Britain, Iran, Israel, Middle East, United Nations, United States

Iran’s nuclear threat will be a concern for Netanyahu

IRAN-ISRAEL

ISRAEL’S Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, may feel he faces an impossible dilemma following the successful neutralisation of Iran’s missile and drone onslaught.

President Biden has counselled him to “take the win” and refrain from escalating hostilities. But the hawks in Mr Biden’s war Cabinet and the Israeli public want their PM to press home the advantage and take the battle to Tehran. After all, they say, the mullahs have never been closer to developing a nuclear bomb.

While there is no doubt Iran’s nuclear ambitions pose a grave threat to Israel and the West, as David Ben-Gurion (Israel’s prime minister from 1955 to 1963) once said, the Jewish state cannot afford long wars.

Ben-Gurion was right then, and he’s probably right today. Even with its allies’ help, defending itself against last weekend’s single Iranian attack is estimated to have cost Israel no less than $1billion. The last thing Tel-Aviv needs is a long and protracted internecine conflict with the theocrats of Persia.

But nor can Jerusalem do nothing. It does look evident that Israel will mount surgical strikes against Iran’s missile launch sites and the factories that produces its ordnance. Even if Iran does develop a bomb, without a delivery system it will be unable to use it against its enemies.

The world itself should be in no doubt as to the danger an Iranian bomb would present – and just how terrifying close the regime is to building one.

In a desolate mountainous region 140 miles south of Tehran is a one-square-mile site protected by anti-aircraft batteries, and a detachment of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard: the Natanz nuclear facility.

Over the years, Natanz has been subjected to a remorseless campaign of sabotage in a bid to prevent it creating the wherewithal for a nuclear warhead.

In 2009, it was hit by a sophisticated cyber-attack using a computer virus called Stuxnet. This is believed to have been created by Israel along with American cooperation.

For months, Iranian scientists scratched their heads in puzzlement as its centrifuges, vital tools in the uranium enrichment process, failed at an unprecedented rate. Israelis also organised the targeted assassinations of key scientists involved in the nuclear programme and destroyed elements of the Natanz facility using bomb-carrying drones.

Now, however, there are signs that great strides have been made in improving security at Natanz, to the point where it has become virtually impregnable.

A recent analysis of satellite images of the site concluded that the Iranians are building an underground facility at Natanz at a dept of between 260ft and 328ft.

As the US’ most advanced bunker-busting bomb, the GBU-57, is designed to plough through just 200ft of earth before detonating, this is bad news for the Israelis and their allies.

Meanwhile, in the five years since President Trump unilaterally withdrew America from a nuclear accord that strictly limited Iran’s enrichment of uranium to 3.67 per cent purity (enough to fuel civilian power stations) and by keeping its stockpile to some 300kg (660lb), it has made good progress towards developing weapons-grade uranium.

Last year, inspectors discovered that it had produced uranium particles that were 83.7 per cent pure, just short of the 90 per cent weapons threshold.

And Natanz and its various sister sites are not the Iranians’ only nuclear option. Just as Britain and Russia developed “civil” nuclear energy, which produces plutonium as a by-product of the electricity-generating process, to give themselves a source of the necessary nuclear warhead material, so Iran has acquired a plutonium-powered plant of its own.

At the port of Bushehr on the Persian Gulf, there is an atomic energy plant controlled by Russian engineers.

Conventional wisdom has it that the plant will not bring Iran any closer to building a nuclear bomb, because Moscow supplies the enriched uranium for the reactor and – under a “peaceful use” clause in the deal – repatriates to Russia spent fuel rods that could be reprocessed and enriched into weapons-grade plutonium.

Yet much has changed in the world of geopolitics since that deal was struck. Russia has turned itself into a pariah following its unprovoked, brutal, and bloody war against Ukraine.

It was also striking quite how pro-Iran Putin’s UN ambassador was at the Security Council meeting immediately following the attacks on Israel. Who’s to say, then, Russia would object to Iran purloining enough plutonium to produce a range of nuclear warheads?

Certainly, using the plutonium produced at Bushehr would be a quicker route to making a bomb than waiting for Natanz to come up with sufficient enriched uranium.

Given that Tehran could, theoretically, have a bomb within a matter of months, the need for Israel to take out Iran’s ability to make delivery systems could not be more urgent. The destruction of manufacturing facilities for rockets, guidance systems, and detonator plants at centres such as Parchin, would mean Iran would not have a deployable nuke even if it had sufficient highly enriched uranium. Precision strikes would also spare civilian Iranians the calamity engulfing Gaza.

Such a move would also send a powerful signal to Iran’s increasingly restive population. A decisive Israeli military strike now could destabilise the Ayatollah’s regime and remove the fear of his Revolutionary Guards enforcers.

Standard
Britain, Iran, Israel, Middle East, United States

Fears grow that Tehran is plotting revenge attacks

IRAN–ISRAEL

BENJAMIN Netanyahu has warned that Israel would “harm whoever harms us” as the country is braced for an armed confrontation with Iran.

Tensions are high after Iran has vowed revenge following the Israeli defence force’s strike on its embassy in Syria which killed a leading general.

American intelligence suggests that the regime in Tehran is planning a “significant attack” against Israel. There are fears that the Middle East crisis could trigger a global conflict.

Perspective

In January 2020, Iran’s military mastermind Qasem Soleimani was assassinated by missiles fired from an American drone as his escort convoy left Baghdad airport.

In response, Tehran made bloodcurdling threats of revenge.

Five days later, that retaliatory attack duly came. But it proved a pitiful embarrassment.

Dozens of missiles rained down on two U.S. airbases in Iraq. Collateral damage amounted to the destruction of only a gymnasium and canteen; no lives were lost. It seems to have been a moment of shame for the mullahs – and one whose pain still stings.

So, following the attack by Israel on an Iranian consulate earlier this month, killing 13 people including senior military officers, Tehran’s theocratic mullahs are once again thirsting for revenge.

President Joe Biden has warned that a significant attack is imminent. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared that his country is primed “offensively and defensively” in meeting all of the security needs of the State of Israel.

Tuesday was the last day of Ramadan: one of the most important dates in the Muslim calendar. It is thought that many Iranian generals will be arguing that the time is ripe to strike.

So, what could they do?

There are three main options. Most apocalyptically, Iran could risk all-out war by targeting specific locations in Israel itself.

Or it could launch deniable attacks via its proxy forces in Lebanon (Hezbollah), Syria and western Iraq (Shi’ite militias), or Yemen (Houthis). Third, it could carry out a tit-for-tat raid on an Israeli consulate.

Each one of these options has its own risks.

An attack on Israel would be a seminal moment in modern military history. For one thing, Iran’s sophisticated arsenal of ballistic missiles bears no resemblance to the primitive home-made delivery systems, fashioned from repurposed water pipes, used by Hamas in Gaza.

Its “Kheibar Shekan” missile alone has a warhead that can be packed with 1,100lb of high explosive. Its range of 900 miles means it could devastate or obliterate targets deep inside Israeli territory.

While Israel’s “Iron Dome” air-defence system has proved effective against Hamas’s periodic onslaughts, it has never faced such formidably fast and manoeuvrable firepower.

But the bigger the action, the bigger the consequences. Tehran is all too aware that Israel boasts equally powerful weapons itself and its own nuclear deterrent (which it has never admitted).

This means the mullahs are far more likely to opt for an attack via one of their proxies.

Hezbollah has traded fire with Israel across the latter’s northern border with Lebanon almost daily since Hamas launched its deadly attacks to the south on October 7. These exchanges have intensified in recent weeks.

With a vast stockpile of rockets and missiles at its disposal, Hezbollah can inflict significant damage at considerable cost. Its threat forces Netanyahu to keep large numbers of young Israelis in uniform – and thus out of work – with sharp consequences for the domestic economy.

Endemic conflict will inevitably play havoc with Tel-Aviv’s lucrative tourism industry. This year, the streets of Jerusalem have been noticeably deserted, even over the Easter holiday, as Christian visitors shunned the Holy Land.

The third retaliation could be simple payback: an attack on one of the Israeli embassies.

They would not be short of targets. Israel has long had consulates in Egypt and Jordan and, following the Abraham Accords in 2020, in Bahrain and the UAE, too.

The danger is that any such attack could carry the risk of a military response from the host country or the US – and from there, matters could swiftly spiral out of control.

While events in Gaza have dominated the headlines in recent months, the risk of a wider conflagration between Israel and Iran would make the conflict with Hamas look like a sideshow. A wider war has the potential to draw in all the Middle East powers.

The United States has promised Israel “ironclad” support in the event of Iranian reprisals, and Britain will stand squarely behind its American ally.

If oil exports are disrupted, with all that means for household energy bills, other Western actors surely will be drawn into the conflict.

The challenge facing our leaders is to avoid an escalation in hostilities which could have devastating consequences for the world.


Sunday, 14 April

It has commenced. Following Israel’s airstrike on key Iranian commanders in the Syrian capital of Damascus, the “phoney war” in which threats and counterthreats were exchanged, have now ended.

Unlike previous skirmishes in which Iran waged war from behind its proxies of Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthi rebels of Yemen, events overnight represent a significant escalation.

In a chilling development, the two dominant military powers in the Middle East have begun to trade punches directly, in a heavyweight contest that could wreak dire consequences on each other, but also the world economy.

The arteries of global trade in oil and natural gas run through the region, as do Europe’s imports of goods from China, Japan, and South Korea.

International shipping is imperilled like never before. Events yesterday also saw Iranian special forces seizing an Israeli-owned container ship in the Persian Gulf. This was not an act of piracy committed by Iran’s proxies in the Red Sea – this was Tehran itself, committing an act of bald aggression.

Israel’s next move is critical. If the country’s Iron Dome anti-missile defence system blunts this onslaught by shooting down most of Iran’s drones and missiles, then maybe an opportunity could present itself in which tensions might ease.

But if Israel feels confident that it can go further and neutralise Iranian attacks, it might decide to go on the front foot.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could strike at Iran’s launch sites and nuclear facilities before Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi can retaliate. But it is a big and highly risky job.

Britain and the U.S. have been trying to silence Yemen’s much weaker Houthis for six months now – without success. Can either side back down?

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards, whose senior commanders were assassinated by Israel on April 1, are Tehran’s enforces – at home as well as abroad.

Amid the pressure that has forced the country’s mullahs to unleash their drones on Israel, they will find it difficult to step back from the brink.

The hardmen who keep them in power will push for the attacks to continue, not just on Israel directly but also on her allies, such as Britain and the U.S. – their shipping and embassies will become prime targets.

Backing off now is not an option for either side, nor for Britain. Rishi Sunak has committed UK support to its ally, and it will be seen whether he will waver now a wider war is inevitable.

Any chink in Western resolve will only encourage hostile states beyond the Middle East, like Russia and China – big power rivals who eagerly await a window of weakness in which to further their own territorial aims.

Standard
Arts, Books, History, NATO, Society, United States

Book review: Deterring Armageddon

LITERARY REVIEW: A BIOGRAPHY OF NATO

Intro: NATO’s modus operandi is centred around the pledge that an attack on one member is an attack on all. In a provocative new book, however, the author asks: would any nation today really put itself in the firing line to protect another?

DURING the depths of the Cold War, 40 years ago, there were undoubtedly gullible victims in Britain of Moscow propaganda.

Paradoxically, many of these people have now become warmongering Blairites, keen advocates in bombing distant countries. But back in the 1980s, they detested NATO with every human fibre. Houses were plastered with peacenik posters; many camped out at the U.S. Air Force base at Greenham Common, protesting against the presence of American cruise missiles; others still chained themselves to fences and blocked roads leading into the Naval base at Faslane; the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was rampant among the militants who were disruptive in their aims and actions.

Many of these people were perceived as being deluded as they actively wanted the former Soviet Union to dominate all of Europe. They failed, yes, but actually, only by a narrow margin.

They failed because NATO held together under very great pressure from the Kremlin and from the European Left. The Communist Empire had exhausted itself in one last failed attempt to destroy the Free West, and the Soviet Union sickened and eventually perished.

Many things contributed to that demise, but many military commentators and analysts believe that the battle over cruise missiles, and the resolve of NATO, were decisive.

The NATO alliance, set up in 1949 specifically to prevent a Soviet takeover of Western Europe, still exists almost 33 years after the collapse of the Soviet empire. Yet, an oddity is at play. The alliance was created to deal with that particular menace, which still exists long after that threat melted away.

Even more surprising, NATO has actually got bigger since its arch enemy vanished. An explanation is more than overdue.

We should therefore be very grateful to Peter Apps, a British Army reservist, and Reuters columnist, for writing a comprehensive and full history of NATO since its inception in 1949 to today.

The workings of this book started life under the rather exalted working title “Sacred Obligation”. But are we looking at an organisation that has become the world’s most successful bluff?

Mr Apps spends a great deal of his time chronicling the endless unresolved tension between the mighty, rich, and powerful U.S., NATO’s backbone and muscle, and Europe, its vulnerable and pitifully weak underbelly. It was of course this tension which the USSR ceaselessly sought to exploit.

NATO’s historic and famous promise, that an attack on one would be an attack on all, was and remains a very precarious gamble. History features sad examples of security pacts being called out and exposed as bluffs.

The normally pugnacious Lord Palmerston wriggled out of Britain’s 1860s pledge to defend Denmark against Prussia – when he realised it would get us into a war we would lose.

Neville Chamberlain’s 1939 guarantee to protect Poland from Germany failed to deter Hitler from invading. Even worse, when the invasion came, Britain did nothing.

And we shouldn’t forget, either, how fiercely determined America was in 1939, and for years afterwards, in staying out of European quarrels. Donald Trump means what he says, too.

Washington only went to war against Berlin after Hitler declared war on America, not the other way round. Any careful and studious reader of this book will begin to wonder whether NATO, far from being an enshrined promise of aid in time of trouble, is in fact a good way of avoiding any real obligation to fight.

The much-touted Article 5 of NATO’s charter is not quite the magnificent guarantee of armed support from the strong to the weak that it appears to be. Members of the alliance pledge to assist an attacked nation “by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force”.

Read carefully. This means that if a NATO member does not “deem” armed force to be necessary, it can send a note of protest instead, or make a fierce and angry speech at the United Nations.

America would never have signed or ratified a treaty which obliged it to go to war, which is why the clause is so weak.

All the small, poor ill-armed countries on NATO’s eastern edge would be well advised to take note of that. During its 40-year life cycle, NATO has shown how cautious, limited, and risk-averse it has been. Its recent reinvention as a kind of mini-United Nations task force has been mainly outside its original operational area, in former Yugoslavia, Libya, and Afghanistan.

Its founding membership was carefully restricted to countries already well outside the Soviet sphere of influence.

It stood aside when Russian tanks crushed the 1953 East Berlin rising, the 1956 Budapest revolt, and the 1968 Prague Spring.

It did precious little when Moscow ordered Poland’s Communist rulers to curtail a democratic and Christian rebellion by imposing brutal martial law there from 1981 to 1983.

Where the West did stand up to Soviet power in Europe, mainly in West Berlin, it tended to be the U.S. which did most of the heavy lifting. We should suspect it is still much the same. In an enlightening passage, Apps describes a recent scene at NATO’s Joint Force Command in the Dutch town of Brunssum.  

He writes: “Officials in its 24-hour operations room described their main role as stopping the Ukraine war spreading to alliance territory”. Well, quite. For who knows what stress would be placed on NATO if, thanks to some rash incursion or off-course missile, it faced a direct war with Russia?

As it happens, the task of avoiding the spread of war into NATO territory would be much easier if NATO had not expanded so far east in the past 30 years. Its leaders had been warned.

In 1997, the greatest and toughest anti-Soviet U.S. diplomat of modern times, George Kennan, said shortly before he died: “Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.”

Recalling his generation’s successful handling of Soviet power, he sighed: “This has been my life, and it pains me to see it so screwed up in the end.”

Deterring Armageddon: A Biography of NATO by Peter Apps is published by Wildfire, 624pp

Standard