Category Archives: United States

Economic, European Union, Government, Politics, Russia, Society, Ukraine, United States

Ukraine and its future stability…

Intro: For Ukraine to have a stable future it is imperative that Russia, the European Union and the US work together in collaboration if that stability is to be assured

Despite all the tumult of recent weeks, the crisis in Ukraine is just at the beginning. Europe’s seventh most populous country will be without a fully-elected government until at least May, a situation that has arisen following its former president who was stripped of his power and who has been on the run since being forced out. It is believed Viktor Yanukovych has found safe haven in Russia, Ukraine’s closest ally in the region.

The underlying mood appears to be one of score settling. Separatism in the east is stirring, especially in Crimea, which is predominately Russian by culture and history. Ukraine is strategically important for Moscow: the Russian’s maintain a major naval base at Sevastopol, allowing the Russian navy to deploy quickly into the Black Sea as the need arises.

Ukraine is broke, precipitated by the immediate origins of the crisis which was economic. The currency, the hryvnia, has depreciated by 12 per cent since the start of the year, and the public finances are teetering on the verge of collapse. According to the interim-government in Ukraine, one which is attempting to aid transition to a newly elected government, the country needs £21 billion between now and the end of 2015 simply to pay its bills. Mr Yanukovych is widely reported as having taken bribes in accepting Russian aid and membership of the Moscow sponsored Eurasian Union, rather than entering into trade deals and agreements with the EU.

The West needs to be careful in any vainglorious attempt of portraying or by assuming it has won following the overthrow of Mr Yanukovych. The geopolitics, best seen as a tug-of-war, is fraught with difficulties. For Ukraine to have a stable future it is imperative that Russia, the European Union and the US work together in collaboration if that stability is to be assured. The danger is that any one of these superpowers treats the country as the prize in a zero-sum game.

America’s approach has been cautious. President Obama has, thus far, shown no desire for a full-scale showdown with Moscow. But this attitude is shared by his European allies, too, as they strive to put together an economic rescue package in which Russia would ideally be involved. In reality, though, the real uncertainty surrounds how Moscow will react to the fate of its southern neighbour. Where culture and history are so closely interwoven, Russia is likely to be wary of any western driven agenda.

The initial response of the Kremlin to events in Kiev was one of ferocious outrage. Dmitry Medvedev, the Prime Minister, accused Europe of turning a blind eye to the dictatorial and ‘sometimes terrorist methods’ used by the new authorities to suppress dissent in eastern Ukraine – the area of the country which is particularly sympathetic to Russian ideals. Mr Medvedev has also declared that the opposition had seized power by an ‘armed mutiny’, a belief which could still lead to direct military action by Russia in the Crimea. A request by the Crimeans for Russian protection would be the pretext for the worst possible outcome.

However, since that outburst, the tone from Moscow has been more restrained. Earlier this week, Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, indicated that the policy of ‘non-intervention’ would continue. He said, rather curiously, that it was in Moscow’s interests for Ukraine to be part of a ‘broad European family’. However, the Kremlin has an array of options of how it might influence events such as how it will control vital gas exports to all parts of the Ukraine.

Gauging how the crisis will end is no easy task. A form of partition is one possibility, but that can only happen if the considered consent is given by all interested parties. Demarcation along similar lines to the 1993 ‘velvet divorce’ between the Czech Republic and Slovakia is one model that might prove helpful if negotiators are looking for historical references in bringing about an ordered and peaceful outcome in Ukraine.

Standard
Foreign Affairs, Government, History, Middle East, Syria, United Nations, United States

The US Secretary of State faces challenges, but is John Kerry sufficiently supported?

US FOREIGN POLICY

John Kerry has illuminated the paradox of current American foreign policy. No where is this more embodied than in the Middle East, the region that continues to consume so much time and effort for the US Secretary of State. Rarely has the diplomacy and energies spent been as active and as bold as they are today. But flamboyant charges that the US is enfeebled and in retreat are also accusations that are running in parallel.

Mr Kerry is tacitly involved on three immensely challenging and overlapping fronts: his efforts to end the bloody civil war in Syria; the continued search for a nuclear deal with Iran that might end more than three decades of hostility between Washington and Tehran; and, the renewed and engaging process to secure a two-state settlement between Israel and Palestinians that has eluded negotiators since 1948.

An analysis of the progress being made will reveal a mixed picture. Encouragingly, the best advances have been made with Iran, with an interim deal that parts of the country’s nuclear programme have been frozen for a period of six months. This deal could yet unravel, but the U.S. and Iran are engaged in a process of constructive dialogue.

To the other extreme, Syria constitutes a total failure. The recent Geneva conference which could not even deliver an agreement on bringing humanitarian aid to tens of thousands of civilians, trapped by the savagery of the conflict, epitomises this rank failure. Vladimir Putin’s Russia continues to arm and supply the regime, while progress on securing Assad’s chemical weapons and stockpiles is, at best, described as being limited. More accurately, it would not be amiss to say that progress in removing Assad’s arsenal has been brought to a stuttering halt.

The current state of play in dealing with the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is less clear. Whilst Mr Kerry has been doggedly determined in keeping talks going, his indefatigability may be perceived from different angles of thought. For those who support him, this involvement and persistent diligence is proof of resolve. It is also recognition of his courage by placing his prestige on the line in a way that many of his predecessors never did. For the detractors, though, the US Secretary of State is merely on an ego trip, driven largely by the naïve belief that hope will triumph over experience. The more impartial may wonder whether Mr Kerry’s goal of a ‘framework’ plan – an agreement by the two sides on the shape of the final agreement with the details being worked out later – is really any different from the other diplomatic formulae’, such as the ‘road maps’, that have littered nearly seven decades of futile peacekeeping.

Underpinning Mr Kerry’s efforts on all three fronts is the ‘damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don’t’ scenario faced by the US in the Middle East. Most expect America to lead, even if its ability to shape and bend the region to its will is often grossly exaggerated. When the U.S. has taken decisive action, as in Iraq or Afghanistan, it has been accused of being a blundering warmonger. Following on from these two long and costly interventions, Americans will have no appetite for another. Yet, when it steadfastly refuses to robustly intervene in Syria (or to a lesser extent in Egypt), it is denounced for abandoning its responsibilities, and of condoning and supporting human rights abuses. It can hardly wave a magic wand and expect all to be well.

American history tends to suggest that the most effective Secretaries of State tend to be those that have been closest to their respective Presidents. Henry Kissinger, for instance, under President Richard Nixon, or James Baker who held post during the reign of President George HW Bush, spring to mind. Secretary of State Kerry is barely a year into his tenure, and so it is too early to say whether he will join this company. Success, however, on one of the three major challenges he is faced with would amount to a distinguished and noteworthy achievement.

Standard
Britain, Foreign Affairs, Government, Intelligence, Military, National Security, Politics, Society, United States

Reconfiguring Defence for reasons of a changed world…

DEFENCE & FUTURE OVERSEAS PARTNERSHIPS

Over the course of the last half-century defence spending has attracted and been a hot issue of contention. This has been brought to the fore in recent times, through government rounds of budget and expenditure reductions. Most notably, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review and the cuts to overall manning levels to the armed services have brought the issue into sharp focus. Critics argue this has seriously skewed our defence posture and capability towards mammoth (and massively expensive) commitments such as upgrading and maintaining Trident and the development of new aircraft carriers.

Last month, former US defence secretary, Robert Gates, asserted that defence cuts in Britain have left the UK unable to be a ‘full partner’ in future military operations with the United States. As a result of defence cuts, Mr Gates believes that the UK no longer has ‘full-spectrum capabilities’. This, he says, will affect the UK’s ability to be a full partner and will change the dynamics of how operations are conducted in the future. His comments came in the wake of remarks by General Sir Nicholas Houghton, the Chief of the Defence Staff, who said that manpower is increasingly being perceived as an ‘overhead’ and that Britain’s defence capabilities have been ‘hollowed out’.

It is right that these cuts have been questioned in the UK. The concerns over the knock-on direct and indirect effects on local economies, and the dangers of global military over-stretch, have been well aired. At the same time, however, many have long queried the need for such a large and over-bloated defence budget, particularly when our appetite for overseas engagements in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts has greatly diminished.

The world has changed, too. Britain is certainly not the global power she once was. There is perhaps room for debate on the reasons for this relative decline, but some truths are incontrovertible. The growing focus of global power and wealth from West to East, the profound change in the nature and structure of armed conflict and the threats that we face to our national security are all factors that must enter the equation if we are to explain and account for how the world has changed and how, as a consequence, our influence has declined. Our reduced military capabilities reflect in large part the need to bear down and address our massive budget deficit and public debt. Such considerations have, as Gates himself stated, also forced spending reductions in the US.

But what is also true is that Britain is less committed in performing the role of being an acquiescent subordinate to the United States in international affairs. Widespread disquiet has also stemmed from the ubiquitous relationship that US intelligence has with Britain’s intelligence services and the close links that have existed between America’s National Security Agency (NSA) and Britain’s communications and listening posts at GCHQ in Cheltenham. In light of these considerations, it is only right and proper that the UK’s military relationship with the US be subject to re-examination.

Public ambivalence is not likely to stop there, either. It should also lead in due course to a more searching examination of Britain’s future commitment to Trident and what justifications there are in keeping a nuclear deterrent. Particularly so, given the changing political landscape in the UK and the very real prospect of Scotland (where Trident and the nuclear deterrent is housed against its will) becoming an independent nation. The referendum for Scottish independence is to be held this year in September.

It may be tempting to compare our defence capacity with what the country was able to sustain in the past and no-doubt some will rue Britain’s reduced capabilities. But the fact remains that the world has changed and with it the shifting balance of global power. It is to the future, not the past, which we should now look in how our overseas partnerships are formed. Britain’s defence arrangements will become a reflection of these changed requirements.

 

Standard