Tag Archives: Xi Jinping

Defence, National Security, Nuclear Weapons

Fears of a more dangerous Cold War

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Intro: As weapons limits expire, the scene is set for a new nuclear arms race between the US and Beijing

Around midday on October 30, 1961, a Soviet plane flying above the Arctic archipelago of Novaya Zemlya dropped the most powerful nuclear bomb ever created.

The USSR’s “emperor bomb” was 3,000-times more powerful than the US atomic attack that killed 140,000 people in Hiroshima two decades earlier. On explosion, it unleashed a six-mile-wide fireball and a mushroom cloud that loomed more than 40 miles into the sky. And the Soviets were testing it at only half of its designed capacity.

Since then, decades of negotiations and arms-control treaties have massively reduced American and Russian warhead arsenals, with neither side testing a nuclear bomb in more than three decades.

But the last of these bilateral agreements has expired – and, with it, hopes that the nuclear arms race had been consigned to the history books.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which capped the number of deployed nuclear warheads held by the US and Russia, has now come to an end.

It is the first time since the 1970s that the two powers have had no agreement in place without at least negotiations for a new treaty under way.

At a time of huge geopolitical upheaval, analysts and diplomats are concerned that the stage is set for a new nuclear arms race – one that could prove even more dangerous than the world has seen before.

This is because the competition will not just be confined to Russia and the US.

China has also been developing nuclear weapons at a startling trajectory. It has more than doubled its stockpile of warheads over the last six years.

A three-way race will be hugely destabilising for the world order. If America tries to build an arsenal large enough to deter its twin foes at once, it will spur an even more dramatic increase in their respective stockpiles.

The director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), says that although this is the end of an era, it is not the end of arms control “but it is definitely the end of arms control as we know it.”

Smaller nuclear powers such as Britain and France will also face pressure to bulk up, particularly at a time when US security guarantees feel less reliable. And there will likely be a proliferation of new nuclear states.

Donald Trump has insisted for decades that he wants denuclearisation. But he seems to have no strategy in delivering this. His plans to build a new missile defence system – which he refers to as the “Golden Dome” – are only fanning the flames.

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Britain, China, Economic, Europe, European Union, Government, Politics, Society, United States

UK-China relations: The Brexit dilemma

BRITAIN-CHINA

Intro: Trump’s trade wars have exasperated the Eurosceptic model, which is more outdated than ever

WHEN the transatlantic alliance was more functional than now, there was never a united view of China. Beijing has always been perceived as a commercial rival and potential security threat, and a common wariness has existed. For hawks in Washington, however, the idea of an alternative superpower closing in on economic and technological parity feels existential. More dovish Europeans have been openly compromising and readier to leaven caution with engagement.

Britain has veered between the two poles. In 2015, David Cameron promised a “golden era” of open trade with China. In 2020, under pressure from the US, Boris Johnson banned Huawei, a Chinese telecoms company, from UK 5G infrastructure.

In opposition, Conservative politicians have become increasingly hawkish against Beijing. Keir Starmer’s Labour government has tilted back towards cooperation. Several Labour ministers have visited China, including the chancellor. Other ministers, including the business secretary, will go there later this year, to revive a trade commission that has been dormant since 2018. Despite being manifestly frustrated with the Chinese owners of British Steel during the recent dash to keep Scunthorpe’s blast furnaces operating, the UK government has retreated from intimations of deliberate sabotage.

At some point, a reckoning has to be made. The pursuit of economic growth and investment will inevitably come into conflict with a national security interest in keeping China at arm’s length. The question is where to draw the line. The official line is that judgment is deferred pending a Whitehall “audit” of relations with Beijing. That is due in June.

A UK government decision is also imminent on China’s status under the foreign influence registration scheme – a system for keeping tabs on international organisations and companies exercising political influence in Britain. China is not expected to be named in the “enhanced tier” of risky states, alongside Russia and Iran, but some Chinese institutions might have that designation.

Calibrating these judgments – choosing when to prioritise security over commerce – is much harder with Donald Trump in the White House. What used to be a difference of emphasis between the US and Europe looks like an irreparable fracture in the west.

Trump has started a ferocious trade war with Beijing without a convincing strategic rationale. His officials have told Europeans they will have to choose a side when it comes to vital communications technology. Yet, what we see is a US president who has become routinely aggressive in his rhetoric towards the EU, dismissive of NATO, and reliably emollient towards Putin’s Russia.

From that pattern it is clear in Brussels and other continental capitals that Washington is no longer a reliable ally and the trajectory must be “strategic autonomy” for Europe. That is changing the calculus of risk and potential benefit from a more pragmatic China policy. The authoritarian character of Xi Jinping’s regime hasn’t changed, but it presents itself as a more predictable force in international affairs while US democracy declines in harsh and sporadic spasms.

Such changes illuminate a crisis of international orientation for Britain that has been building since Brexit. Economic detachment from Europe was promised on a model of the UK as a lone sovereign agent in an open, free-trading globalised world. That concept has aged very poorly, and it stands more of an outdated concept now than it ever has. Britain is not alone in struggling to navigate relations with China in the turbulent new geopolitical climate, but choosing loneliness and isolation in a world of rival continental blocks is making the struggle much harder.

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China, Economic, Government, International trade, Politics, Society, United States

Global trade war: America is advancing its own decline

ECONOMIC

Intro: China is braced for economic turbulence due to swingeing tariffs. But it sees an opportunity by taking the longer-term view: a decline in US hegemony 

THERE can be no winners in Donald Trump’s ferocious trade war that he has unleashed, least of all among consumers and workers. In strongarm tactics, this has become a game of who can bear more pain. And because trade is at the heart of US ties with its biggest tariff target, China, the rest of the bilateral relationship is likely to deteriorate. That too is concerning.

Yet, paradoxically, despite the economic struggles of recent years, China may see a longer-term opportunity in the current crisis. Beijing’s response to the initial US tariff announcements was measured. Now it vows to “fight to the end” and has imposed an additional 50% tariff on US goods – taking total tax charges to 84% – in retaliation for reciprocated tariffs that Mr Trump now says will hit 125%.

Such an approach is unlikely to falter first. Any concessions would likely be taken as a sign of weakness, encouraging the US to ramp up the pressure even more. Xi Jinping is also a strongman who has dialled up nationalism as economic growth has slowed. Backing down would be humiliating, especially when the US vice-president, JD Vance, speaks dismissively of “Chinese peasants”.

Beijing is already allowing the yuan to weaken, but a major devaluation in the currency is thought unlikely. It has been preparing for this moment. China’s demographic boom is at an end, Mr Xi’s new vision for his nation, the impact of the pandemic, Donald Trump’s first term in office, and US bipartisanship have all turned against China in reshaping the world economy. But China has diversified in areas such as agricultural imports and found new markets for its goods – though exports to the US still account for just under 3% of its GDP. In recent weeks, it announced plans to “vigorously boost” domestic consumption, although previous action on that long-held ambition has not matched the rhetoric.

Mr Trump’s sudden announcement that he is suspending punitive tariffs on other countries for 90 days highlights an apparent underlying intention to make them distance themselves from China and stop them being used as a conduit for its goods. Still, if he goes ahead, high rates risk pushing them towards Beijing instead. Trump’s erratic policy may also reflect growing anxieties about the impact of those tariffs, not least among his own supporters. China is quietly confident that the U.S. will come under growing pressure to rethink from billionaire backers, ageing workers worried that their retirement funds are losing value, farmers, employees fearing for their jobs, and consumers contemplating higher prices in everyday consumables. A bilateral deal is not impossible, but sense needs to be restored.

Beijing does not like what lies ahead. But in the longer term, it has more confidence in its trajectory. It looks back to the 2008 financial crisis, when it “saved the world” with its massive stimulus package, and looks ahead now with emboldened self-assurance following its launch in January of its AI DeepSeek platform.

Above all, Beijing believes that when this storm has passed, few will regard the US as a dependable economic or security guarantor, with China becoming a more predictable and likeable partner. At February’s Munich security conference – where Mr Vance’s sneering attacks on European allies made the headlines – China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, pledged that China would be “a steadfast constructive force” and “factor of certainty in this multipolar system”. Some countries may feel forced to live with Beijing’s own trade and investment restrictions, and its use of economic coercion for political purposes. But others may simply drift from America’s orbit.

China expects to suffer, but as it watches on it will not be entirely unhappy as the US advances its own decline.

This is a transformational moment in the global order.

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