Britain, Defence, Economic, European Union, Government, Military, National Security, NATO, Politics

Defence spending and the ‘peace dividend’…

DEFENCE SPENDING

Throughout history, defence spending has always gone up and down, and has responded largely to the perceived level of threat at the time.

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War expectations were high for a so-called ‘peace dividend’. This led to the British military, along with its NATO partners, assuming they would no longer have to maintain a massive defence capability in central Europe as a bulwark against the Russians. Tank squadrons, for example, on the German plain were drastically reduced as the threat from the Russian bear showing its claws no longer existed.

This, it was generally agreed, was a good thing. There was never any shortage of other priorities on which politicians could spend otherwise huge sums of money that had previously been spent on defence.

However, the question now, according to General Sir Richard Shirreff, who recently stepped down as NATO deputy supreme commander, is whether a new and heightened level of threat should now require an increase in defence capability, and therefore defence spending.

General Shirreff is eminently qualified to make such a judgment, of that few will doubt. He has said that the dismantling of the West’s presence in mainland Europe has gone too far, leaving us vulnerable and exposed in the face of a renewed Russian threat.

The facts tend to support his case. A recent defence analyst’s report, for instance, revealed that Britain now had fewer tanks than Switzerland.

And there can be little doubt that the threat level facing mainland Europe is now significantly different to what it was a decade ago. Russia has annexed Crimea and the Kremlin is making less pretence about the fact that it is at war with Ukraine.

NATO’s primary role is to defend its members from military threat and attack. Shirreff questions whether NATO is able to perform that key function, at current strength.

Highlighting ‘the reality’, Shirreff says that NATO would be very hard-pressed and they would find it very difficult to put into the field the means required, particularly on land, to counter any form of ‘Russian adventurism’.

Undoubtedly, the signal General Shirreff gives amounts to a stark warning, and one that deserves to be the start of a serious debate.

At a time of continuing financial and economic austerity, this will be the last thing that many European political leaders will want to hear. The ‘peace dividend’ has been taken for granted for a quarter of a century. Even in Britain, following recent bloody wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have not led to a reversal in political thinking that says Britain needs fewer soldiers and fewer sophisticated weapons.

The focus of efforts in keeping the UK safe has moved away from hard power and more towards intelligence and security led measures in tackling jihadist terror groups – at home and abroad.

While this is bound to remain the key priority, the challenges being posed elsewhere by an expansionist President Putin can no longer be ignored. Putin’s threat to eastern Ukraine as well as to Western concerns over Russian interests in the Baltic States are proof enough that NATO requires and needs an adequate defence capability in dealing with challenges it could be called upon in dealing with. The security of the wider world surely depends on it.

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Britain, Defence, Europe, Foreign Affairs, Government, Military, National Security, NATO, Politics, Society, United States

Being prepared for war is essential, but war is not cheap…

ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE STUDY

A study released by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) shows that Britain’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan has cost the UK Treasury more than £29 billion. In the report, the think tank argues that the wars were “strategic blunders, spreading terrorism, drumming up resistance and increasing the opium trade”.

The conclusions, though, are controversial. For instance, the authors of the study assert that various terrorist groups would not be infiltrating Syria or threatening Britain had Saddam Hussein stayed in power. Yet, Hussein was a bloodthirsty tyrant and despot, who clearly acted as a state sponsor of terror. Tens of thousands of lives were lost, thousands more were gassed in ethnic style cleansing in northern Iraq, and Saddam Hussein would certainly have had vast stockpiles of nerve and chemical agents at his disposal left over from his 8-years war with Iran. Many of these stockpiles still remain unaccounted for. Had Hussein not been toppled he doubtless would have continued to persecute his own population. The tyrant’s bloody wars against the Kurds in the north and Arab populations of the south should never be forgotten.

Putting aside the arguments about Britain’s role in the ‘War on Terror’, one uncontroversial fact emerges from the report which is indisputable: war is not cheap. The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) has witnessed massive cuts to our Armed Forces budget. Army numbers have been drastically cut back, aircraft have been withdrawn, tank battalions diminished, and even our last aircraft carrier decommissioned. Further cuts are imminent. Many of these cuts are being justified by the theory that we would never have to engage in the variety of long-term overseas military adventures that typified our activities and engagements during the Cold War era.

Since 2001, however, we have actually been involved in two such operations at a significant cost. And within the last few days, President Barack Obama announced that he would like America to act more as part of an international coalition rather than taking unilateral action. This implies, at least, a continued British role in Western security.

The UK has to be prepared for all eventualities, and adequate contingencies should be in place. As relations with Russia continue to worsen, for example, it might prove necessary for the UK to play a part in the wider campaign of checking Vladimir Putin’s belligerence. Only last month, Britain sent four Typhoon fighter jets to the Baltics as part of a NATO deployment, a sign that the West is unwilling to allow Europe to disintegrate at the hands of the Russian president. Nobody wants a conflict, but the potential for a tough offence remains the best defence.

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China, Economic, Foreign Affairs, History, Politics, Russia, Society, United Nations, United States

The new and emerging Russia-China pact bodes ill for the United States…

GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

It was in 1972, at the height of the Cold War, when President Nixon made his impromptu (but famous) visit to China in an attempt to normalise relations with Beijing. His aim was for the United States to gain an advantage over its superpower rival, the Soviet Union. In recent days, Russia’s Vladimir Putin made his journey to China. The countries in this geopolitical strategic triangle may be the same, but their roles are far different from what they once were.

Transformation in Russia, the successor state of the former Soviet Union, has been huge. Moscow is a diminished power now and not the threat it once posed. The US, the only remaining superpower, is also in decline, at least in relative terms. But this trend in turn reflects the emergence of China, almost dormant 40 years ago, but now accepted as being a mighty global force on the world stage. China’s economy is soon expected to surpass that of the US, and many economists suggest that China’s currency poses a serious challenge to the US dollar, the world’s main currency reserve.

In the 1970s, the odd man out in the triangle was Moscow. Now, though, Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping are trying to forge an alliance that will cut the US down to size.

Symbols of intent are apparent in this new and emerging joint partnership. The launch of the current joint naval exercises, for example, was attended by both leaders. And, far more importantly, is the massive 30-year deal signed this week for the sale of Russian gas to China. This will start in 2018, but the deal also contains contractual terms which allows for substantial Chinese investment in Russia’s infrastructure. The agreement will provide a new outlet for the energy exports on which the Russian economy largely depends. More broadly, Moscow’s orientation is being seen as part of a ‘pivot to Asia’, with a focus on deepening ties with the East (rather than the West).

The driving force and logic behind this new alignment has been accentuated when we consider the sharply deteriorating relations between America and its emerging eastern superpower rivals. In the case of Moscow, the annexation of territory in Ukraine has raised tensions with the West to levels not seen since the Reagan era. Ongoing difficulties have generated a fear of a looming second Cold War, which are by no means fanciful. Mr Putin’s unconcealed ambition to restore a de facto Russian empire continues to fuel such suspicions.

China and the United States, economic and increasingly geopolitical rivals, could well be described as being at loggerheads. Notwithstanding Beijing’s perceived expansionism in South-east Asia, which has brought it into direct conflict with several close American allies in the region, this week’s announcements of unprecedented criminal indictments in the US against Chinese military officials for cyber spying has raised the political stakes even further. Not surprisingly, Beijing has referred to a major setback in relations with Washington, while simultaneously proclaiming that relations with Moscow have never been better.

In some respects, however, this Sino-Russian rapprochement may make little difference. Economically, Russia needs China far more than the other way round: not just as an export energy market, but also as a source of vital capital.

When Russia’s economy is slowing and tensions over Ukraine threaten future financing and investment by the West, having Beijing as a strategic partner could unsettle relations with the West much further. China is already increasingly supportive of Russia’s position on Ukraine and, with both countries being permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, with the right to exercise the power of veto, the prospects of resolving the crises in Syria and elsewhere seems remoter than ever. Between them, too, they could also make it even harder to secure a satisfactory nuclear deal with Iran. Whichever way we turn, the loser in this changing eternal triangle of geopolitics is the United States.

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