Tag Archives: Keir Starmer

Britain, Government, Immigration, Politics, Society

Labour’s immigration plan: language not fit for purpose

BRITAIN

IMMIGRATION policy is an important plank of any government, and the one led by Sir Keir Starmer is no exception. Laws are required to establish the terms under which migration to the UK is allowed, and to deal with the range of complexities surrounding irregular arrivals. But the decision to publish an immigration white paper (which allows for consultation) a week after Reform UK made significant gains in local elections, where Nigel Farage is riding high in national polls, is hard to defend. Rather than defusing public concerns, the PM risks playing into the hard right’s hands – and directly undermining the community cohesion he says he wants to protect.

Some of the proposed measures are reasonable. Others are not. Visa rules are complicated and ministers have identified real concerns about the way the system works. But the timing and language, particularly Sir Keir’s references to an “island of strangers” and forces “pulling our country apart”, were dreadful choices. The danger is that such rhetoric ends up reinforcing divisions and xenophobia.

Labour’s target is the opposition’s record. Starmer was right to assert that the policies of the Conservatives were a cynical disgrace. Legal migration rose from 224,000 in 2019 to a staggering level of 906,000 in 2023. Voters who were entitled to think they had opted for reduced inward migration, both in the Brexit referendum and by electing a prime minister, Boris Johnson, who vowed to “take back control” of borders, instead got a free-market experiment. While the Tories ramped up their inhumane Rwanda scheme as a distraction, employers intensified overseas recruitment as skill thresholds were lowered.

In manufacturing, transport, and engineering, the subsequent increase in foreign employees is correlated with a decline in the UK workforce and apprenticeships. The failure of this laissez-faire approach to the economy has not been limited to jobs. Living standards have stagnated, with lower rates of growth than in the eurozone and US. The Labour government is right that employers should invest in people here, as well as scouting in other countries for highly skilled workers. If it is well run, the new Labour Market Evidence Group could play a positive role in a more industrially activist government. It is good to signal a looser approach to refugees working, and reasonable to expect migrant workers’ dependants to learn English. Councils should support this.

However, the white paper, in both tone and substance, is distinctly illiberal. It uses the language of “fairness”, “integration”, and “public confidence”. And yet, its core proposals represent a consolidation of executive power, a curtailment of individual rights, and a weakening of judicial independence. These are not reforms – they are regressions.

The pledge to deport more foreign criminals speaks volumes of tabloid politics. Granting counter-terrorism-style powers to the Border Force risks stoking, not easing, fear. Cancelling social care visas on the grounds of “abuse” threatens a sector already on the brink. Raising income thresholds for those with dependants penalises lower-paid workers. And while student visas are in need of review, the real issue is the crisis in underfunding of higher education – not the students themselves.

Starmer’s anger about the Tories’ track record is justified. It harms democracy, and has helped opportunists like Nigel Farage, when parties tell voters one thing while doing another. But past mistakes do not justify present ones. Migrants have been and will remain a vital part of the UK’s labour force and student bodies. Positives that require to be reinforced loud and clear.

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Britain, China, Economic, Europe, European Union, Government, Politics, Society, United States

UK-China relations: The Brexit dilemma

BRITAIN-CHINA

Intro: Trump’s trade wars have exasperated the Eurosceptic model, which is more outdated than ever

WHEN the transatlantic alliance was more functional than now, there was never a united view of China. Beijing has always been perceived as a commercial rival and potential security threat, and a common wariness has existed. For hawks in Washington, however, the idea of an alternative superpower closing in on economic and technological parity feels existential. More dovish Europeans have been openly compromising and readier to leaven caution with engagement.

Britain has veered between the two poles. In 2015, David Cameron promised a “golden era” of open trade with China. In 2020, under pressure from the US, Boris Johnson banned Huawei, a Chinese telecoms company, from UK 5G infrastructure.

In opposition, Conservative politicians have become increasingly hawkish against Beijing. Keir Starmer’s Labour government has tilted back towards cooperation. Several Labour ministers have visited China, including the chancellor. Other ministers, including the business secretary, will go there later this year, to revive a trade commission that has been dormant since 2018. Despite being manifestly frustrated with the Chinese owners of British Steel during the recent dash to keep Scunthorpe’s blast furnaces operating, the UK government has retreated from intimations of deliberate sabotage.

At some point, a reckoning has to be made. The pursuit of economic growth and investment will inevitably come into conflict with a national security interest in keeping China at arm’s length. The question is where to draw the line. The official line is that judgment is deferred pending a Whitehall “audit” of relations with Beijing. That is due in June.

A UK government decision is also imminent on China’s status under the foreign influence registration scheme – a system for keeping tabs on international organisations and companies exercising political influence in Britain. China is not expected to be named in the “enhanced tier” of risky states, alongside Russia and Iran, but some Chinese institutions might have that designation.

Calibrating these judgments – choosing when to prioritise security over commerce – is much harder with Donald Trump in the White House. What used to be a difference of emphasis between the US and Europe looks like an irreparable fracture in the west.

Trump has started a ferocious trade war with Beijing without a convincing strategic rationale. His officials have told Europeans they will have to choose a side when it comes to vital communications technology. Yet, what we see is a US president who has become routinely aggressive in his rhetoric towards the EU, dismissive of NATO, and reliably emollient towards Putin’s Russia.

From that pattern it is clear in Brussels and other continental capitals that Washington is no longer a reliable ally and the trajectory must be “strategic autonomy” for Europe. That is changing the calculus of risk and potential benefit from a more pragmatic China policy. The authoritarian character of Xi Jinping’s regime hasn’t changed, but it presents itself as a more predictable force in international affairs while US democracy declines in harsh and sporadic spasms.

Such changes illuminate a crisis of international orientation for Britain that has been building since Brexit. Economic detachment from Europe was promised on a model of the UK as a lone sovereign agent in an open, free-trading globalised world. That concept has aged very poorly, and it stands more of an outdated concept now than it ever has. Britain is not alone in struggling to navigate relations with China in the turbulent new geopolitical climate, but choosing loneliness and isolation in a world of rival continental blocks is making the struggle much harder.

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Britain, Economic, Government, International trade, Politics, Society, United States

UK-US trade deal: Parliament must vote on any agreement

TRADE DEAL

Intro: Abolishing tariffs would be welcome for UK firms, but not at the price of reducing high regulatory standards or a reset with the European Union

LOOKED at dispassionately and objectively, a bilateral trade agreement between Britain and the United States is of relatively small economic significance to this country. Even ardent supporters of UK-US relations will find it difficult to argue otherwise. Back in 2020, for instance, Boris Johnson’s government estimated that a US deal “could increase UK GDP in the long run by around 0.07%” – a statistical calculation that is not exactly transformative. The view touted by some Brexiters that a US trade deal would fire up the entire British economy was always fantastical. Based on the assumption of a yearning for deregulation, there was little public support, even among leave voters themselves. Any urge of that kind now is even more delusional, in the wake of Donald Trump’s tariff wars.

The deregulatory alarm is hopefully a thing of the past. But global trade has new traumas too. Trump’s protectionist policies and bullying of US rivals are resetting the terms. There are nevertheless specific reasons why it is in Britain’s interest to pursue free trade talks with the US. Chief among these is the direct threat posed by current tariffs, especially on cars and pharmaceuticals. There is also the distinct prospect that a 10% tariff will be re-imposed on all UK exports to the US after the current 90-day pause ends in July.

The problem with any trade deal lies with the prices that the US may try to extract for tariff reductions or exemptions. And while the U.S. vice-president, J.D. Vance, has said that he sees a “good chance” of a deal, this could still be contingent on UK concessions in sectors such as agriculture, sanitary rules, and digital regulation. These are the same sectors that, for good reason, proved to be stumbling blocks in the post-Brexit discussions. Efforts to rebrand things like AI, biotech, and digital infrastructure, as strategically vital industries of the future, do not dispel some real threats now facing British food standards, healthcare, or online controls.

All this is multiplied by the Trump administration’s unreliability and geostrategic approach. Trump’s policy in Europe is to weaken and destroy the EU. Urged on by right-wing Brexiter politicians, the president sees pulling Britain away from the EU’s orbit as part of that effort. So, however, does the EU. As a result, any attempt by Washington to offer generous terms to the UK in particular sectors is likely to make any reset with the EU far more problematic. Sir Keir Starmer says that Britain does not need to make an either/or choice. Insisting that Britain can have its cake and eat it, that’s hardly the brutal reality being faced; neither the US nor the EU will necessarily take the same generous view that Starmer holds.

Even if the prospective UK-US deal is less wide-ranging than it once might have been, it is still significant. Politically, the Trump factor also makes any such deal more explosive. UK treaties and international trade deals are traditionally delivered under prerogative powers. As the Brexit argument about a “meaningful vote” showed, there is a very limited role for parliament. That needs to change. It would be intolerable in the UK-US case. This is clearly a matter for parliament to debate, both during and after negotiations, and for both houses of parliament to vote on.

In recent days, the Labour chairs of the Commons foreign affairs and trade select committees called for such votes. The Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National Party are both in favour. The UK government should make clear that no agreement will go ahead without a meaningful Commons vote in favour. Democracy cannot be usurped on this issue.

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