Tag Archives: Keir Starmer

Britain, China, Economic, Europe, European Union, Government, Politics, Society, United States

UK-China relations: The Brexit dilemma

BRITAIN-CHINA

Intro: Trump’s trade wars have exasperated the Eurosceptic model, which is more outdated than ever

WHEN the transatlantic alliance was more functional than now, there was never a united view of China. Beijing has always been perceived as a commercial rival and potential security threat, and a common wariness has existed. For hawks in Washington, however, the idea of an alternative superpower closing in on economic and technological parity feels existential. More dovish Europeans have been openly compromising and readier to leaven caution with engagement.

Britain has veered between the two poles. In 2015, David Cameron promised a “golden era” of open trade with China. In 2020, under pressure from the US, Boris Johnson banned Huawei, a Chinese telecoms company, from UK 5G infrastructure.

In opposition, Conservative politicians have become increasingly hawkish against Beijing. Keir Starmer’s Labour government has tilted back towards cooperation. Several Labour ministers have visited China, including the chancellor. Other ministers, including the business secretary, will go there later this year, to revive a trade commission that has been dormant since 2018. Despite being manifestly frustrated with the Chinese owners of British Steel during the recent dash to keep Scunthorpe’s blast furnaces operating, the UK government has retreated from intimations of deliberate sabotage.

At some point, a reckoning has to be made. The pursuit of economic growth and investment will inevitably come into conflict with a national security interest in keeping China at arm’s length. The question is where to draw the line. The official line is that judgment is deferred pending a Whitehall “audit” of relations with Beijing. That is due in June.

A UK government decision is also imminent on China’s status under the foreign influence registration scheme – a system for keeping tabs on international organisations and companies exercising political influence in Britain. China is not expected to be named in the “enhanced tier” of risky states, alongside Russia and Iran, but some Chinese institutions might have that designation.

Calibrating these judgments – choosing when to prioritise security over commerce – is much harder with Donald Trump in the White House. What used to be a difference of emphasis between the US and Europe looks like an irreparable fracture in the west.

Trump has started a ferocious trade war with Beijing without a convincing strategic rationale. His officials have told Europeans they will have to choose a side when it comes to vital communications technology. Yet, what we see is a US president who has become routinely aggressive in his rhetoric towards the EU, dismissive of NATO, and reliably emollient towards Putin’s Russia.

From that pattern it is clear in Brussels and other continental capitals that Washington is no longer a reliable ally and the trajectory must be “strategic autonomy” for Europe. That is changing the calculus of risk and potential benefit from a more pragmatic China policy. The authoritarian character of Xi Jinping’s regime hasn’t changed, but it presents itself as a more predictable force in international affairs while US democracy declines in harsh and sporadic spasms.

Such changes illuminate a crisis of international orientation for Britain that has been building since Brexit. Economic detachment from Europe was promised on a model of the UK as a lone sovereign agent in an open, free-trading globalised world. That concept has aged very poorly, and it stands more of an outdated concept now than it ever has. Britain is not alone in struggling to navigate relations with China in the turbulent new geopolitical climate, but choosing loneliness and isolation in a world of rival continental blocks is making the struggle much harder.

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Britain, Economic, Government, International trade, Politics, Society, United States

UK-US trade deal: Parliament must vote on any agreement

TRADE DEAL

Intro: Abolishing tariffs would be welcome for UK firms, but not at the price of reducing high regulatory standards or a reset with the European Union

LOOKED at dispassionately and objectively, a bilateral trade agreement between Britain and the United States is of relatively small economic significance to this country. Even ardent supporters of UK-US relations will find it difficult to argue otherwise. Back in 2020, for instance, Boris Johnson’s government estimated that a US deal “could increase UK GDP in the long run by around 0.07%” – a statistical calculation that is not exactly transformative. The view touted by some Brexiters that a US trade deal would fire up the entire British economy was always fantastical. Based on the assumption of a yearning for deregulation, there was little public support, even among leave voters themselves. Any urge of that kind now is even more delusional, in the wake of Donald Trump’s tariff wars.

The deregulatory alarm is hopefully a thing of the past. But global trade has new traumas too. Trump’s protectionist policies and bullying of US rivals are resetting the terms. There are nevertheless specific reasons why it is in Britain’s interest to pursue free trade talks with the US. Chief among these is the direct threat posed by current tariffs, especially on cars and pharmaceuticals. There is also the distinct prospect that a 10% tariff will be re-imposed on all UK exports to the US after the current 90-day pause ends in July.

The problem with any trade deal lies with the prices that the US may try to extract for tariff reductions or exemptions. And while the U.S. vice-president, J.D. Vance, has said that he sees a “good chance” of a deal, this could still be contingent on UK concessions in sectors such as agriculture, sanitary rules, and digital regulation. These are the same sectors that, for good reason, proved to be stumbling blocks in the post-Brexit discussions. Efforts to rebrand things like AI, biotech, and digital infrastructure, as strategically vital industries of the future, do not dispel some real threats now facing British food standards, healthcare, or online controls.

All this is multiplied by the Trump administration’s unreliability and geostrategic approach. Trump’s policy in Europe is to weaken and destroy the EU. Urged on by right-wing Brexiter politicians, the president sees pulling Britain away from the EU’s orbit as part of that effort. So, however, does the EU. As a result, any attempt by Washington to offer generous terms to the UK in particular sectors is likely to make any reset with the EU far more problematic. Sir Keir Starmer says that Britain does not need to make an either/or choice. Insisting that Britain can have its cake and eat it, that’s hardly the brutal reality being faced; neither the US nor the EU will necessarily take the same generous view that Starmer holds.

Even if the prospective UK-US deal is less wide-ranging than it once might have been, it is still significant. Politically, the Trump factor also makes any such deal more explosive. UK treaties and international trade deals are traditionally delivered under prerogative powers. As the Brexit argument about a “meaningful vote” showed, there is a very limited role for parliament. That needs to change. It would be intolerable in the UK-US case. This is clearly a matter for parliament to debate, both during and after negotiations, and for both houses of parliament to vote on.

In recent days, the Labour chairs of the Commons foreign affairs and trade select committees called for such votes. The Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National Party are both in favour. The UK government should make clear that no agreement will go ahead without a meaningful Commons vote in favour. Democracy cannot be usurped on this issue.

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Britain, Economic, Government, International trade, Politics, United States

US tariffs: a show of coercive control

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Intro: President Trump is wielding tariffs not as a policy tool but as an instrument of political pressure – rewarding loyalty and punishing defiance

THERE is a growing consensus that Donald Trump is embodying the French philosophy of Michel Foucault in that “politics is the continuation of war by other means”. Nowhere is this more apparent than his penchant for tariffs. He presents taxing foreign imports as a way to rebuild the American economy in favour of those workers left behind by free trade and globalisation. Quite clearly, he thinks that politics is not about truth or justice. It is about leverage and supremacy.

The UK is learning first-hand that Mr Trump, with his way of dealing and taste for spectacle, is an accidental Foucauldian – using tariffs as tools of loyalty and dominance, even against allies. If the U.S. follows through on Mr Trump’s threat to impose a 20% tariff on all imports, UK growth will suffer. The effect depends on the response. If the UK decided to do nothing that would mean GDP being 0.4% lower this year and 0.6% next. A global trade war would push that to 0.6% and 1%. Either outcome would wipe out the government’s fiscal headroom. The shrinking margins of the UK’s fiscal rules is making policymakers nervous. Trump sees no need to cloak power in objectivity.

His rationale and logic for imposing tariffs is confused. But two things are discernible. One is his self-styled image as the ultimate dealmaker; the man who can turn any situation to his advantage. The other is his view of politics as a means of structuring society to favour one group over another – not just economically, but in terms of legitimacy and who defines reality. Tariffs will probably be lifted if nations accede to Mr Trump’s wishes and, in doing so, reward politically useful constituencies, big tech allies, or his wealthy donors.

All three of these are visible in a paper-thin UK-US “economic deal”, likely to result in the lifting of Trump’s tariffs – if the US signs it. And, if so, that would further open British markets to US agribusiness; end the digital services tax, which applies to companies such as Amazon and Google; and make it difficult to hold AI companies, like those owned by Mr Trump’s ally Elon Musk, liable for harm. The danger is that whenever there’s a grievance, Mr Trump threatens tariffs – then offers to lift them if you do what he wants.

It’s even more blatant with the EU, which is expected to fine Apple and Meta under its digital competition rules. Regulation looks certain to become another front in the trade war. And that is troubling Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg.

What makes Mr Trump’s “Liberation Day” so dangerous is its scale. In 2024, the US ran a $1.2tn trade goods deficit. Just two months into his White House return, Mr Trump has imposed tariffs on goods from Canada, Mexico, China, all steel and aluminium imports, and foreign cars and auto parts. Asia will be next, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, and Vietnam.

What emerges is less of a trade policy than performance politics – where coercion, loyalty, and theatre converge. This is Foucault philosophy in action: power exercised not through rules, but through disruption and dealmaking that rewards fealty and punishes defiance. Like many others around the world, Britain is navigating a battlefield. Trump is no student of Foucault but he seems to grasp the lesson. For him, war isn’t the alternative to politics. It is politics.

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