorise the use of long-range weapons, such as the UK’s Storm Shadow, to strike targets inside Russia.

That would likely lead to some escalation. But as in the Cold War, many strategists are confident this war, at least, won’t go nuclear, despite the warnings of those concerned about the UK’s deepening involvement in the conflict.

For one thing, Russian tactics would probably use a tactical nuclear weapon only to stop an enemy breakthrough in Ukraine. Such a breakthrough could only occur in one of the four eastern provinces that Putin has decreed to be forever Russian. Where is the logic in irradiating many square miles of your own soil?

Then there is the relationship between China and Russia to consider. President Xi has so far offered only mild support to Putin and is unquestionably the dominant partner in the relationship. China has consistently opposed the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

Of course, matters could seriously escalate long before it reached nuclear proportions.

A cyber attack on the scale of the IT outage chaos caused by CrowdStrike is well within Russia’s capability, as is severing underwater communications or energy pipelines in the North Sea. And if the Houthi rebels in Yemen were capable of striking Tel Aviv, we cannot rule out a long-range conventional missile strike on a target in Western Europe, even potentially one on the UK.

Nevertheless, military strategists and theoreticians often refer to the concept of “limited war” – that is, restricted in its aims and its geography. The war in Ukraine does indeed have limits, but history has demonstrated that Putin’s ambition is not restrained in the same way.

Before Ukraine there was Chechnya and Georgia. Why, after Ukraine, should we not think there might be Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia, or even all three? Why not Poland? Anxiety levels are already high in the Baltic States, and one has to wonder why at this moment in their history, both Sweden and Finland recently chose to join NATO. The fear of Russian expansion is tangible on Russia’s borders – no wonder the Poles are spending more than 4 per cent of GDP on defence and building the largest army in Europe.

Any discussion of Ukraine’s prospect of achieving military success must also confront the issue of Donald Trump returning to the White House in November. He has made the claim that he could settle the war in a day with one telephone call. If that’s the case, Ukraine must be given every chance to achieve a position of advantage on the battlefield before that call is made.

If this war is to have a successfully negotiated end, Ukraine must be in the strongest possible position at the start of any talks. The reality is that Putin must be stopped, and Ukraine is the place to stop him. The best means of doing so is by giving Kyiv what it needs to finish the job.

The price of stopping Putin now is far better than paying the price of a wider devastating war – as the history of the last century shows.

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