Category Archives: United States

Britain, Economic, Foreign Affairs, G8, Government, Russia, Society, Ukraine, United Nations, United States

Restraint by the West over Ukraine is needed…

UKRAINE

Intro: Mr Kerry infers a Russian policy of the playground bully, laying claim to another country’s territory and assets, because – perhaps accurately in calculation – there is no one with the strength to defy him

Throughout history, a host of rules have been built up about how nations should relate to one another. International diplomacy, largely a game of manners and etiquette, seeks to operate through points of protocol. A president, for example, as head of state, will outrank the standing of that country’s prime minister. But these rules may also be fundamental points of law, where the use of force, say, removes another country’s territorial sovereignty. In such circumstances, ostracism has to be the best punishment.

Diplomacy, as it happens, is also a game of power. When a nation with vast power and strength confronts one that has very little, there is not much the weaker party can do. This is reflective of what we are now seeing between Russia and Ukraine.

The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, is likely to claim that by occupying Crimea is solely to do with protecting ethnic Russians and his country’s strategic interests. Such an argument was used by Mr Putin when Russian forces invaded Georgia in 2008 (in claiming the tiny mountain enclave of South Ossetia). The US Secretary of State, John Kerry, has said, however, that this should be deemed in the pretext of being ‘completely trumped-up.’ Mr Kerry infers a Russian policy of the playground bully, laying claim to another country’s territory and assets, because – perhaps accurately in calculation – there is no one with the strength to defy him.

This has become a crucial question for the West. Russia refuses to be constrained by international niceties, not only with its neighbours, but others too. Consider the example in Britain. Even if the Kremlin did not sanction the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, a Russian turned British spy, on British soil, it certainly did its level best to block and impede the investigation. If Mr Putin is willing to flagrantly breach the rules of the club of nations, why, then, should he be allowed to profit from membership?

While we should not be arguing that East-West relations be thrown back towards a Cold War philosophy, it is right that Western leaders question why Russia is worthy of G8 membership on its current form. Sochi was to play host to G8 in June, but that is now in jeopardy following Russian military manoeuvres in Ukraine.

It is generally accepted that there is little we or our allies can do, other than supporting the new government as best we can on the ground in Ukraine. Whether Mr Putin aims to seize wider territory in Ukraine, a gamble which seems unlikely, there is little doubt that Crimea is now de facto Russian territory and has been annexed.

Western countries will be fearful of confrontation with Russia, because it can seriously hurt Europe (at least in the short-term, economically). Russia controls the levers of oil and gas that flows through the Siberian Straits, any disruption to Europe would be hugely costly.

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Economic, European Union, Government, Politics, Russia, Society, Ukraine, United States

Ukraine and its future stability…

Intro: For Ukraine to have a stable future it is imperative that Russia, the European Union and the US work together in collaboration if that stability is to be assured

Despite all the tumult of recent weeks, the crisis in Ukraine is just at the beginning. Europe’s seventh most populous country will be without a fully-elected government until at least May, a situation that has arisen following its former president who was stripped of his power and who has been on the run since being forced out. It is believed Viktor Yanukovych has found safe haven in Russia, Ukraine’s closest ally in the region.

The underlying mood appears to be one of score settling. Separatism in the east is stirring, especially in Crimea, which is predominately Russian by culture and history. Ukraine is strategically important for Moscow: the Russian’s maintain a major naval base at Sevastopol, allowing the Russian navy to deploy quickly into the Black Sea as the need arises.

Ukraine is broke, precipitated by the immediate origins of the crisis which was economic. The currency, the hryvnia, has depreciated by 12 per cent since the start of the year, and the public finances are teetering on the verge of collapse. According to the interim-government in Ukraine, one which is attempting to aid transition to a newly elected government, the country needs £21 billion between now and the end of 2015 simply to pay its bills. Mr Yanukovych is widely reported as having taken bribes in accepting Russian aid and membership of the Moscow sponsored Eurasian Union, rather than entering into trade deals and agreements with the EU.

The West needs to be careful in any vainglorious attempt of portraying or by assuming it has won following the overthrow of Mr Yanukovych. The geopolitics, best seen as a tug-of-war, is fraught with difficulties. For Ukraine to have a stable future it is imperative that Russia, the European Union and the US work together in collaboration if that stability is to be assured. The danger is that any one of these superpowers treats the country as the prize in a zero-sum game.

America’s approach has been cautious. President Obama has, thus far, shown no desire for a full-scale showdown with Moscow. But this attitude is shared by his European allies, too, as they strive to put together an economic rescue package in which Russia would ideally be involved. In reality, though, the real uncertainty surrounds how Moscow will react to the fate of its southern neighbour. Where culture and history are so closely interwoven, Russia is likely to be wary of any western driven agenda.

The initial response of the Kremlin to events in Kiev was one of ferocious outrage. Dmitry Medvedev, the Prime Minister, accused Europe of turning a blind eye to the dictatorial and ‘sometimes terrorist methods’ used by the new authorities to suppress dissent in eastern Ukraine – the area of the country which is particularly sympathetic to Russian ideals. Mr Medvedev has also declared that the opposition had seized power by an ‘armed mutiny’, a belief which could still lead to direct military action by Russia in the Crimea. A request by the Crimeans for Russian protection would be the pretext for the worst possible outcome.

However, since that outburst, the tone from Moscow has been more restrained. Earlier this week, Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, indicated that the policy of ‘non-intervention’ would continue. He said, rather curiously, that it was in Moscow’s interests for Ukraine to be part of a ‘broad European family’. However, the Kremlin has an array of options of how it might influence events such as how it will control vital gas exports to all parts of the Ukraine.

Gauging how the crisis will end is no easy task. A form of partition is one possibility, but that can only happen if the considered consent is given by all interested parties. Demarcation along similar lines to the 1993 ‘velvet divorce’ between the Czech Republic and Slovakia is one model that might prove helpful if negotiators are looking for historical references in bringing about an ordered and peaceful outcome in Ukraine.

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Foreign Affairs, Government, History, Middle East, Syria, United Nations, United States

The US Secretary of State faces challenges, but is John Kerry sufficiently supported?

US FOREIGN POLICY

John Kerry has illuminated the paradox of current American foreign policy. No where is this more embodied than in the Middle East, the region that continues to consume so much time and effort for the US Secretary of State. Rarely has the diplomacy and energies spent been as active and as bold as they are today. But flamboyant charges that the US is enfeebled and in retreat are also accusations that are running in parallel.

Mr Kerry is tacitly involved on three immensely challenging and overlapping fronts: his efforts to end the bloody civil war in Syria; the continued search for a nuclear deal with Iran that might end more than three decades of hostility between Washington and Tehran; and, the renewed and engaging process to secure a two-state settlement between Israel and Palestinians that has eluded negotiators since 1948.

An analysis of the progress being made will reveal a mixed picture. Encouragingly, the best advances have been made with Iran, with an interim deal that parts of the country’s nuclear programme have been frozen for a period of six months. This deal could yet unravel, but the U.S. and Iran are engaged in a process of constructive dialogue.

To the other extreme, Syria constitutes a total failure. The recent Geneva conference which could not even deliver an agreement on bringing humanitarian aid to tens of thousands of civilians, trapped by the savagery of the conflict, epitomises this rank failure. Vladimir Putin’s Russia continues to arm and supply the regime, while progress on securing Assad’s chemical weapons and stockpiles is, at best, described as being limited. More accurately, it would not be amiss to say that progress in removing Assad’s arsenal has been brought to a stuttering halt.

The current state of play in dealing with the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is less clear. Whilst Mr Kerry has been doggedly determined in keeping talks going, his indefatigability may be perceived from different angles of thought. For those who support him, this involvement and persistent diligence is proof of resolve. It is also recognition of his courage by placing his prestige on the line in a way that many of his predecessors never did. For the detractors, though, the US Secretary of State is merely on an ego trip, driven largely by the naïve belief that hope will triumph over experience. The more impartial may wonder whether Mr Kerry’s goal of a ‘framework’ plan – an agreement by the two sides on the shape of the final agreement with the details being worked out later – is really any different from the other diplomatic formulae’, such as the ‘road maps’, that have littered nearly seven decades of futile peacekeeping.

Underpinning Mr Kerry’s efforts on all three fronts is the ‘damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don’t’ scenario faced by the US in the Middle East. Most expect America to lead, even if its ability to shape and bend the region to its will is often grossly exaggerated. When the U.S. has taken decisive action, as in Iraq or Afghanistan, it has been accused of being a blundering warmonger. Following on from these two long and costly interventions, Americans will have no appetite for another. Yet, when it steadfastly refuses to robustly intervene in Syria (or to a lesser extent in Egypt), it is denounced for abandoning its responsibilities, and of condoning and supporting human rights abuses. It can hardly wave a magic wand and expect all to be well.

American history tends to suggest that the most effective Secretaries of State tend to be those that have been closest to their respective Presidents. Henry Kissinger, for instance, under President Richard Nixon, or James Baker who held post during the reign of President George HW Bush, spring to mind. Secretary of State Kerry is barely a year into his tenure, and so it is too early to say whether he will join this company. Success, however, on one of the three major challenges he is faced with would amount to a distinguished and noteworthy achievement.

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